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Abstract  
Essays on the Law of One Price in Financial Markets and the Recent 
Financial Crisis  
by  
 
IGOR SORKIN 
Advisor: Professor Merih Uctum 
Essay 1: The theory of the Law of One Price (LOOP) is one of the most important theories in 
International Economics. I use financial markets to revisit the validity of the LOOP in the short 
run, and then extend the analysis into the long-run to examine whether events such as the 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 can lead to the failure of the LOOP or worsen deviations from it. 
Using the data on Canadian companies cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange, I find 
strong support that the LOOP holds in a cross-sectional framework despite the fact that the 
sample includes a highly volatile period. This is in contrast to the consensus in the literature that 
the LOOP is observed as a long-term phenomenon. However, in the long run the relative Law of 
One Price holds for only a third of the stocks individually. Moreover, it fails when the aggregate 
portfolio is considered, creating a major contradiction to the cross-sectional results. Another 
finding is that the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 had a significant and persistent effect by 
increasing the deviations from the law. 
 
Essay 2: This paper studies effects of the shocks to an exchange rate on the behavior of prices of 
cross-listed shares during the financial crisis of 2008. Using a sample of Canadian firms listed on 
v 
 
the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), I test the validity of 
the LOOP and estimate the speed at which the difference between the prices on the markets 
reverts to the equilibrium, i.e. the $C/$US exchange rate. Findings include: a) Despite the 
financial crisis, the relative prices and the exchange rate are cointegrated, and the LOOP holds as 
a long run relationship; b) the adjustment to an exchange rate shock is faster relative to other 
findings in literature; c) measures of prevalent geographical trading location and relative 
liquidity show importance of both, home and foreign markets, in restoring the equilibrium during 
the crisis. 
 
Essay 3: This paper investigates the role that the local and foreign macroeconomic news 
announcements and surprises play in the dynamics of the convergence to the law of one price 
during the recent financial crisis.  We use Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and employ a vector error-
correction model that incorporates a large panel of both Canadian and U.S. news releases. We 
find that regardless of the specification, both announcements and surprises in macroeconomic 
indicators increase the speed of convergence to the law of one price and half-life by 3% and 
15%, respectively. Furthermore, we investigate the cross-sectional dispersion in the reaction of 
stocks to news releases and find that liquidity, listing duration, and industry dummies are 
significant factors determining reaction of stocks to different type of news. 
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Chapter 1  
The Law of One Price and the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the U.S. and the 
Canadian Equity Markets 
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1. Introduction 
 The theory of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is one the oldest and most 
fundamental concepts in economics. According to Taylor and Taylor (2004), the official roots of 
the theory go back to the beginning of the 20
th
 century, and the implicit idea was born even 
earlier. Under PPP, the aggregate price levels should be the same across countries once 
converted to a common currency.  The implication of the theory is widely used in the economics 
literature to analyze and predict movements of the exchange rates. The so called law of one price 
is a reduced version of, and an integral part of, PPP theory.  Instead of looking at the aggregate 
price levels, the LOOP states that taken on an individual level, the prices of homogenous goods 
should be the same in spatially separated markets once converted to common currency.  
 The logic behind the law is simple: if the LOOP doesn’t hold, there would exist an 
opportunity of a riskless profit through arbitrage. In other words, the goods could be shipped 
from locations where the price is low to locations where the price is high. However, in practice, 
it is often observed that prices of similar goods fail to be the same across countries. This 
contradicts the idea of arbitrage that drives the LOOP and is a signal of incomplete market 
integration. One reason why the prices of homogenous goods may fail to equalize across 
different countries is the presence of significant transaction costs, and barriers to trade such as 
tariffs or quotas. When cross-listed equity stocks are considered though, most if not all of these 
costs may disappear, creating a convenient environment for testing the LOOP.  
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
theory and literature behind the LOOP. Section 3 describes the short-run analysis and results 
while the long-run model, methodology, and results are covered in section 4. Some concluding 
remarks are presented in section 5. 
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2. Theoretical and Econometric Background 
 
2.1  Absolute vs. Relative PPP 
 The Purchasing Power Theory and the LOOP have two versions, absolute PPP and 
relative PPP. The absolute version examines the aggregate price levels, while the relative version 
examines the changes in aggregate price levels over time.  In its original form, the absolute PPP 
can be expressed as follows
1
: 
  
    
                     (1)
 
Where   
  and   
 
 are domestic and foreign price levels respectively and    is the price of the 
foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. If equation 1 does not hold, then an arbitrage 
opportunity exists. 
 The relative version of the law instead, examines the relative percentage changes 
over time. Mathematically, it is expressed in the following way:  
    
       
                     (1*) 
 
2.2  The Early Work and OLS 
To get a general regression equation form, two steps should be taken. First, define   
        
   
  
        
   and            . Second, add the white noise error   , so equation (1) becomes: 
  
         
                         (2) 
Equation 2 represents the original version of the absolute PPP models that were empirically 
tested. To test whether the absolute PPP holds, the joint hypothesis of                  
                                                          
1
 Since PPP concentrates on an aggregate price level, it can be thought of as a sum of individual goods for which 
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is tested and if the hypothesis fails to be rejected, the conclusion prevails that absolute PPP 
holds. However, for particular situations, a reverse causality problem may exist between 
  
  and   
 
, therefore, a new variable 
      
     
  is defined, and in the amended model,               , test jointly    
          . 
 Early studies (Isard, 1977; Richardson, 1978 and Giovannini, 1988)
2
 have shown that the 
relationship fails. Furthermore, the deviations from the LOOP are significant and 
-
highly volatile. 
Since then the law of one price was mostly considered a long-term phenomenon and the cross-
sectional analysis had been abandoned by the scholars. As an exception, Gluschenko (2004) 
analyzed changes in the Russian goods market integration through a cross-sectional analysis of 
the LOOP. But even though he found improved integration over the years, price dispersion was 
still significant and the law failed to hold. The reasons for this failure have been extensively 
analyzed in the international trade, international macroeconomics and finance literatures. One 
reason, which has spawned a use of one of two new and dominant methodologies in the modern 
literature, follows the idea that prices of homogeneous commodities may not be the same across 
different countries due to the existence of transaction costs in international arbitrage (Heckscher, 
1916). If two homogeneous goods are sold at different prices (once expressed in the same 
currency) in two locations, the LOOP does not hold because it will not be worth arbitraging if the 
anticipated benefit exceeds the transport costs between the two locations.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 
 
Additional list of works that test the given and amended models, with different conclusions, includes Cumby 
(1996), Engel, Hendrickson and Rogers (1997), Frankel and Rose (1996), Papell (1997), O'Connell and Wei (1997), 
Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), and Parsley and Wei (1996). Froot and Rogoff (1995), and Taylor and Taylor (2004) 
provide an overview of the literature. 
 
-5- 
 
2.3  The Evolution of Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) Models in PPP Literature
3
 
 Because of the original failure of the PPP relationship to hold, a new theoretical 
framework began to be formalized in the late 1980s and early 1990s that concentrated on 
nonlinearities in international trade arbitrage as a result of the transaction costs.
4
 In these studies, 
transaction costs, such as transport costs, were treated as a waste of resources – if a unit of a 
good is shipped from one location to another, a fraction is ‘destroyed’ on the way so only a 
portion of it arrives. These costs, therefore, create a band of inaction within which the marginal 
benefit from arbitrage is lower than the marginal cost of arbitrage. Hence, the no-arbitrage zone 
is extended from any deviation from the LOOP to a zone that includes the transaction costs. This 
allows the prices in different locations to be different to some extent. 
 Transport costs are obviously not the only type of transaction costs. The role of trade 
barriers such as tariffs and quotas were examined as well. The empirical evidence, though, offers 
mixed findings on its relevance to explain deviations from the LOOP. Knetter (1994), for 
example, argues that nontariff barriers are important empirically to explain deviations from PPP. 
In contrast, Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) do not find nontariff barriers to be of significance. 
 Overall, these frictions can create a wedge between the prices or price levels of different 
countries and the estimated transaction costs band may be wider than the one implied by 
transport costs. This was considered by Dumas (1992). The findings were that in the presence of 
sunk costs and random productivity shocks, trade takes place only when there are sufficiently 
large arbitrage opportunities. When this happens, the real exchange rate has mean-reverting 
properties.  
                                                          
3
 The information on TAR models is based on Juvenal and Taylor (2008)
 
4
 Williams and Wright, 1991; Dumas,1992; Sercu et al., 1995 
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 O’Connell and Wei (2002) extended the analysis further by using a broader interpretation 
of market frictions operating at the level of technology and preferences. They also allow for 
fixed and proportional market frictions. When both of these types of costs are present, they find 
that two bands for arbitrage are generated. The arbitrage is strong when the benefit is high 
enough to outweigh fixed cost. In the presence of proportional market frictions, the adjustments 
are small, and they don’t allow deviations from the LOOP to grow, nor do they allow deviations 
to disappear completely. 
 These studies, in which the bands for no-arbitrage zones are estimated, use the TAR 
framework. Recent works that use TAR models to analyze deviations from the LOOP and PPP 
include Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Taylor (2001), Imbs et al. (2003), Sarno, Taylor and 
Chowdhury (2004) and Juvenal and Taylor (2008). In general, using different aggregated and 
disaggregated goods and sectors, these works find supportive evidence of the LOOP when non-
linear adjustments are allowed. Mean reversion takes place when LOOP deviations are large 
enough for arbitrage to be profitable (Juvenal and Taylor, 2008). 
 There are, however, a few problems that TAR models fail to address. Taylor, Peel and 
Sarno (2001) and Taylor and Taylor (2004) note that even though the model is appealing for 
individual goods context, it might not be appropriate in the aggregate context. The reason is that 
the transaction costs may differ across sectors, and consequently the speed of arbitrage may 
differ across goods, thus creating an unclear effect on an aggregate level. In related work, Imbs, 
Mumtaz, Ravn, and Rey (2005) argue that previous empirical work on real effective exchange 
rates significantly understates the persistence of price deviations from PPP due to the presence of 
an aggregation bias, a finding that highlights the need to test convergence to PPP based on the 
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prices of single (identical) products. Another problem is that “mean reversion thus does not 
imply reversion to Absolute PPP” (Haskel and Wolf, 2005) 
 
2.4  VECM Models 
 Taylor and Taylor (2004) review early empirical works on PPP and remark that 
although the short-run tests of absolute version of the law failed, there was strong evidence for 
the long-run validity of it. However, with the development of time-series econometrics, Ardeni 
(1989) invalidated the long-run results by showing the presence of a unit root in prices. He 
argued that with the presence of a unit root, the assumptions of the classical model are violated 
because each series follows a random-walk, therefore creating flawed estimates and spurious 
regression. Since then, another traditional approach has been the use of cointegration analysis 
and VECM models.  
 These models focus on two factors. First, the model tests whether, over time, there is 
a convergence to the LOOP. The second emphasis is on the speed of convergence, assuming the 
evidence for convergence has been found in the first place. Until mid 1990s, “there was little 
evidence in favor of convergence” (Goldberg and Verboven 2005). Since then, however, with the 
exploitation of longer time-series data sets (Taylor 2001) and improvements in methodology 
(Taylor 2002) new evidence has surfaced in favor of the convergence.  
 Rogoff (1996), instead of concentrating on convergence itself, analyzed the speed of 
convergence to the LOOP.
5 
 He noted that a general consensus on the speed of convergence was 
a half-life of 3-5 years.
6
 Such slow speed of convergence led to the Rogoff puzzle. Because in 
general there is a much quicker adjustment to shocks of nominal variables Rogoff (1996) stated : 
                                                          
5
 If there is a convergence in the first place. 
6
 For detailed discussion see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). 
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“The purchasing power parity puzzle then is this: How can one reconcile the enormous short 
term volatility of real exchange rates with the extremely slow rate at which shocks appear to 
damp out?”.   
 
A few attempts have been made at solving the puzzle;
7
 however no particular 
consensus has been reached. Goldberg and Verboven (2005) attempted to shed light on which 
actions could be efficient to improve market integration as they found a significantly lower half-
life of 1.3 years using European car prices, but in the end they warn that the results are heavily 
dependent on the market itself. At the same time, Taylor and Taylor (2004) advocated non-
linearity and use of TAR models. In fact, Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn, and Rey (2003) show that this 
non-linearity in the relationship leads to understating the convergence speed when estimated 
using linear models.
 
 Since then, TAR models have become a predominant methodology in recent 
economic literature that involves testing for the LOOP and PPP
8
, while the usage of VECM has 
been gradually introduced into the financial literature, where price discovery and the effect of 
financial controls were analyzed with the use of LOOP, although the usage of TAR models is 
gaining traction as well.
9
 
 
2.5  Law of One Price in the Financial Literature 
 The concept of the LOOP is one of the cornerstones the international finance theory 
textbooks are based on. The outcome of the LOOP, if it indeed holds, is non-existence of 
arbitrage opportunities. The absence of any arbitrage opportunities, in its turn, is the premise on 
                                                          
7
 Parsley and Wei (1996), Engel and Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (2001), Goldberg and Verboven (2005) 
8
 In recent years, panel estimation techniques have become very popular. A full literature review and application of 
panel estimation techniques to the same dataset is the focus of the forthcoming separate paper. 
9
 For example see Yeyati, Schmukler and Van Horen (2009). 
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which the efficient market hypothesis rests. Therefore, the validity of the LOOP is highly 
important for the financial markets. 
 There are a few main streams in financial literature that make use of the LOOP 
concept. One of them studies financial integration by testing the validity of the LOOP in capital 
markets. Akram, Rime and Sarno (2009), for example, examine the frequency, size and duration 
of inter-market price differentials for borrowing and lending services. Even though they test for 
the interest rate parity (IRP), the criteria are related to the LOOP group to the extent that they 
focus on the analysis of onshore-offshore return differentials. Another recent example is Yeyati, 
Schmukler and Van Horen (2009), who use cross-market premium to assess financial 
integration.
10,11 
Another stream that uses the LOOP extensively focuses on price discovery. The 
logic of the LOOP is used in the following way: as prices of the same asset change on separate 
markets, both markets adjust to return to the LOOP.
12 
In this stream of literature however, the 
focus is not on the validity of the LOOP as a concept.  
 
2.6  Summary   
 The theoretical and empirical work on the LOOP/PPP has been vast and multi-
dimensional. However, there doesn’t seem to be a particular consensus on the topic. Taylor and 
Taylor (2004) conclude as their consensus: “short-run PPP does not hold, and the long-run PPP 
may hold in the sense that there is significant mean reversion of the real exchange rate.” The 
problem that I see with this consensus, however, is that conclusion for the LOOP is gloomy. The 
findings in the economics literature have completely invalidated the absolute version of the 
                                                          
10
 The original working paper by the authors was available in 2006, in which the prime purpose was to test LOOP, 
but in the published version the focus shifted to analysis of liquidity and capital controls effects. 
11
 A few other examples are Yan, Wells and Fellmingham (2006), and Hearn and Piesse (2009). 
12
 See Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Gramming, Melvin and Schlag (2005). 
-10- 
 
LOOP, and even though the methodological innovations (such as TAR models) test relative 
version of the law relatively successfully, the end result still allows for a certain range within 
which the prices of the same good may vary. That invalidates the original form of the law.  
However, the types of goods/indices that are used in economics literature usually 
automatically exhibit the problems of transaction costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
absolute LOOP fails and complex models have to be used to test the convergence. Capital 
markets present a much more attractive area for tests of the LOOP. Assets like cross-listed stocks 
represent exactly the same good, can be traded simultaneously
13 
and the information in most 
cases is easily found. Financial assets, however, are not studied in economics literature in the 
context of the LOOP. 
 Cross-listed stocks are widely used in the financial literature, but the focal point is 
not the LOOP.
14 
The literature does not draw a conclusion on the validity of the law itself, but 
mostly uses it (or a methodology consistent with the LOOP) for other purposes. Therefore, there 
seems to be a gap between the economics literature where the center of attention is on the LOOP 
but the type of goods presents a problem, and financial literature, where the conditions for testing 
the LOOP seem to be ideal but there is a different focus.  
 The approach and concentration of this paper differs from previous literature in the 
following ways. First, I use financial assets with a focus on the LOOP. Second, I examine 
whether financial crises has an effect on the LOOP. 
 
 
                                                          
13
 If trading hours coincide. 
14
 For example, the shift in focus from testing the validity of the LOOP to testing the effect of capital controls by 
Yeyati, Schmukler and Van Horen from their original working paper (2006) to the published one (2009) seems to 
suggest that claim. 
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3. Short-Run Analysis 
 
3.1  Data Description 
 The data for this study uses a sample of 54 Canadian companies that are trading on both 
the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The advantages 
of using these particular markets are covered extensively by Eun and Sabherwal (2003). To 
highlight a few of them: first, both markets start trading at 9:30am and close at 4pm, which 
means there is no gap in trading hours.
15  
Second, one share of a Canadian equity stock that 
trades on NYSE is equivalent to one share of the same stock trading on TSX, which eliminates 
the share conversion associated with American Depository Receipts (ADRs).
16
 Third, no 
financial controls are present that may prevent free flow of capital in either direction. 
 The list of stocks that are cross-listed on both TSX and NYSE was taken from Toronto 
Stock Exchange website. The daily closing prices for stocks on both markets were obtained from 
the yahoo.com website, and the exchange rates that coincide with the closing times of equity 
markets were taken from Bloomberg. The data set is a two-year period from January 2, 2008 to 
December 31,
 
2009; it covers the period of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, which allows 
examining its effect on the LOOP. For the cross-sectional test of the LOOP I select 45 randomly 
chosen trading days from the data sample.  
 Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the companies chosen for the analysis. It is 
important to note that even though the majority of stocks is concentrated in the Basic Materials 
sector, the sample is sufficiently diversified and includes a variety of other sectors. This reduces 
                                                          
15
 Gramming, Melvin and Schlag (2005) look at Frankfurt and NYSE markets so their study is constrained by 
overlapping trading hours.  
16
 1 ADR that trades on NYSE usually has a certain number of underlying shares of a company that trades on a 
domestic market. Yeyati (2009) uses ADR’s from several emerging markets to test effect of financial controls 
through LOOP. 
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potential sector specific problems. Another important factor is that the sample doesn’t have a 
trading liquidity problem, as only 5% of the stocks in the sample have relatively low average 
daily trading volume.
17
 
 
3.2  Estimation and Results 
 The estimation is done in two steps. First, the following version of the law of one price is 
estimated for each day t individually using an OLS method with robust White standard errors: 
             
                                             (3) 
 j is the index for stocks; t is the time index;    is the closing price of each company on the New 
York Stock Exchange;    
  is the closing price on the Toronto Stock Exchange; and    is the 
exchange rate between US and Canadian dollars at closing time of the markets
18
.  
 Our interest is in whether the confidence intervals for the estimates      , include 1. If so, 
then it can be concluded that the LOOP held on day t. The information about an individual day, 
however informative, is not sufficient to make a conclusion for or against the validity of the law 
of one price. Therefore, in the second step of estimation, a pooled test on all 45     estimates is 
done using the weighed least squares method. Since each individual     has its own variance    
 , 
the weights that are used are equal to     
   to give higher prominence to the more precisely 
determined estimates.  
 Figure 1 shows the distribution of the daily estimates of the LOOP parameter      and the 
distribution of the upper and lower limits of the 95 percent confidence intervals. For the LOOP 
to hold, the LOOP line should be between the boundaries of the confidence intervals. This 
                                                          
17
 This is a crucial factor as low liquidity may prevent simultaneous buying and selling, thus preventing an 
exploitation of a potential arbitrage opportunity. 
18
 This specification controls for reverse causality between prices of stocks trading on NYSE and TSX. 
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happens for the majority of the results.  The estimates however, exhibit high volatility in the first 
half of 2008
19
 - the beginning of the Financial Crisis. It is evident that as the Financial Crisis 
eased toward the end of 2008, the volatility of the estimates went down substantially. Even in 
cases where there is some deviation, the resulting estimate is still very close to one with narrow 
confidence intervals. 
 To examine the effect of volatility in daily estimates, I break the sample into three 
subsamples –Jan 1 – June 31, 2008; Jan 1 – Dec 31, 2008 and Jan 1 – Dec 31, 2009. I estimate 
the overall result for each time period using unweighted least squares and a pooled regression 
that adjusts for daily volatility. Table 2 summarizes the results of these regressions. In each 
regression, the LOOP holds for all the subsamples, as well as the full sample, since the 
confidence intervals are centered around 1 in each case. However, it is quite clear that adjusting 
for the more precisely determined parameters improves the quality of the results significantly. 
All the estimates of the pooled regression are much closer to 1, the standard errors are 
significantly lower, and the confidence intervals are much narrower. 
 Furthermore, the result for the 2009 subsample confirms the picture shown in Figure 
1. As the Financial Crisis eased in 2009, so did the range of the confidence intervals, leading to 
strong support in favor of validity of the law of one price in the cross-sectional framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 There is one day in the end of 2009, Dec. 7, 2009, with a significantly wider confidence interval, but there is not 
enough information to identify the reason behind it. 
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4. Long-Run Analysis  
4.1  Data Description and Unit Root Tests 
 For the purpose of the long-run analysis I use the whole data set from January 2, 2008 to 
December 31,
 
2009. In order to examine the effect of the Financial Crisis on the deviations from 
the LOOP I break the data into two subsets. The first set covers the year 2008 and the second set 
covers the year 2009. I then do the estimation on each subset separately and the estimates can be 
compared to examine if there is a crisis effect on the deviations from the LOOP. 
 
 In contrast to the cross-sectional data used for the short-run analysis of the LOOP, 
this set presents a time-series data set for each stock and the exchange rates. Therefore, following 
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) a unit root test is performed on each time series to determine 
stationarity. I test for unit root each price series of the stock that trades on NYSE, each price 
series of the stock that trades on TSX and on the exchange rate series. The results are consistent 
with the Eun and Sabherwal (2003) study that both the stock price series and $US/C$ exchange 
rate are non-stationary, and that all series are first-difference stationary; thus, these data are all 
integrated of order 1, i.e., I(1). 
 When time series contain a unit root, the conventional technique is to test for a presence 
of a cointegration relationship between the series and then use the VECM model to test for 
stationarity of the residuals. However, since our emphasis in this study is on the relative LOOP, 
which is represented by the first difference of the absolute LOOP, the least squares methodology 
is appropriate. I use the following model to test the validity of the LOOP.  Let     
   represent the 
price of stock j at the closing of the trading day t on the NYSE, and     
    represent the price of 
the same stock j at the closing of the trading day t on TSX. Furthermore, let   represent the $/C$ 
exchange rate on day t at the time of closing of both markets. Then the LOOP equation is 
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                             (4) 
Taking logs and moving    
    to the left hand side to avoid Granger causality issues because 
price changes on NYSE may affect price changes on TSX and vice versa, equation (4) becomes 
        
            
                           (5) 
Because of a presence of a unit root in each price series, the first difference has to be taken. By 
adding a constant and a white noise error, the following regression model is estimated for each 
stock separately: 
                                               (6) 
where                
              
              
               
     ,                      , 
and    is a disturbance with mean 0 and variance   
 .  
 
4.2  Methodology 
 Looking at equation 6, it can be seen that it tests the original form of the relative 
LOOP.
20
 The joint hypothesis of               would provide the answer about the validity 
of the law. An important feature in the model is omission of any type of costs, in contrast to the 
TAR models that are predominant in the economics literature. The justification for this omission 
relies on two assumptions. The first assumption is that companies that engage in trading on 
equity markets in different countries have access to currencies of the corresponding country 
without engaging in foreign exchange trading.
21 
The second assumption is that the major players 
engaging in trade and taking advantage of arbitrage opportunity are large financial institutions 
                                                          
20
 The difference of natural logarithms is a very close approximation for percentage changes; therefore equation 6 is 
equivalent to a modified equation 1* (a constant and white noise added on the RHS and %Δ  
 
 moved to the LHS). 
21
 For example, a company may have accounts in both euro and dollars. Therefore when they trade on European 
markets, they use euro accounts, and when trading takes place in US, they use dollar accounts, hence avoiding costs 
associated with currency exchange. 
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such as investment banks and hedge funds.
22
 Together, these two assumptions allow for one 
justification for OLS estimation technique
23
, because in absence of transaction costs, the non-
linearities associated with those costs disappear as well. Another justification for OLS is that the 
price difference series,      , is stationary for each corresponding stock j and the exchange rate 
difference series,     , is stationary as well.
24
 That confirms that the unit root problem that was 
present in level analysis is resolved. Therefore, OLS can be used to test the original specification 
of the relative LOOP, and only if it doesn’t hold a different technique such as VECM or TAR 
may be used.
25
 
 Once the estimates for      are obtained for each stock, the joint hypothesis of  
                     is tested. The drawback of the hypothesis test, however, is that the non-
rejection of the hypothesis doesn’t prove the law to hold, but only that there is not enough 
evidence to reject it at that high level of significance. In that light, 95% and 99% confidence 
intervals are constructed to see if 1 falls within the interval. Based on these confidence intervals, 
a stronger conclusion can be made whether the relative LOOP holds.  
 The final step in the analysis is aggregation. The LOOP may or may not hold for a 
particular stock, but it may still hold at an aggregate level. Therefore, two portfolios are 
constructed, where one portfolio consists of one share of each stock trading on the NYSE and the 
other consists of one share of each stock trading on the TSX. By doing so, a test of all pooled 
        together can provide a test of PPP for a portfolio choice. In order for PPP to hold, the 
difference of percentage changes of the value of the portfolios should be equal to the percentage 
                                                          
22
 The underlying reason behind this assumption is that large financial institutions can use economies of scale to 
minimize transaction costs associated with trading. 
23
 Rossi, Rogoff and Ferraro (2012) use similar methodology for estimation. 
24
 The unit root test was performed on each series individually, and the null hypothesis of a unit root could be 
rejected at a 99% level of significance for each stock difference series and the exchange rate difference series. 
25
 SUR model will lead to the same result as OLS because the same regressor is used in each equation. 
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change of the exchange rate. The weighted least squares method is used for this test, because 
each       has its own variance      
    and the weights that are used are equal to       
  . 
 This technique is applied to three different time periods: 1) 2008 only 2) 2009 only and 3) 
2008-2009. The first period represents the time of the Financial Crisis; therefore, a comparison 
between      
     with      
     provides an insight into the effect of the Financial Crisis on the 
relative LOOP on an individual level, while a comparison between    
     with    
    (the 
estimates from the WLS regression) provides the effect on the relative LOOP on an aggregate 
level. The third period is used to test the validity of the relative LOOP over the entire time 
period. 
 
4.3  Serial Correlation Correction 
 For each stock, a Breusch-Godfrey LM test was performed to test for serial correlation. 
Then, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) has been used to determine the number of lags 
for the OLS regression with Newey-West standard errors. This procedure is necessary because in 
the presence of serial correlation the OLS standard errors are incorrect, which potentially may 
lead to wrong confidence intervals and hypothesis conclusions. Correct standard errors are also 
needed for correct WLS regression since the variances are used as weights. 
 
4.4  Results 
  Tables A1, A2 and A3 provide OLS estimates for       26 the 95% confidence 
intervals, OLS and Newey-West standard errors, and    for each regression for the 
corresponding time period. It can be seen that the relative LOOP held for only 15 out of 54 
                                                          
26
 The estimates for       are very close to 0 for each stock and the hypothesis of         cannot be rejected for any 
stock. These estimates are available upon request. 
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stocks when the whole period from 2008 to 2009 is considered. When the data is broken into two 
sub-periods the results improve. In 2008, the LOOP holds for 28 stocks and for 24 stocks
27
 in 
2009. The 2008 results are characterized by higher standard errors of the estimates which 
enlarges the confidence intervals. Furthermore, from the comparison of    between the three 
periods,    is typically higher for the 2009 sample than for the 2008 sample, or the pooled 2008-
2009 sample. These results, however, cannot be conclusive about the validity of the LOOP as it 
shows to hold for some stocks and doesn’t hold for others. The next table provides aggregate 
results for     that are obtained from WLS regression. 
 It can be seen that the relative PPP fails for each period when aggregate portfolio is 
considered. However, the effect of the Financial Crisis can be examined by comparing the 
estimates of 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 periods.  It is clear, that the financial crisis creates 
substantial deviations from the LOOP, as the     estimate for the 2008 sample is significantly 
lower than the 2009 sample estimate. Furthermore, the standard error for the 2008 time period is 
twice the standard error of the 2009 period, indicating substantially higher volatility. It also 
explains why the estimate for the whole 2008-2009 sample period is lower than the estimate for 
2009, as the events of 2008 have a significant effect. This result is consistent with the conclusion 
from the literature that higher volatility creates higher deviations from the law.  
 Another interesting result that can be observed is that even though the relative LOOP 
fails to hold, the     value is consistently below one. That means that the exchange rate changes 
are larger than the price difference changes. What could explain this behavior? One possible 
                                                          
27
 After correction for serial correlation the OLS and Newey-West standard errors for 2009 only period are 
practically the same. While the difference is larger in two other periods, there is no effect on hypothesis testing 
decisions on a 95% significance level. For a 99% significance level, however, the decision switches from reject the 
null hypothesis to fail to reject the null for nine stocks in both periods.  
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explanation may be provided by the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model of exchange rate. 
The insight of the model is that the exchange rate overshoots its long-run equilibrium value 
because of price stickiness in the short run. When during the financial crises, the central bank 
took measures and reduced interest rates, because of inflationary expectations the changes in 
exchange rate could become more volatile, overshooting the long-run value and therefore 
contributing to the     estimate to be below one. That would be also consistent with the observed 
estimates, as the estimate improves from 0.84 in 2008, to 0.908 in 2009, which could indicate 
that inflation expectations slowly adjust. This premise could be tested with the expansion of the 
data to include 2010 and 2011 time periods to see if the estimate improves even more. 
 Even though these results provide an insight into the effect of financial crises, they also 
create a theoretical contradiction. As cross-sectional analyses show, the short-run relationship 
holds. Therefore, one would expect the relative relationship to hold as well.
28
 But the relative 
LOOP fails to hold regardless of which time period is considered.  The solution to this puzzle is 
a matter for future research. Here are a few reasons to be explored that may shed light on the 
situation: 
1) Perhaps, there is some kind of a dynamic equilibrium relationship that OLS does not capture. 
2) The effect of the crisis has not disappeared fully and therefore the inflationary expectations 
haven’t settled down, so the estimate hasn’t returned fully to 1, even though it did improve to 0.9 
in 2009.  
3) One of the assumptions about transaction costs doesn’t hold, and in that case the TAR models 
should be used. That, however, does not solve the puzzle, as TAR models only provide a long-
run convergence and do not prove the LOOP in its original form. 
 
                                                          
28
 In theory if an absolute LOOP holds, then the relative LOOP must hold. 
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5. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I use cross-listed stocks of Canadian companies to test the validity of the 
LOOP theory. In contrast to recent literature, I test both short-run and long-run relationship 
between the prices and the exchange rate. An absolute version of the LOOP can be tested using a 
cross-sectional framework, however due to the non-stationarity issues the long-run absolute 
LOOP cannot be tested. Therefore, I test the relative version instead. The primary purpose of 
these analyses is to try and establish a basic case in which, prior to testing, one would expect for 
the law to hold. Another purpose is to test both absolute and relative versions of the LOOP in its 
true, original form. Unlike conventional methods in current literature, however, I argue that for 
this specific case the OLS methodology is sufficient for testing. This allows me to test the 
original form of the LOOP, unlike VECM and TAR models which only test convergence to the 
law. In addition, due to the time period of the data, the effect of the financial shocks on the 
LOOP can be examined as well.  
 The cross-sectional analyses show that the LOOP holds for the majority of the days in the 
sample, and that most of the volatility in the estimates falls on the beginning of the 2008 – the 
beginning of the Financial Crisis. Once I adjust for this by breaking the sample of 45 randomly 
chosen days into two subsamples and re-estimate using pooled regression, I find strong support 
that the LOOP holds. Furthermore, the law holds perfectly for the 2009 sample. Given these 
results the theory predicts that the relative LOOP will hold as well. However, the long-run 
analyses show that the relative LOOP may or may not hold for a particular stock. Furthermore, 
when a portfolio choice is considered (PPP version), the law surprisingly fails and the estimates 
are lower than 1. In addition, the results show that the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 has a 
negative effect on the deviations from the law, by significantly increasing them.  
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 This failure of the relative law creates a new puzzle in the area of the LOOP research. It 
is unclear at the moment, why the relative law fails to hold when the absolute, short-run version 
has proven to be valid. Therefore, finding the solution to the puzzle presented is an interesting 
area for future research.  
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
Sectors Number of Companies in Sector 
Basic Materials 27 
Consumer Goods 3 
Financial 8 
Industrial Goods 1 
Services 7 
Technology 5 
Utilities 2 
Trading Volume NYSE / TSX 
Mean                            1,972,932 / 1,497,715 
5th percentile                                 28,249 /       30,770 
25th percentile                               332,907 /    541,188 
50th percentile                               922,259 / 1,295,980 
75th percentile                            2,831,145 / 2,134,480 
95th percentile    6,599,894 / 4,167,597 
Market Capitalization (in billions)   
Mean 20.10 
5th percentile 2.08 
25th percentile 5.94 
50th percentile 12.71 
75th percentile 30.58 
95th percentile 56.09 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Short Run Estimated Average LOOP Parameter
*
 
      Unweighted LS     
 
Jan '08 - Jun '08 2008 2009 full sample   
    1.14                         
(.09) 
1.092              
(.053) 
1.001                
(.008) 
1.05            
(.03) 
 
95% CI [0.94 - 1.34] [0.98 - 1.20] [0.98 - 1.02] [0.99 - 1.11] 
 
N 14 25 20 45 
 
   
Pooled OLS 
  
 
Jan '08 - Jun '08 2008 2009 full sample   
    1.01                        
(.028) 
1.021               
(.008) 
1.001               
(.003) 
1.005        
(.004) 
 
95% CI [0.95 - 1.07] [1.004 - 1.03] [0.994 - 1.009] [0.998 - 1.012] 
 
N 14 25 20 45   
* The estimated relationship is:              
             where   ,   
  and    are the U.S. price, the Canadian price, and the 
USD/CAD exchange rate respectively. 
Notes: The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
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Table 3. Weighted Least Squares Regression Results* 
Time Period    95% confidence interval 99% confidence invterval 
2008-2009 0.8478 
(0.0131)  
[0.82  -  0.87] [0.81 -  0.88] 
2009-2010 0.9086 
(0.0066) 
[0.89  -   0.92] [0.89  -  0.92] 
2008-2010 0.8756 
(0.0079) 
 [0.85  -  0.89] [0.85  -  0.89] 
* The estimated relationship is:           with weights=      
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Figure 1. 
Distribution of daily estimates of the LOOP parameter     and the 95% confidence intervals 
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Chapter 2   
Understanding the Exchange Rate Effects on Prices of Cross-Listed Shares in 
times of Financial Crisis: Evidence from the US and the Canadian Stock Markets 
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1. Introduction 
 The last several decades have seen increasing globalization and advancement in 
technology that affected the global trading of financial assets.  These changes have sharpened 
competition among stock exchanges around the world and allowed investors a faster and easier 
access to information and trade execution. This has also brought on an increased number of firms 
offering their shares on foreign exchange markets in addition to domestic listing. According to 
Karolyi (2010): over 3,000 foreign firms have secondarily listed on over 40 major stock 
exchanges. Stock exchanges in the United States (NYSE and NASDAQ), United Kingdom 
(London Stock Exchange and London’s Alternative Investment Market), Germany (Deutsche 
Börse), Singapore, and Hong Kong have all become popular destinations for cross-listed firms 
(Peng and Su, 2012), as more than 170 billion shares of cross-listed firms have been traded in 
2011.
29
 
 The behavior of stocks of cross-listed firms has been a subject of extensive research in 
finance literature. The work has mainly focused on (1) cost of capital and corporate governance 
and (2) price discovery. The first branch deals with the analysis of benefits a firm derives from 
cross-listing, while the price discovery analyzes the importance of location where information is 
impounded into prices.
30
 The advantages of cross-listing have been well documented in the 
literature
31
, but the results for price discovery are not as clear. 
 The goal of this study is to analyze the response of the prices of cross-listed stocks to 
changes in the exchanges rate, and how differences in stock characteristics affect the speed of the 
convergence to the long run equilibrium. In contrast to the price discovery literature which 
                                                          
29
 Citi Depositary Receipts Services. 
30
 Hasbrouck (1995); Harris (1995); Lieberman et al (1999); Eun et al (2003); Gramming et al (2005); Pascual 
(2006);  Frijns et al (2010); Chen et al (2013) among others. 
31
 See Hail and Leuz (2009); Coffee (1999); Stulz (1999); Vaaler and Zhang (2011). 
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converts prices into the same currency, I modify the LOOP model to focus on the exchange rate 
effects and this leads to several interesting findings. I find that the spread of the TSX and the 
NYSE prices is non-stationary with a unit root and a similar result is found for the $C/$US 
exchange rate. The two series however, are cointegrated, and despite the financial crisis, the 
LOOP holds as an equilibrium relationship. Thus, when there are deviations from this 
relationship due to a shock to an exchange rate, the equilibrium is restored through an adjustment 
on the stock markets and/or reversal of the shock on the foreign exchange market. Second, for 
most of the stocks in the study, the equilibrium is restored strictly through adjustment to the 
stock prices. However, in certain cases, not only do prices on the stock markets adjust to restore 
the LOOP relationship, but a feedback is provided back to the foreign exchange market, so that 
some of the adjustment occurs on the foreign exchange market. The breakdown of the analyses 
by year leads to a conclusion that this anomaly is likely attributed to the financial crisis. Third, 
the adjustment to equilibrium is faster compared to other studies that analyze cross-listed shares 
using daily data. The average half-life is 0.7 days. Fourth, the regression analysis of the speed of 
adjustment parameter estimate indicates the importance of the relative relationship between the 
TSX and the NYSE:  the higher the daily average trading volume on the NYSE relative to the 
TSX, the faster the prices revert back to the equilibrium relationship. Simultaneously, for stocks 
with relatively higher liquidity on the TSX the equilibrium relationship is restored faster.  Other 
factors affecting the speed of adjustment are the presence of the financial crisis effect, and the 
industry that the company is in. 
 The original studies in price discovery started with the analysis of US firms listing their 
stock on multiple U.S. stock exchanges. Hasbrouck (1995) examines price discovery for a 
sample of 30 DJIA companies. He shows that NYSE price changes represent 92.7% of price 
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discovery, with regional exchanges making up the rest.  Harris et al. (2002) examine the 
importance of NYSE in comparison to regional exchanges. They show that NYSE has remained 
the dominant information market over time, even though by 1995 its dominance has declined.  
 With increased international cross-listing, researchers have switched their attention to 
firms trading on the home market and a cross-listing on the U.S. market. Lieberman et al. (1999), 
for example, study a sample of six Israeli firms cross-listed on the NYSE and find that price 
discovery occurs mostly in Israel for all but one firm. Gramming et al. (2005) examine three 
German firms cross-listed on Frankfurt Stock Exchange (XETRA) and NYSE and find that for 
all three firms the home market dominates the price discovery. Su and Chong (2007) examine 
eight Chinese firms cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the NYSE and also 
report the dominance of the home market. These studies suggest a very limited role for the 
NYSE. 
 Literature has not been limited to stocks that are cross-listed in the United States, as there 
are a few studies that consider other destinations of cross-listing. For example, Ding et al. (1999) 
consider a case of a Malaysian firm cross-listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange and find the 
dominance of the home market. Lok and Kalev (2006) and Frijns et al. (2010) analyze stocks 
cross-listed in Australia and New Zealand and both conclude that home markets are dominant in 
terms of price discovery. On the other hand, Kadapakkam et al. (2003) find that home and 
foreign markets contribute equally to price discovery when analyzing Indian firms cross-listed in 
the U.K.  
 Even though the majority of studies show the domination of home markets in terms of 
price discovery, the variation in relative dominance has been significant. While Gramming et al. 
(2005) and Pascual et al. (2006) find little to no influence of the NYSE on the informative 
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process of price discovery, Hupperts and Menkveld (2002) show great variation in the NYSE’s 
contribution to price discovery across cross-listed Dutch stocks.  Similarly, Eun et al. (2003) use 
Canadian stocks cross-listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, and find that the price 
discovery ranges from 0.02% to 98.2% on US markets.  
 An abundance of Canadian firms listed on the NYSE relative to firms from other 
countries provides a unique opportunity of extending the analysis further. Several authors have 
performed cross-sectional analysis to explain the variation in price discovery across firms. Eun et 
al. (2003) show a positive relationship between the share of trading occurring on the NYSE and 
its contribution to price discovery.  Kehrle and Peter (2013) estimate intensity based information 
shares for TSX. They show that the higher the share of trading volume on the TSX, the higher its 
contribution to price discovery. 
 In this paper I use stocks of the Canadian companies cross-listed on the NYSE and 
contribute to the current literature in several ways. First, while most of the studies of cross-listed 
companies concentrate on “non-crisis” periods, I analyze the behavior of cross-listed stocks 
during the time of the financial crisis of 2008. Second, I modify the LOOP model to concentrate 
on the speed of price adjustment after an exchange rate shock. Most of the studies convert all 
prices into common currency and hence lose any potential direct effect the exchange rate 
changes may have on the equilibrium. As Gramming et al. (2005) note, there is little prior 
evidence to explain how stock prices in multiple markets adjust to exchange rate changes. The 
period of the financial crisis is of a particular interest because the $C/$US exchange rate 
experienced significant volatility.  As Figure 1 shows, the exchange rate first depreciated from 
0.92 at the end of 2007 to 1.3 in the early 2009 (more than 40% depreciation), and then 
appreciated back to 1.05 by the end of 2009 (20% appreciation). 
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Third, the intraday data used in recent price discovery studies is too “noisy” to isolate shocks to a 
fundamental variable such as an exchange rate; therefore, the daily data I use for the analysis is 
more suitable. Fourth, I introduce a measure of relative liquidity that hasn’t been used in 
literature and perform cross-sectional analysis to assess the importance of both, NYSE and TSX, 
in the adjustment process.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in more detail the modification I 
make to the LOOP in order to conduct my analysis. In section 3, I discuss the data sources and 
the sample details. In section 4, I perform preliminary data analysis, including unit root and 
cointegration tests. I discuss the error correction models in section 5. In section 6, I provide the 
details of the cross-sectional analysis. In particular, I discuss the proxy measure of relative 
liquidity and other variables that I use to analyze the difference across the estimates from section 
5, my hypothesis regarding the determinants of this difference, and the results of regression 
analysis used to test these hypotheses. I conclude with a recap of the study in section 7. 
 
2. Model  
The LOOP is one of the most fundamental models in economics. Generally, it states that 
a good that is traded on both domestic and foreign markets should have the same price, once 
adjusted for the exchange rate. Formally, the model is given by equation (1a) and/or (1b) 
                            (1a) 
                                 (1b) 
   and    are domestic and foreign prices of the good, respectively, and E is the price of one 
unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. The majority of the studies in financial 
markets employing the LOOP model use equation (1b) to first convert the prices into the same 
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currency, and then perform time series analysis to analyze the feedback each market provides to 
the prices.
32
 Alternatively, Yeati et al (2009) define market premium as                 
       and then analyze the behavior of said premium over time. Both of these model 
specifications, as discussed in section I, ignore the potential effects that shocks to the exchange 
rate may have on the equilibrium. During the financial crisis, the $C/$US exchange rate had 
experienced 40% depreciation, and then a 20% appreciation; therefore I modify equation (1b) in 
a different way to concentrate on the exchange rate shocks. 
 Instead of converting the prices into the same currency, or alternatively moving both  
       and E to the left-hand side, I define variable Dif = difference between the price of a good 
at home and the price of a good abroad (in natural logs), and therefore only move        to the 
left hand side. This is shown in equation (1c). 
                                                    (1c) 
In essence, if the LOOP holds, the difference between the prices on foreign and domestic market 
should be explained by the exchange rate between the currencies of the countries where the 
markets are located. Restating equation (1c) in the context of the present study: 
           
          
                          (2) 
 In contrast to price discovery analysis where the goal is to identify on which market, 
foreign or domestic, the price adjustment occurs, this paper concentrates on the exchange rate 
effects. Therefore, the specification in (2) is more appropriate. The goal of this paper is to 
estimate how quickly the difference in prices is restored back to the exchange rate, without 
establishing which market is the “leader” in the adjustment process. In subsequent analysis, I 
                                                          
32
 See Eun et al. (2003), Gramming et al. (2005). 
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construct the time series according to equation (2) and then analyze how this price difference 
responds to shocks to the exchange rate. 
 
3. Data Sources and Sample Details 
 
3.1  Sources of Data 
 The daily data used in this study are from the following sources. The list of companies 
listed on both New York and Toronto stock exchanges was obtained from the TSX website, and 
later cross-referenced with the NYSE website for correct ticker information.
33
 The daily adjusted 
closing prices are from Yahoo! Finance website.
34
  In addition to prices, the Yahoo! Finance 
historical database provides daily trading volumes which are later used in the cross-sectional 
analysis.  
 For the exchange rate corresponding to the closing time of the stock exchange markets, 
i.e. 4pm Eastern Standard Time, I use a Bloomberg dataset. This dataset provides the midpoint of 
bid-ask quotes at the closing of the foreign exchange market in New York.
35
 Other data, such as 
the date of listing in the United States and the market capitalization, are from the websites of 
exchanges and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
36
. Company industry 
classification is based on the classification by the Yahoo! Finance website. 
 
                                                          
33
 At the time of data collection, there were fifty five companies listed on both TSX and NYSE. As of August 31, 
2013, TSX database has 106 cross-listed companies on NYSE. 
34
 The data were later cross-referenced with COMPUSTAT North America database for accuracy. However, since 
Yahoo! Finance database also provides daily closing prices adjusted for splits and dividends, it was used as the 
primary data source for stock prices. 
35
 For accuracy, I cross-referenced the exchange rate data from Bloomberg with a tick data from Gain Capital 
historical database. 
36
 CRSP provides historical daily data for number of outstanding shares, which are used to calculate the 
corresponding market capitalization for the day. 
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3.2  Sample Details 
 This study covers the two-year period from January 2, 2008 to December 31, 2009. This 
period is of a particular interest due to the Financial Crisis period that began at the end of 2007 
when financial markets experienced periods of extreme volatility. As Figure 2 shows, the 
Financial Stress Index was at its highest level in the past twenty years, reaching the peak of six at 
the end of the year 2008, and then declining back to levels around zero towards the end of 2009. 
 I choose to study Canadian stocks listed in the U.S. for several reasons. First, Canadian 
stocks represent the largest share of stocks cross-listed in the U.S. from a single country. Second, 
many of these Canadian stocks trade actively on both the TSX and the NYSE. Third, the trading 
hours of the TSX coincide with that of the NYSE (9:30 AM – 4:00 PM, EST), a distinct 
advantage for studying Canadian stocks relative to those from other world markets with little or 
no overlap in trading times between home and U.S. markets. Finally, Canadian stocks trade in 
the U.S. as ordinary shares due to compatible accounting standards, whereas shares from other 
countries are American Depositary Receipts issued by U.S. custodian banks. This makes taking 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities easier, since it is not necessary to create or destroy 
depositary receipts. Similarly to Choi et al. (2012, 2013) I analyze Canadian stocks that are listed 
on the TSX in Canada and on the NYSE in United States. My sample has 491 days for which 
trading occurred simultaneously on both markets.  
 Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the sample firms. It is evident that majority 
of the Canadian firms trading on NYSE are well capitalized and are actively traded. Seventy five 
percent of the firms in the sample had more than 250 million shares traded on both the TSX and 
the NYSE over the two-year period and had an average market capitalization above 1.8 billion. 
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There is a great variation in market trading shares across the stocks. The share of trading 
volume in a stock on NYSE for a median firm is 57 percent
37
, with a high of 95 percent and a 
low of 6 percent. Most of the stocks have a history of cross-listing as only five percent of the 
firms have been listed for less than a year on the NYSE as of the beginning of the sample period. 
The median duration of a listing is 6.7 years.  
 
4. Preliminary Data Analysis: Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
 In this section, I first provide the basic details of the price difference series and exchange 
rate used in the time series analysis. I  then perform unit root tests for each stock and the 
exchange rate to establish that each series are non-stationary  and integrated of order 1, denoted 
as I(1). Subsequently, I use the Johansen (1988) method to confirm the cointegration between the 
price difference and the exchange rate. 
 
4.1  Price Difference and Exchange Rate Series for Analysis 
 The majority of the studies that deal with cross-listed shares, either convert prices into the 
same currency or calculate cross-market premiums.
38
 Both methods ignore the effect the 
exchange rate may have on prices; thus, these studies primarily focus on either the price 
discovery or the market efficiency.  In contrast to these studies, I concentrate on how quickly the 
difference between the stock prices of the same Canadian company trading on multiple markets 
responds to exchange rate shocks during the times of turmoil. Therefore, as discussed previously, 
I utilize a modified model that uses the price difference and the exchange rate series.  
                                                          
37
 Interestingly,  the median share is above 50 percent (compared to 43 percent in Eun et al (2003) study), perhaps 
indicating a preference  shift towards trading in the United States, or perhaps an increased interest from U.S. 
investors for Canadian stocks during the crisis. 
38
  See Lieberman (1999); Hupperets and Menkveld (2002); Yeati (2009); Chen and Choi (2012); Kehrle and Peter 
(2013) 
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 The price difference for each stock in the sample is calculated by subtracting the adjusted 
close price of the stock on the NYSE from the adjusted close price of the stock on the TSX.  
Both New York and Toronto prices are obtained from the finance.yahoo.com historical database. 
These prices are adjusted for all applicable splits and dividend distributions, using appropriate 
split and dividend multipliers adhering to CRSP standards.
39
   
 The exchange rate series are obtained from a Bloomberg dataset. This dataset provides 
the mid-point between the bid and ask quotes at 4pm Eastern Standard Time, which is the time 
corresponding to the closing of the stock markets. Consequently, there is a total of 491 days in 
the sample when the trading occurred on all three markets
40
, and therefore there are 491 
observations available for each stock and the exchange rate series. During the two-year period, 
the exchange rate was unusually volatile. The C$ had been appreciating steadily prior to 2008, 
reaching its highest point of C$0.92/US$ at the end of 2007. However, at the onset of the 
financial crisis, the C$ began depreciating significantly, reaching its lowest point of C$1.3/US$ 
in the middle of 2009, and then, as the financial crisis eased, the C$ appreciated back to the pre-
financial crisis levels. The average exchange rate was C$1.10/US$ and the standard deviation 
based on daily exchange rates was C$0.092/US$. This is more than triple the standard deviation 
the exchange rate exhibited during the period of Eun and Sabherwal analysis, where the standard 
deviation of the exchange rate was 0.026. 
 
4.2  Unit Root Tests 
 My first objective now is to test whether or not the price difference series and the 
exchange rate series are cointegrated. Cointegration becomes relevant when the analysis deals 
                                                          
39
 Source: help.yahoo.com 
40
 There were a total of 24 days of non-synchronous trading that were omitted from the analysis. 
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with non-stationary series. If both time series    and    are integrated of order one, then both 
series are non-stationary, but their changes are stationary. Then    and    are cointegrated if 
there exists a linear combination           , which is stationary, denoted as I(0).  
Therefore, before conducting cointegration analysis of the exchange rate with the price 
difference of each stock, I check if each series in the sample is I(1).  
 I use the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) test, which includes lagged first differences of 
the price series in the equation, to check for the presence of a unit root. Similarly to Eun et al 
(2003), I consider the following three regression equations to determine if the time-series has a 
unit root: 
            
 
                           (1) 
               
 
                          (2) 
                   
 
                         (3) 
 The difference among the equations is the addition of the drift term in equation 2 and a 
linear time trend in equation 3. The null hypothesis in each case is that ρ=0. If the null fails be 
rejected, the time-series {  } contains a unit root. To determine the number of lags in the model, 
I use the Schwartz Bayesian criterion (Schwartz (1978)), a test statistics that is most commonly 
used in the literature. I estimate the above equations for each price difference series and also for 
the exchange rate series. Using the critical values of the t-statistics as per Enders (1995), I find 
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all but one series at the 1% level and that other 
series are indeed I(1)
41
.  
 
                                                          
41
 See Table A1.3 in Appendix 1 for these results. 
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5. Cointegration Tests and Analysis of the ECM 
42
  
 Though each price difference series in the sample is non-stationary, I do not expect any 
of these series to diverge without boundary from the exchange rate series, as it would be a clear 
violation of the LOOP. In other words, I expect the price difference series of each stock to be 
cointegrated with the exchange rate series. This would be true if there exists a vector   
   
   
,   
  ) such that   
           
      is I(0). There are n-1 possible independent 
cointegrating vectors, and since in this case n=2, then there may only be one cointegrating 
vector. Therefore, I only need to include one error-correction term in the error correction models 
that I estimate later.  
 To test for cointegration of the price difference series of each stock with the exchange 
rate series, I use the Johansen (1988) method. In this method, a p-th order autoregressive process,  
                                is rewritten as        
   
                   
where ∆ is the first-difference lag operator,    is a (nx1) vector of I(1) time-series variables,    is 
a zero mean n-dimensional white noise vector,    are (nxn) matrices of autoregressive 
parameters, and Π is a (nxn) matrix of parameters whose rank is equal to the number of 
independent cointegrating vectors.
43
 
I use the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (Schwarz 1988) to determine the number of appropriate 
lags in the model and then test for cointegration. For each stock in the sample, I find that        
and   
      
 are indeed cointegrated, and there is only one cointegrating vector.  
 Studies that do not convert the prices into the same currency use the Hasbrouk (1995) 
approach in their analysis (Gramming et al, 2005; Frijns et al, 2010). Hasbrouk’s starting point is 
that if a security is traded in two different markets, its prices should be cointegrated, which 
                                                          
42
 The description of the unit root tests and cointegration analysis is following Eun and Sabherwal (2003). 
43
  In this case, the rank of Π=n-1=2-1=1.  
-38- 
 
means that the price series have a common stochastic trend. By measuring each market’s relative 
contribution to the variance of the innovations in the common trend, Hasbrouck finds each 
market’s “information share”. 44 Gramming et al. (2005) use this methodology to test exogeneity 
of the exchange rate relative to the stock prices.  In this study my aim is not examining price 
discovery, but analyzing how stock price dispersion reacts to fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
Therefore, I follow Eun et al. (2003) and conduct VECM analysis.  
 Based on chapter 1, and due to absence of capital controls between the U.S. and Canadian 
markets, I expect that the difference between the price of a stock on TSX and its counterpart on 
the NYSE will be reflected in the C$/U.S.$ exchange rate,
45
 despite the period of financial 
turmoil that’s being analyzed.  Accordingly, I expect the cointegrating vector       
   
,   
    to 
be [1, -1]. I use the Johansen methodology to estimate the cointegrating vector for each firm. I 
report a summary of normalized estimates (  
   
 equals 1) in Panel A of Table 2. The results are 
as expected.
46
  Overall, the median vector of the normalized estimates for the sample firms is [1, 
-1]. These results confirm that the difference between the price of a stock on TSX and its 
counterpart on the NYSE is reflected in the C$/$U.S. exchange rate. 
 Before proceeding with estimation of the error correction models, an appropriate version 
should be chosen. There are five versions of an error correction model that may be used for 
estimation. The difference in these models stems from an inclusion of a constant and/or time 
trend in either the undifferenced relationship or the cointegrating relationship.  I estimate each 
                                                          
44
 These information shares are extracted from variance decomposition in the vector moving average representation 
of the error correction model. For further discussion of the methodology, see Hasbrouck (1995, 2002) 
45
 As Yeati et.al. (2009) show, capital controls may create persistent deviations from the Law of One Price. 
46
 Except for TU and ECA for which the long run relationship failed to hold. Examining the reasons behind this 
result is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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model for each stock and then use Schwarz Bayesian criterion to choose the best estimation 
model.
47
 
 I estimate the following error correction models, which include the lagged changes in the 
dependent variable. Following the methodology by Eun et al. (2003), I use SBIC to determine 
the number of lags p (i, j = 1... p), which is set uniformly across each equation. This reveals 
optimal lags to be one for all but three firms in the sample.
48
 The values of betas are from 
cointegrating vector estimated above, with     values typically close to negative one: 
       
            
              
 
              
 
           
            (4) 
       
           
              
 
              
 
           
           (5) 
 The main parameter of interest is the estimate of     , as it indicates the extent to which 
the difference in prices responds to a deviation from the equilibrium relationship caused by 
shock fluctuations in the exchange rate.   
 Before discussing the estimation results of the     parameter, it is interesting to note the 
meaning of the    parameter from eqn. 5. This parameter measures the reaction of the C$/US$ 
exchange rate to the change in the difference between the price of the stock on Canadian and NY 
markets. Melvin et al. (2005) observe that the exchange rate is exogenous, i.e. irresponsive to 
changes in prices of individual stocks. Such result is expected, as it is unlikely that deviations 
from the LOOP in one stock would be significant and persistent enough to move the exchange 
                                                          
47
 For all but CAE and TD, the best model allows for an inclusion of a constant in the cointegrating relationship and 
eliminates an inclusion of a constant in the undifferenced relationship, as well as inclusion of time trend in both 
cointegrating and undifferenced relationship. CAE and TD also allow for a trend in the cointegrating relationship 
and a constant in the undifferenced relationship. 
48
 Only AUY, CAE and TRP have lags of two, four, and three respectively.  
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rate.
49
  This means that any deviation from the law of price is being corrected through partial 
changes in prices on both markets.
50
  
 For the exchange rate to be exogenous with respect to difference between the prices, the 
    parameter should be insignificant. I find, however, that for approximately a third of all firms, 
    is positive and statistically significant, indicating that if stock prices deviate from the 
equilibrium (the LOOP), there may be a partial adjustment occurring in the foreign exchange 
market. Panel B of Table 2 provides the summary of the     and      estimates.  
 The main results regarding the estimates of     parameter are as follows. First, for all the 
firms the coefficients have the expected sign:     <0, indicating the reversion to the LOOP. 
Second, for all but two firms in the sample, the     parameter is statistically significant at one 
percent level.
51
 This implies, as expected, that stock prices respond to changes in the exchange 
rate.   
 As was mentioned previously, a third of the firms in the sample exhibited adjustment on 
both stock markets and the foreign exchange market. For these firms, I compare the magnitudes 
of        and     to examine where the majority of the adjustment occurs. In Figure 3, I plot 
       versus     for these firms. Even though all of the observations are above the 45◦ line, 
implying that most of the adjustment to equality occurs on the stock markets, most of the 
observations are substantially off the vertical axis. This indicates that the foreign exchange 
market also contributes in the process of adjustment to equality.  
 Nonetheless, such result is highly illogical, since it is quite implausible for a 
macroeconomic variable such as the foreign exchange rate to respond to changes in a price 
                                                          
49
 For example, it has been shown that the exchange rate responds to changes in overall price levels (see economics 
literature on PPP theory), oil prices (see Rossi (2012)), or follows random walk (financial literature).  
50
 See studies on price discovery such as Harris (1995), Hasbrouck (1995) Eun et.al. (2003), and Gramming et.al. 
(2005), among others. 
51
       is statistically significant at five percent level for all the firms except TD Bank 
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difference of a single stock. To investigate the matter further, I break the full sample into two 
subsamples by year
52
, and estimate the error-correction model described by (5) and (6) for each 
subsample. The comparison of the    estimates, by stock, is presented in table 3.  
 We can see that the anomaly of the significance of the     estimates persists only for the 
2008 subsample, as for 12 stocks      estimates are significant at 1% or 5% level. However, 
none of the     estimates for the 2009 subsample are significant. Therefore, while the precise 
reasons for this anomaly are beyond the scope of this paper, I believe that this can mainly be 
attributed to the investment climate created by the financial crisis.  
 Finally, I use the     parameter to calculate the "half-life” of the process53, estimated as 
       
       
           
           (6) 
This measure provides the estimate of how quickly half of the deviation from the equilibrium 
disappears. Since I am using daily data in the analysis, the units of measurement for the half-life 
are in days. It is important to note, that since the sign of the     parameter is negative, the higher 
(in absolute value) the value of the     , the smaller the half-life, and vice versa.   
 Moreover, the half-life is undefined for values of        that are greater than one. Since 
the magnitude of      shows the fraction of the shock that is reversed in one time period, I 
interpret that in such cases the shock is reversed immediately and half-life is effectively equal to 
zero. 
 Panel C of Table 2 provides the summary of the half-life estimates.  Compared to Yeati et 
al (2009) who use daily trading data to examine average half-lives for nine developing countries, 
                                                          
52
 The first subsample includes all trading days in 2008, the onset of the financial crisis, and the second sample 
contains all days in 2009. 
53
 I use only the      parameter in half-life calculations because it was significant for all but one firm in the sample, 
and the adjustment in the stock markets significantly dominated the adjustment in the foreign exchange for those 
firms that had both,     and     , significant.  
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the average half-life for Canadian stocks is significantly lower. The range for average half-lives 
observed by Yeati et al (2009) is 0.73 to 1.64, and the average for all the stocks in their sample is 
1.04.  As panel C shows, the median half-life is 0.31 excluding the stocks with “undefined” half-
life and 0.29 for the whole sample. Such result is expected, since the Canadian and US markets 
likely are more integrated relative to the integration level between US and developing markets.
54
 
Nonetheless, it is a curious result, since the analysis covers the financial crisis period. Even 
though, due to panic, one might expect more evident arbitrage opportunities to be present during 
the times of financial turmoil, it is not the case.  
 
6. Cross-Sectional Analysis: Explaining the variation in the speed of convergence across 
stocks
55
 
 Even though the average speed of convergence and half-life are surprisingly low, they do 
vary considerably across firms. Why do some firms revert to equality faster than others? What 
explains this variability? Those are the questions I address in this section.  I first discuss the 
dependent variables which are used in the cross-sectional regressions. Then, I introduce a few 
explanatory variables that have not been used before in the literature. I then discuss other 
common explanatory variables used in the regressions and the associated hypothesis, which is 
followed by summary statistics of the all the explanatory variables and the regression results.  
 
6.1  Dependent variables 
 The coefficients      and      of the error correction terms, estimated in the previous 
section, can be interpreted as the average adjustment of each series towards each other in order to 
                                                          
54
 As Yeati et al (2009) show. 
55
 ECA, TCK, TRI and TU are excluded because of their time-series properties; therefore the sample size for the 
cross-sectional analysis is comprised of 50 stocks. 
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restore equality between the price difference on the stock markets and the exchange rate. 
Consequently, if     parameter is insignificant, then all of the adjustment occurs on the stock 
markets. As an example, consider Bank Nova Scotia. The coefficient      is 0.006 and 
insignificant. The coefficient of main interest,      is -0.974 and significant at one percent level. 
So, if the difference between the prices on the stock exchanges is greater than the exchange rate 
by one percent, the difference reverts back by 0.97 percent in the next period.  Hence, a higher 
absolute value of the      parameter reflects faster adjustment to deviations from equality.  In 
this light, I use |      as the dependent variable in the regressions. Additionally, I transform the 
     coefficients into the half-lives. Since equation 6 is a monotonic transformation, it is a useful 
characterization of the convergence of the price difference to the changes in the exchange rate. 
An interpretation is slightly different, however, as higher values of half-life represent a slower 
convergence. I use half-life measures as a dependent variable in an alternative cross-sectional 
regression. 
 
6.2  Explanatory variables 
 
 6.2.1  U.S. Trading Volume Share and Relative Average Volume 
 Studies in price discovery examined the role of the trading share in a price discovery 
process. The logic is based on an idea that the share of total adjustment in prices that occurs on 
one market is affected by the trading volume share on the other market. One of the reasons to 
expect such relationship is that a market with a higher share of trading in a stock will be more 
informative relative to the other. Also, the efficiency of one market relative to the other increases 
with an increase in trading volume share. Stickel and Verrechia (1994) suggest that investors 
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interpret high volume as an indication that demand underlying a price change is informative.  
Hasbrouck (1995) uses 30 Dow stocks to study a contribution of NYSE to price discovery 
relative to the regional markets. He finds a statistically significant effect of a share of total 
trading that occurs on NYSE and its contribution to the price adjustment.  Eun et al (2003) 
examine shares of stocks cross-listed on the TSE and the U.S. markets. They find a positive and 
statistically significant effect of a proportion of trading occurring on the foreign (U.S.) market on 
the share of the price adjustment to equality occurring on TSE. They interpret this result as TSE 
market makers’ concern about the U.S. prices. This interpretation is also based on the study by 
Foerster and Karolyi (1998) who analyze the effects of cross-listing on the bid-ask spreads on 
TSE and find that they decline with the decrease in spreads concentrated in those stocks for 
which U.S. exchange captures relatively large proportion of total trading volume. Their 
interpretation of the result is that it is TSE market makers’ competitive response to the additional 
presence of the U.S. market makers, and hence the transaction costs decline.  A similar result is 
found by Werner and Kleidon (1996) who examine British cross-listings on NYSE and AMEX. 
They find that during the time of synchronous trading on U.K. and U.S. markets, the London 
dealers in cross-listed stocks are concerned about the added competition of New York activity.   
 As previous discussion shows, the relative relationship between the markets may play a 
significant role in affecting the adjustment process. Hasbrouck (1995) and Gramming et al. 
(2005) show that domestic market plays a dominant role in the share of convergence to 
equilibrium. Eun et al. (2003) on the other hand, observe that a foreign (here U.S.) market plays 
an important role in the price discovery as well. To assess the importance of the domestic versus 
foreign market I introduce an alternative measure of geographically prevalent trading: a relative 
average volume. In contrast to the trading volume share, which is a cumulative measure, the ratio 
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of average daily volumes provides an insight which market is more significant to the speed of 
adjustment to equality on a daily basis. I use the domestic average volume as the numerator; 
therefore a positive sign of the coefficient means that higher average daily trading volume on the 
home market relative to the average daily trading volume on the foreign market leads to a 
quicker return to equilibrium relationship.   
 To summarize, for stocks that exhibit higher U.S. trading volume share, the transaction 
costs become smaller due to the increased competition and faster adjustment to equality. 
Therefore, similarly to Eun et al (2003), I expect the speed of convergence to the equilibrium to 
be directly related to the proportion of trading occurring in U.S.   
 
 6.2.2  Relative Daily Volume Volatility 
 Another stock characteristic that may play an important role in the speed of adjustment is 
the liquidity of the stock. There are several measures of liquidity that have been used in the 
literature. Yeati et al (2009) use two measures of liquidity, one based on the trading value, and 
the other on trading frequency.
56
 They find a negative relationship between both liquidity 
measures and the half-life of the deviations. These measures, however, would not be useful in the 
context of my analysis for the following reasons. First, the trading value measure equals the 
number of stocks traded in a certain day multiplied by quoted price. In the case of Canadian 
stocks, unlike ADR’s of stocks from developing countries which exhibit relatively low 
volumes
57
, the daily trading volumes are mostly significant
58
. This would produce excessively 
high trading values, which combined with relatively low      coefficients and half-lives, would 
                                                          
56
 For in depth discussion on liquidity measures see Levine and Schmukler (2006) 
57
 See Yeati et al (2009) 
58
 Especially when taking both markets combined 
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likely produce insignificant coefficients in the cross-sectional regression.
59
 The trading 
frequency measure, on the other hand, which is measured as the fraction of contemporaneous 
trading days out of the total number of trading days in the sample period, is not appropriate 
because all the stocks in the sample are contemporaneously traded, therefore the fraction will be 
one for each firm.
60
 
 Instead, I introduce an alternative measure of relative liquidity: relative daily volume 
volatility.
61
 In addition to providing an insight into the importance of the liquidity, it allows for a 
relative importance of the markets.  
 Relative daily volume volatility is measured as follows: 
                 
    
 
   
                      (7) 
where     
 is the variance of the daily trading volume of a stock on TSE and    
 is the variance 
of the daily trading volume of the same stock on NYSE.  It is reasonable to assume that the 
smoother the daily trading volume of a stock, the more liquid it is.
62
 Since the Canadian volatility 
is in the numerator, one should obtain a negative sign of the coefficient for the domestic market 
to be of greater significance in its contribution to quicker convergence to equality. 
 
 6.2.3 The Endogeneity of Foreign Exchange Market 
 Unlike other studies that analyze cross-listed shares in the context of convergence to 
equilibrium or price discovery
63
, the VECM model that I estimate indicates an anomaly 
                                                          
59
 Using a lognormal transformation, in turn, significantly reduces the variability in trading values.  
60
 In contrast, with ADR’s there is a significant number of days when trading occurs only on one market, therefore 
this measure is useful. 
61
 To the knowledge of the author neither relative average volume, nor relative volume volatility have not been used 
in the literature. 
62
 I would like to thank several brokers and analysts on Wall Street, especially Ilya Guzman, for this insight.  
63
 The only exceptions are Gramming et al. (2005) and Frijns et al. (2010) who find the exchange rate to be 
exogenous. 
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(endogeneity) of the foreign exchange market. As mentioned before, I find a significant number 
of stocks
64
 for which the exchange rate market is endogenous. I use a dummy variable, exmove, 
which takes the value of 1 if      coefficient is statistically significant, and 0 otherwise, to 
control for this effect. 
 I expect the sign of the exmove coefficient to indicate a faster convergence. Since the 
coefficients      and      of the error correction terms can be interpreted as the average 
adjustment of each series towards each other in order to restore equality between the price 
difference on the stock markets and the exchange rate, a significant      coefficient means that 
for these stocks some of the adjustment occurs through the exchange rate. Therefore, the price 
difference for these stocks should converge towards the exchange rate faster.  
 
 6.2.4 Other Variables 
 Additionally, I control for several firm characteristics. I examine the duration for which a 
firm has been listed in the United States. Shares that have been listed longer on the U.S. market 
are likely to have greater analyst coverage and media attention, resulting in more informed and 
interested U.S. investors.  Hence, during times of calamity, this leads to a faster response if these 
stocks are provided arbitrage opportunities due to the changes in the exchange rate, and therefore 
quicker convergence to equality. Eun et al (2003) show that duration of the listing may have an 
effect on the share of adjustment occurring on home market. On the other hand, during the times 
of financial turmoil, less seasoned stocks may attract more attention due to their “novelty”, and 
therefore lead to faster response to changes. 
                                                          
64
 For a third of a sample the      coefficient from the VECM model is statistically significant. 
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 Eun et al. (2003) show that firm size, proxied by market capitalization at the beginning of 
the sample period, has a statistically significant effect on the adjustment process . Since my 
analysis covers a longer time period marred by great financial instability
65
 and great fluctuation 
in stock prices
66
, I compute average market capitalization instead.
67
  
  Finally, during the Financial Crisis, the firms in financial industry may have been 
affected differently than others. Therefore, I also use dummy variables to examine potential 
industry effects. The choice of these variables is in-line with cross-sectional analysis performed 
by Eun et al (2003). 
 
6.3  Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Variables 
 The summary statistics of the explanatory variables are presented in Table 4. USvolshare, 
the share of trading in a stock occurring on NYSE, is measured as the number of shares traded in 
the United States as a fraction of the total number of shares in that stock traded in both countries 
over the two-year period. Relavol is the ratio between the stock’s average daily trading volumes 
on TSE and NYSE, with the TSE average daily volume in a numerator. Similarly, relvolvolatility 
is the ratio of the variances of the daily volumes on TSE and NYSE. The variables lyears, 
lavcap, and lntotvol are logarithmic transformations of the number of years the shares were listed 
on the NYSE, the average market capitalization of the stock, and total number of shares traded 
during the two-year period, respectively.  
 Table 4 shows that the sample stocks are actively traded on both NYSE and TSX 
markets. The median number of shares traded over two year period is 1.28 billion shares and the 
                                                          
65
 Eun et al. (2003) analyze a 6-month period which didn’t exhibit any financial instability 
66
 Since market capitalization is equal to the product of market price and the number of outstanding shares, great 
fluctuation in price of a stock leads to fluctuation in the market capitalization.  
67
 Market capitalization may also be used as a proxy for liquidity.  
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median value of the U.S. share of the trading is 57 percent. Based on the daily average volume, 
TSX is more actively traded relative to the NYSE, as the median relative average volume is 1.33. 
Consequently, the trading on TSX is also less volatile, on average, as median relvolvolatility is 
0.64. Most of the Canadian cross-listed companies have been well capitalized during the two 
year period. Only five percent of companies had an average market capitalization of less than 
300 million, and the median company has an average market capitalization of 7.4 billion.  For 
my sample, the median duration of listing on the NYSE at the beginning of the study period is 
6.7 years. 
 
6.4  Regression Analysis 
 The      estimates are negative and the further away the estimate is from zero, the faster 
the convergence of the price difference towards the exchange rate happens. Therefore, a negative 
sign of the coefficient in the cross-sectional regression represents a positive effect of the 
corresponding explanatory variable on the speed of convergence. To avoid confusion in reading 
the results of the regressions, I use |       as the dependent variable. That way, positive sign of 
the coefficients signals a positive effect on the speed of convergence, while the opposite is true if 
the sign of the coefficient is negative. 
 The variables of main interest in the analysis are USvolshare, relavol, and relvolvolatility. 
Due to high correlation between USvolshare, relavol, and relvolvolatility
68
, I estimate the 
following models separately: 
   
                                                     
                                                
 
                                       (8)     
                                                          
68
 The multicollinearity analysis based on variance inflation factors. 
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                        (9) 
                       
                                                           
                                                 
 
                      (10) 
 To estimate equations 8-10, I use the least squares method with a correction for 
heteroskedasticity. The results of alternative regression models are presented in Tables 5, 6 and 
7. The results particularly highlight the importance of the relative volume volatility.  
 
 6.4.1  Variables of Main Interest 
 The coefficient of the usvolshare is positive, indicating that with higher share of trading 
on the NYSE, the speed of convergence is faster. This result is in line with the findings of Eun et 
al. (2003). However, the coefficients are insignificant, with one exception where the coefficient 
is significant on a 10% level. The importance of geographic trading prevalence is highlighted by 
the coefficients of the relavol variable in table 6. The coefficients are consistently significant and 
negative. The negative sign of the coefficient signifies that as the relative average volume 
variable increases, the speed of adjustment becomes slower. Based on our definition of the 
relative average volume as average daily volume on the TSX over average daily volume on the 
NYSE, it follows that if the average daily volume on the TSX increases relative to the daily 
volume on the NYSE, the stocks will be converging slower to the equilibrium. This result is 
stronger than, and consistent with the signs we obtain on the usvolshare coefficients, signifying 
the importance of the NYSE.  The liquidity, however, is more important for the TSX. Looking at 
the sign of our relative liquidity measure in table 7, we find that the sign of the relvolvolatility is 
negative and consistently significant at the 1% level. Since higher volume volatility represents 
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lower liquidity, for the stock to converge faster the volatility on the TSX should be lower relative 
to the volume volatility on the NYSE. This result provides an interesting contrast to the results in 
the price discovery literature. While I believe that the implication of the sign and significance of 
relavol is similar Eun et al. (2003), i.e., the markets feeding information to each other, the 
significance and sign of relvolvolatility implies that domestic investors are more likely to take 
advantage of potential arbitrage opportunities.  
 Another interesting result in the analysis is the sign of the exmove coefficient.  This 
variable controls for the crisis created endogeneity of the exchange rate. As I discussed in a 
previous section, the expected sign of the coefficient is positive. The logic behind such 
expectation is that a partial adjustment of the exchange rate would provide for a faster 
adjustment to equilibrium from corresponding price difference. Surprisingly, the sign of the 
exmove coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the five percent level, implying a 
slower response. What may explain such result? Perhaps this is due to a sort of “catch-up” 
effect
69
 that happens due to endogeneity. Suppose there is a change in the exchange rate and the 
price difference between the prices of the stock on TSE and NYSE does not correspond to the 
exchange rate; hence, the system is not in the equilibrium state. As the prices on both markets 
start adjusting to reflect the change in the exchange rate, due to endogeneity of the exchange rate 
with a particular stock, the exchange rate moves in response to price changes. That sends anther 
feedback to the prices of the stock on the NYSE and the TSE. Hence, due to the fact that the 
feedback goes in both directions, i.e. from the exchange rate to the stock prices and vice versa, 
these stocks take longer to revert to equilibrium.  
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 6.4.2  Other Variables 
 The coefficient for the duration of listing on the NYSE supports the hypothesis that less 
seasoned stocks respond faster to shocks in the exchange rate during the financial crisis. It is not 
consistently significant, however. Hence, the evidence that the seasonality of the listing affects 
speed of reversion to equilibrium is weak. The results also suggest that the size of the firm is not 
important during the times of financial turmoil. The coefficient of the average market 
capitalization (lavcap) is consistently insignificant across all specifications.  
 
 6.4.3  Half-life analysis
70
 
 Yeati et al (2009) use the autoregressive parameter estimated from the error correction 
models, to calculate the half-life of the AR model, and then analyze the effect liquidity; 
characterized by a low trading value or infrequent trading, may have on the length of the half-
lives. They find a significant negative correlation between AR half-lives and liquidity. Their 
work though, lacks explicit regression methodology. Additionally, the liquidity measures used by 
Yeati et al (2009) are not appropriate in the context of my analyses. While I introduce alternate 
relative measures, I expect to find similar results.  
 Tables 8, 9, and 10 present the results from the cross-section regression analysis with 
half-life as a dependent variable and explanatory variables as in previous models. The results are 
consistent with the findings of the previous models. Consider the coefficient on relavol in table 
9. It ranges from 0.03 - 0.05 and is statistically significant across all the specifications.  How can 
this result be interpreted? For example, assume that a stock initially has an identical average 
daily trading volume on the TSX and the NYSE, and therefore its relative average volume is 
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 For 5 stocks the estimate of β, the estimated speed of convergence,       was <-1, thus making the half-life 
estimate undefined. For these stocks 0 was used, which represents immediate adjustment.   
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equal to 1. Now assume that after some time, the average daily trading volume decreases on the 
NYSE and simultaneously increases on TSX
71
 such that the ratio of average volumes changes to 
two. Then, in a case of a change in an exchange rate , it would take about 0.04 of a day longer for 
this stock to cover half of the deviation from the LOOP. 
 
 6.4.4  Standardized results 
 The results discussed are useful in explaining the factors contributing to differences in the 
speed of convergence across the stocks in the sample; however, the magnitude of the impact of 
variables of main interest is relatively low and difficult to interpret.  For example, the magnitude 
of the coefficient on relative volume volatility in Table 7 is equal to -0.002 across all 
specifications. That means that for one percent increase in volume volatility on TSX relative to 
NYSE, the speed of convergence will decrease by 0.002 percent which is negligible. In addition, 
the results for models that use relavol and relvolvolatility as relative measures
72
 are quite similar, 
and therefore it is difficult to assess which specification is a better fit. To address these issues, I 
re-estimate models (8),(9), and (10) using corresponding z-scores of both dependent and 
explanatory variables, and then compare the findings.
73
 
 Looking at Tables 11, 12 and 13, which present the results of the standardized regressions 
for models (8), (9), and (10) respectively, a few observations can be made. First, usvolshare and 
relavol lose significance compared to their respective non-standardized models. The usvolshare 
coefficients are insignificant across all specifications, and the coefficients of the relavol, while 
significant in four out of five specifications, are significant at 5% level at best. Furthermore, the 
financial crisis effect, represented by the exmove variable, also loses significance. Despite the 
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 Due to lower transaction costs on the TSX for example.  
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 Equations 9 and 10. 
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 A similar approach is done for models with half-life as a dependent variable. 
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loss of significance, the magnitude of the effects is easier to interpret. For instance, consider that 
magnitude of the zrelavol coefficient in table 12 - specification (5) , which controls for all firm 
characteristics. It is 0.676 and is significant at five percent level. That means that for one 
standard deviation change in relative average volume toward the U.S. market, the convergence to 
the equilibrium will be 0.676 standard deviations faster. 
 It is also interesting to note the significance of the industry dummies. While in non-
standardized models the industry dummies were insignificant , standardized regressions reveal 
that industry dummies play a role after all.  The coefficients for financial and technology 
dummies are negative and consistently significant. These results are in contrast to Eun et.al. 
(2003) who find no significance. The stocks in technology and financial industries generally tend 
to exhibit larger price fluctuations, therefore it is not surprising that during the times of financial 
crisis investors may be more concerned with these stocks, which in turn leads to a quicker 
response to the presence of arbitrage opportunities.  
 Our most robust results, obtained from the standardized regression of the model specified 
by equation (10), are presented in table 13. The financial crisis effect variable, exmove, is 
significant at either 5% or 10% level.  The industry effects are consistent with results presented 
in tables 11 and 12. In addition, and most importantly, the measurement of relative liqudity, 
zrelvolvolatility, is significant at 1% level across all specifications. The magnitude of the effect is 
also significant. For one standard deviation change in relative liquidity toward the Canadian 
market, the convergence to the equilibrium is between 0.632-0.709 standard deviations faster, 
depending on the specification. Finally, in addition to having more robust results, the explanatory 
power of the model with the relative liquidity measure is also higher. The    values range from 
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0.427 to 0.605 for models that use relvolvolatility, compared to the 0.26-0.50    range of the 
model that use relavol.  
 These results are even more profound when the standardized regressions are performed 
on the half-lives.  The explanatory power of the models based on relvolvolatility ranges from 
0.648 - 0.715 compared to 0.436-0.536 (relavol based models) and 0.079 - 0.171 (usvolshare 
based models). The relvolvolatility coefficients are consistently significant at 1% across all 
specifications showing that for one standard deviation change in relative liquidity toward TSX, 
the stocks converge almost one standard deviations faster. Similarly to results discussed earlier, 
the financial and technology industry dummies are strongly significant and negative, implying 
faster convergence for stocks in these industries. 
 Overall, either of the new relative measures introduced in these analyses prove to be 
superior explanatory variables to the US volume share - an explanatory variable commonly used 
to assess the importance of one market relative to another. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 In this study, I use a modified model of the LOOP to examine the relationship between 
the prices of cross-listed shares and the foreign exchange rate, during the period of financial 
crisis of 2008-2009. Using the sample of 54 Canadian stocks cross-listed on Toronto and New 
York stock exchanges, I find that despite highly volatile time period that saw the financial stress 
index at its highest level in history, the long run relationship held and the LOOP remained valid.  
  Consequently, I estimate the speed with which the price difference responds to the 
changes in the exchange rate, examine the factors affecting it, and assess the importance of 
NYSE and TSX in the system's convergence to the equilibrium. Similar to Eun et al (2003), I use 
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the US trading volume share to examine the relative importance of the NYSE. In addition, I 
introduce an alternative measure for relative geographic trading prevalence  - relative average 
daily volume, and also a new measure of relative liquidity - relative daily volume volatility, to 
assess the relative importance of the markets. The regression results highlight the importance of 
the NYSE in terms of geographic trading prevalence. This is particularly evident based on the 
relative average volume measure. Stocks with higher average daily trading volume on the NYSE 
converge faster to the equilibrium. The liquidity, however, is more important for TSX. The 
results also show that both, the relative average volume and relative volume volatility, 
significantly outperform the U.S. volume. Standardized regression analysis
74
 highlight the 
significance of the relative volume volatility as an explanatory variable, as the models based on 
the relative volume volatility provide the best fit based on explanatory power and robustness of 
the results.   
  I also find that firms industry plays a role in how fast the stocks' price difference returns 
to the equilibrium. The standardized regression results show consistently that firms in financial 
and technology industries converge quicker by about .6 of the standard deviation relative to firms 
in other industries. Finally, in contrast to other studies in the field, I find that some of stock 
prices provide feedback back to the foreign exchange market. In other words, the exchange rate 
is endogenous with respect to these stocks. The breakdown of the time series by year suggests 
that this anomaly is created by the financial crisis. Furthermore, the stock prices of these firms 
tend to respond slower to the exchange rate shocks compared to the stocks that provide no 
feedback to the foreign exchange. 
 It should be noted that my conclusions are based solely on a sample of Canadian stocks 
that are cross-listed on the NYSE. There are a few specific factors that make them different from 
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other cross-listed shares. First, they trade as ordinaries and don’t require a share conversion 
which reduces transaction costs. Second, there is almost a perfect overlap of trading hours in the 
two markets
75
. The investigation into the factors that contribute to the feedback from the stock 
prices to the exchange rate I leave for future research. 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Sample Firms 
Trading Volume 
Information 
Number of shares 
traded on the NYSE 
(million) 
Number of shares 
traded on the TSX 
(million) 
Total number of 
shares traded on both 
markets 
5th percentile 32.1 27.1 121.2 
25th percentile 254.2 278.4 636.9 
Median 489.0 635.7 1,282.5 
75th percentile 1,595 1,311.0 3,002.2 
95th percentile 5,290 2,669.8 7,009.7 
Company 
Information 
Average Market 
Capitalization (US$ 
million) 
Duration of listing on 
the NYSE (years) 
Percentage of shares 
traded on the NYSE 
5th percentile 304 1.0 13% 
25th percentile 1,813 2.1 28% 
Median 7,400 6.7 57% 
75th percentile 18,970 10.9 68% 
95th percentile 38,831 16.4 85% 
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Table 2.  Error Correction Models* 
 
Panel A: Estimated Values of β 
(Normalized, so that   
   
equals 1)     
 
    
 5th percentile -1.051 
 25th percentile -1.008 
 Median -1.006 
 75th percentile -1.002 
 95th percentile -0.984 
  
Panel B: Estimated values of α 
  
 
         
5th percentile -0.13 -0.02 
25th percentile -0.81 0.01 
Median -0.91 0.06 
75th percentile -0.97 0.15 
95th percentile -1.06 0.21 
 
Panel C: Estimated values of half-
life 
  
 
Half-life
1
 Half-life (all stocks)
2
 
5th percentile 0.18 0 
25th percentile 0.21 0.20 
Median 0.31 0.29 
75th percentile 0.47 0.42 
95th percentile 5.34 4.91 
 
*The following error correction model is estimated for each firm. Schwarz Bayesian criterion is used to determine 
the number of lags. 
 
       
            
       
      
       
 
              
 
         
      
        
 
   
      
             
       
      
       
 
              
 
         
      
      
 
The values of β obtained using the Johansen cointegration methodology are reported in Panel A. Summary statistics 
of estimated values of α are reported in Panel B. The estimates of half-life that use estimates of α from panel B, are 
reported in Panel C. The percentiles for     are computed using the absolute values.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Excluding the stocks with “undefined”, i.e.      < -1, half-life. 
2
 Stocks with      < -1, given half-life equal to 0.  
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Table 3.   Breakdown of the significance of     for each stock by year.* 
 
2008   2009   
 
2008   2009   
NYSE 
ticker      p-value      p-value 
NYSE 
ticker      p-value      p-value 
abx 0.204468 0.016 -0.03175 0.868 itp 0.00611 0.89 -0.00308 0.894 
aem 0.269662 0.001 -0.03365 0.826 ivn 0.04642 0.112 -0.01928 0.776 
agu 0.07357 0.501 0.208218 0.224 kfs -0.15521 0.001 0.058197 0.166 
auy 0.145783 0.217 -0.0543 0.642 kgc 0.11397 0.203 0.194468 0.189 
bce -0.03423 0.837 0.198526 0.314 mdz 0.32018 0 0.058855 0.549 
bmo -0.02144 0.808 0.076108 0.653 mfc 0.07034 0.233 0.048247 0.742 
bns 0.049093 0.584 -0.11997 0.427 noa 0.09547 0.003 0.010798 0.766 
bte -0.03557 0.669 0.070684 0.529 nxy 0.12526 0.133 0.052654 0.705 
bvf 0.092566 0.19 0.306721 0.133 pot 0.10601 0.252 0.190411 0.241 
cae -0.00403 0.955 0.038182 0.635 pvx 0.0539 0.43 0.055214 0.388 
ccj 0.035579 0.752 -0.02283 0.849 pwe 0.02528 0.751 0.160374 0.277 
cls -0.01039 0.792 -0.05325 0.486 rba 0.05302 0.238 0.219078 0.12 
cm -0.06113 0.447 0.252151 0.196 rci 0.20975 0.012 0.055849 0.743 
cmz 0.037121 0.289 0.002826 0.908 ry 0.06234 0.476 -0.11842 0.519 
cni -0.08003 0.538 0.073927 0.638 slf -0.02362 0.733 0.131239 0.317 
cnq 0.18888 0.095 0.18042 0.253 slw 0.09779 0.14 0.188782 0.15 
cot 0.044397 0.089 0.104553 0.138 stn 0.04128 0.617 0.065887 0.507 
cp 0.180233 0.086 0.092193 0.557 su 0.14744 0.066 0.141484 0.282 
enb 0.136385 0.311 0.217449 0.307 tc 0.15196 0.036 0.006404 0.942 
ent -0.01315 0.667 -0.02944 0.204 tck NA NA NA NA 
erf 0.124736 0.128 0.100245 0.454 td 0.27802 0.005 0.3107 0.176 
gg 0.208282 0.001 0.050019 0.736 thi 0.33185 0.002 0.061945 0.72 
gib 0.148334 0.05 0.083014 0.497 tlm 0.19539 0.02 0.041988 0.792 
grs 0.005846 0.887 0.063729 0.391 trp -0.08894 0.708 0.247379 0.295 
iag -0.01189 0.835 0.178746 0.178 ufs -0.04248 0.245 0.020887 0.597 
 
*The highlighted p-values show stocks for which      is significant at 1% or 5% level of significance. 
Notes: 
1. TCK is excluded from the analysis because the null hypothesis of the unit root could be rejected. 
2. ECA and TU are excluded since long run relationship doesn’t hold for these stocks. TRI is excluded for lack of 
trading data for the whole sample period. 
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Table 4.  Cross-Sectional Regression Related Variables* 
Liquidity Measure 
 
relvolvolatility   
5th percentile 
 
0.03 
 
25th percentile 
 
0.30 
 
Median 
 
0.64 
 
75th percentile 
 
7.34 
 
95th percentile 
 
75.16 
 
Measures of trading 
prevalence relavol USvolshare 
  
5th percentile 0.15 13% 
 
25th percentile 0.38 28% 
 
Median 1.33 57% 
 
75th percentile 2.14 68% 
 
95th percentile 5.94 85% 
 
Company Characteristics  avcap years   
5th percentile 304 1.0 
 25th percentile 1,813 2.1 
 Median 7,400 6.7 
 75th percentile 18,970 10.9 
 95th percentile 38,831 16.4   
 
* Relavol is a ratio of daily average volume on TSX and daily average volume on the NYSE;  Relvolvolatility is a 
ratio of daily volume variances; USvolshare, is the number of shares traded on the NYSE as a percentage of the total 
number of shares traded in that stock on the TSX and the NYSE during the two year period;  years is the number of 
years the firm has been listed on the NYSE through January 1, 2008; Avcap is the average market capitalization of 
the firm during the two year period. The data sources are the CRSP database, websites of the exchanges, and yahoo 
financial database.  
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Table 5.  Regression Results Based on the US Trading Share* 
The dependent variable is     |, the speed of convergence to equilibrium due to the exchange rate shock estimated 
from VECM model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Positive 
estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance 
matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
USvolshare is a measure of geographic trading prevalence; lavcap is the log of average market capitalization over 
the sample period; exmove  is a dummy capturing financial crisis feedback to exchange rate; lyears is the log of the 
number of years for which the stock was listed on NYSE. Financial, Materials, Technology, and Services are 
industry dummies. 
See table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for details on variable construction and description. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable      |      |      |      |      | 
            
USvolshare 0.043 0.018 0.073 0.212* 0.235 
 
(0,41) (0.19) (0.78) (1.76) (1.90) 
Lyears 
 
-0.026** -0.016 -0.028* -0.035** 
  
(-2.10) (-1.21) (-1.68) (-2.32) 
Exmove 
  
-0.091*** -0.068* -0.075** 
   
(-2.96) (-1.89) (-2.04) 
Financial 
   
0.163 0.131 
    
(1.34) (1.08) 
Materials 
   
-0.008 -0.037 
    
(-0.10) (-0.47) 
Technology 
   
0.123 0.103 
    
(1.11) (0.94) 
services 
   
0.019 0.002 
    
(0.21) (0.02) 
lavcap 0.009 
   
0.015 
 
(0.64) 
   
(1.33) 
constant 0.857*** 0.924*** 0.912*** 0.822*** 0.823*** 
 
(10.71) (14.59) (14.54) (6.31) (6.148) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.016 0.052 0.159 0.322 0.348 
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Table 6.  Regression Results Based on the Relative Average Volume* 
The dependent variable is     |, the speed of convergence to equilibrium due to the exchange rate shock estimated 
from VECM model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable      |      |      |      |      | 
            
relavol -0.016** -0.016* -0.018** -0.025*** -0.026*** 
 
(-2.03) (-1.81) (-1.98) (-2.95) (-3.15) 
lyears 
 
-0.022 -0.013 -0.029* -0.036** 
  
(-1.60) (-0.92) (-2.01) (-2.45) 
exmove 
  
-0.097*** -0.065* -0.070** 
   
(-3.22) (-1.86) (-2.07) 
financial 
   
0.073 0.038 
    
(0.93) (0.47) 
materials 
   
-0.086 -0.112 
    
(-1.22) (-1.56) 
technology 
   
0.052 0.029 
    
(0.72) (0.40) 
services 
   
-0.061 -0.079 
    
(-0.77) (-1.01) 
lavcap 0.007 
   
0.014 
 
(0.66) 
   
(1.26) 
constant 0.915*** 0.960*** 0.983*** 1.052*** 1.067*** 
 
(40.57) (42.74) (49.21) (14.71) (14.80) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.190 0.216 0.349 0.528 0.551 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
relavol is a measure of geographic trading prevalence; lavcap is the log of average market capitalization over the 
sample period; exmove  is a dummy capturing financial crisis feedback to exchange rate; lyears is the log of the 
number of years for which the stock was listed on NYSE. Financial, Materials, Technology, and Services are 
industry dummies. 
See table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for details on variable construction and description. 
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Table 7.   Regression Results Based on the Relative Volume Volatility* 
The dependent variable is      |, the speed of convergence to equilibrium due to the exchange rate shock estimated 
from VECM model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable      |      |      |      |      | 
            
relvolvolatility -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(-3.92) (-3.62) (-3.73) (-4.63) (-4.74) 
lyears 
 
-0.021 -0.013 -0.025* -0.029** 
  
(-1.65) (-0.99) (-1.84) (-2.02) 
exmove 
  
-0.094*** -0.071** -0.074** 
   
(-3.26) (-2.15) (-2.29) 
financial 
   
0.019 -0.003 
    
(0.25) (-0.04) 
materials 
   
-0.084 -0.099 
    
(-1.27) (-1.55) 
technology 
   
0.041 0.028 
    
(0.54) (0.36) 
services 
   
-0.074 -0.083 
    
(-0.99) (-1.17) 
lavcap 0.002 
   
0.008 
 
(0.19) 
   
(0.81) 
constant 0.911*** 0.948*** 0.968*** 1.022*** 1.039*** 
 
(42.62) (50.31) (60.32) (16.02) (16.67) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.307 0.340 0.467 0.590 0.599 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
relvolvolatility is a measure of relative liquidity; lavcap is the log of average market capitalization over the sample 
period; exmove  is a dummy capturing financial crisis feedback to exchange rate; lyears is the log of the number of 
years for which the stock was listed on NYSE. Financial, Materials, Technology, and Services are industry 
dummies. 
See table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for details on variable construction and description. 
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Table 8.  Half-life Regression Results Based on the US Trading Share* 
Half-life is calculated as follows:           
        
           
, where      is the estimate from the error correction 
model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Half-life Half-life Half-life Half-life Half-life 
            
USvolshare -0.135 -0.090 -0.171 -0.400 -0.443* 
 
(-0.66) (-0.47) (-0.91) (-1.66) (-1.77) 
Lyears 
 
0.037* 0.023 0.042 0.055** 
  
(1.70) (0.97) (1.41) (2.05) 
exmove 
  
0.134*** 0.096 0.109* 
   
(2.92) (1.57) (1.74) 
financial 
   
-0.311 -0.252 
    
(-1.31) (-1.10) 
materials 
   
-0.029 0.024 
    
(-0.29) (0.17) 
technology 
   
-0.261 -0.225 
    
(-1.21) (1.91) 
services 
   
-0.098 -0.066 
    
(-0.57) (-0.40) 
Lavcap -0.020 
   
-0.027 
 
(-0.81) 
   
(-1.41) 
Constant 0.409** 0.294** 0.313** 0.502* 0.500* 
 
(2.54) (2.30) (2.44) (1.88) (1.92) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.036 0.046 0.120 0.285 0.312 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
The explanatory variables are the same as discussed in Table 5. 
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Table 9.   Half-life Regression Results Based on the Relative Average Volume* 
Half-life is calculated as follows:           
        
           
, where      is the estimate from the error correction 
model. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Half-life Half-life Half-life Half-life Half-life 
            
relavol 0.035* 0.034* 0.037* 0.050** 0.051** 
 
(1.97) (1.81) (1.85) (2.52) (2.65) 
lyears 
 
0.030 0.016 0.044* 0.056** 
  
(1.27) (0.67) (1.76) (2.27) 
exmove 
  
0.145*** 0.092 0.102* 
   
(2.85) (1.51) (1.75) 
financial 
   
-0.138 -0.071 
    
(-1.07) (-0.54) 
materials 
   
0.127 0.176 
    
(1.20) (1.57) 
technology 
   
-0.124 -0.081 
    
(-1.03) (-0.66) 
services 
   
0.059 0.092 
    
(0.46) (0.72) 
lavcap -0.015 
   
-0.025 
 
(-0.91) 
   
(-1.46) 
Constant 0.259*** 0.188*** 0.154*** 0.057 0.030 
 
(7.23) (4.53) (3.80) (0.52) (0.27) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.281 0.288 0.381 0.542 0.567 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
The explanatory variables are the same as discussed in Table 6. 
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Table 10.  Half-life Regression Results Based on the Relative Volume Volatility* 
Half-life is calculated as follows:           
        
           
, where      is the estimate from the error correction 
model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Half-life Half-life Half-life Half-life Half-life 
            
relvolvolatility 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(3.49) (3.30) (3.29) (4.23) (4.28) 
lyears 
 
0.029 0.016 0.036 0.043* 
  
(1.34) (0.75) (1.54) (1.76) 
exmove 
  
0.139*** 0.105 0.111** 
   
(3.01) (1.96) (2.11) 
financial 
   
-0.025 0.13 
    
(-0.22) (0.12) 
materials 
   
0.130 0.156 
    
(1.30) (1.59) 
technology 
   
-0.101 -0.077 
    
(-0.77) (-0.56) 
services 
   
0.089 0.106 
    
(0.75) (0.94) 
lavcap -0.005 
   
-0.015 
 
(-0.34) 
   
(-0.93) 
Constant 0.269** 0.215*** 0.186*** 0.090 0.079 
 
(8.29) (6.47) (6.13) (0.91) (0.81) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.432 0.450 0.537 0.641 0.650 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
The explanatory variables are the same as discussed in Table 7. 
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Table 11.  Standardized Regression Results Based on the US Trading Share* 
The dependent variable is      , each stock’s corresponding z-score of the speed of convergence to equilibrium due 
to the exchange rate shock estimated from VECM model. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable                               
            
zusvolshare 0.135 -0.112 -0.182 -0.457 -0.460 
 
(-0.62) (-0.55) (-0.84) (-1.42) (-1.40) 
zyears 
 
0.042 0.004 0.039 0.059 
  
(0.31) (0.03) (0.21) (0.28) 
exmove 
  
0.443*** 0.596*** 0.596*** 
   
(2.45) (2.70) (2.62) 
financial 
   
-1.106*** 
-
1.056*** 
    
(-2.98) (-3.72) 
materials 
   
0.061 0.065 
    
(0.25) (0.25) 
technology 
   
-0.887*** -0.897** 
    
(-2.79) (-2.63) 
services 
   
-0.131 -0.148 
    
(-0.52) (-0.57) 
zcap -0.117 
   
-0.051 
 
(-0.72) 
   
(-0.30) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.026 0.015 0.077 0.245 0.247 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
zusvolshare is a measure of geographic trading prevalence; zcap is the log of average market capitalization over the 
sample period; exmove  is a dummy capturing financial crisis feedback to exchange rate; zyears is the log of the 
number of years for which the stock was listed on NYSE. Financial, Materials, Technology, and Services are 
industry dummies. 
See table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for details on variable construction and description. 
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Table 12.  Standardized Regression Results Based on the Relative Average Volume* 
The dependent variable is      , each stock’s corresponding z-score of the speed of convergence to equilibrium due 
to the exchange rate shock estimated from VECM model.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable                               
            
zrelavol 0.510* 0.511* 0.539* 0.673 0.676** 
 
(1.92) (1.87) (1.94) (2.29) (2.28) 
zyears 
 
0.045 0.008 0.074 0.059 
  
(0.31) (0.06) (0.43) (0.29) 
exmove 
  
0.456** 0.399 0.400 
   
(2.58) (1.60) (1.60) 
financial 
   
-0.917*** 
-
0.957*** 
    
(-5.24) (-5.31) 
materials 
   
0.177 0.177 
    
(0.86) (0.85) 
technology 
   
-0.812*** 
-
0.808*** 
    
(-3.77) (-3.65) 
services 
   
-0.038 0.052 
    
(0.11) (0.15) 
zcap -0.089 
   
0.038 
 
(-0.70) 
   
(0.30) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.269 0.263 0.333 0.500 0.501 
      *Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
zrelavol  is a measure of geographic trading prevalence; zcap is the log of average market capitalization over the 
sample period; exmove  is a dummy capturing financial crisis feedback to exchange rate; zyears is the log of the 
number of years for which the stock was listed on NYSE. Financial, Materials, Technology, and Services are 
industry dummies. 
See table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for details on variable construction and description. 
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Table 13.  Standardized Regression Results Based on the Relative Volume Volatility* 
The dependent variable is      , each stock’s corresponding z-score of the speed of convergence to equilibrium due 
to the exchange rate shock estimated from VECM model.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable                               
            
zrelvolvolatility 0.632*** 0.633*** 0.651*** 0.696*** 0.709*** 
 
(3.49) (3.45) (3.58) (4.33) (4.40) 
zyears 
 
0.049 0.013 0.056 0.014 
  
(0.37) (0.10) (0.37) (0.08) 
exmove 
  
0.443*** 0.416* 0.417* 
   
(2.71) (1.79) (1.84) 
financial 
   
-0.566*** 
-
0.677*** 
    
(-8,77) (-5.17) 
materials 
   
0.097 0.097 
    
(0.59) (0.59) 
technology 
   
-0.818** -0.808** 
    
(-2.41) (-2.53) 
services 
   
-0.069 -0.109 
    
(-0.23) (-0.35) 
zcap -0.006 
   
0.106 
 
(-0.05) 
   
(0.87) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.427 0.430 0.496 0.598 0.605 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
zrelvolvolatility is a measure of relative liquidity; zcap is the log of average market capitalization over the sample 
period; exmove  is a dummy capturing financial crisis feedback to exchange rate; zyears is the log of the number of 
years for which the stock was listed on NYSE. Financial, Materials, Technology, and Services are industry 
dummies. 
See table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for details on variable construction and description. 
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Table 14.  Standardized Half-life Regression Results Based on the US Trading Share* 
Half-life is calculated as follows:           
        
           
, where      is the estimate from the error correction 
model. The dependent variable is zhalf, each stock's corresponding z-score of the half-life. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable zhalf zhalf zhalf zhalf zhalf 
            
zusvolshare -0.259 -0.229 -0.255 -0.472 -0.478 
 
(-0.99) (-0.95) (-0.97) (-1.15) (-1.15) 
zyears 
 
-0.029 -0.043 -0.018 0.034 
  
(-0.33) (-0.45) (-0.17) (0.28) 
exmove 
  
0.164 0.293 0.291 
   
(1.12) (1.68) (1.57) 
financial 
   
-0.817* -0.691** 
    
(-1.82) (-2.24) 
materials 
   
0.069 0.077 
    
(0.31) (0.33) 
technology 
   
-0.715* -0.741* 
    
(-1.80) (-1.76) 
services 
   
-0.207 -0.251 
    
(-1.14) (-1.22) 
zcap -0.165 
   
-0.127 
 
(-0.98) 
   
(-0.73) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.079 0.053 0.062 0.161 0.171 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
The explanatory variables are the corresponding z-scores of explanatory variables discussed in Table 11. 
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Table 15.  Standardized Half-life Regression Results Based on the Relative Volume 
Average* 
Half-life is calculated as follows:           
        
           
, where      is the estimate from the error correction 
model. The dependent variable is zhalf, each stock's corresponding z-score of the half-life. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable zhalf zhalf zhalf zhalf zhalf 
            
zrelavol 0.647* 0.647 0.657 0.780* 0.788* 
 
(1.68) (1.66) (1.62) (1.72) (1.71) 
zyears 
 
-0.022 -0.036 0.026 0.037 
  
(-0.26) (-0.40) (0.27) (0.32) 
exmove 
  
0.164 0.076 0.075 
   
(0.82) (0.29) (0.29) 
financial 
   
0.662*** -0.633*** 
    
(-2.95) (-3.36) 
materials 
   
0.233 0.233 
    
(1.13) (1.12) 
technology 
   
-0.683*** -0.686** 
    
(-2.06) (-2.04) 
services 
   
-0.015 -0.025 
    
(-0.05) (-0.09) 
zcap -0.113 
   
-0.027 
 
(-1.16) 
   
(-0.37) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.432 0.419 0.428 0.536 0.536 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
The explanatory variables are the corresponding z-scores of explanatory variables discussed in Table 12. 
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Table 16.  Standardized Half-life Regression Results Based on the Relative Volume 
Volatility* 
Half-life is calculated as follows:           
        
           
, where      is the estimate from the error correction 
model. The dependent variable is zhalf, each stock's corresponding z-score of the half-life. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable zhalf zhalf zhalf zhalf zhalf 
            
zrelvolvolatility 0.778*** 0.779*** 0.785*** 0.835*** 0.842*** 
 
(2.74) (2.73) (2.69) (2.96) (2.97) 
zyears 
 
-0.018 -0.030 0.008 0.092 
  
(-0.27) (-0.45) (0.10) (0.41) 
exmove 
  
0.147 0.091 0.092 
   
(0.94) (0.41) (0.41) 
financial 
   
-0.255*** -0.313*** 
    
(-5.65) (-4.22) 
materials 
   
0.151 0.151 
    
(1.20) (1.19) 
technology 
   
-0.074 -0.699 
    
(-1.46) (-1.46) 
services 
   
0.028 0.049 
    
(0.13) (0.22) 
zcap -0.010 
   
0.057 
 
(-0.19) 
   
(0.90) 
      Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.648 0.649 0.656 0.713 0.715 
 
*Positive estimates indicate faster speed of adjustment. Adjusted t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix as per White (1980) are in parentheses below the coefficients. Two-tailed significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent level is represented by ***, **, and * respectively.  
The explanatory variables are the corresponding z-scores of explanatory variables discussed in Table 13. 
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Figure 1.  $C/$U.S. Exchange rate 2005-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Financial Stress Index 1994-2014 
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Figure 3.  Plot of        versus    for 17 firms in the sample that have shown adjustment 
in both, stock markets and foreign exchange.   
 
Note: The variables     and     are the coefficients of the error correction terms from equations 5 and 6, 
respectively, in the error correction model estimated separately for each stock. The estimates of      |and     can be 
interpreted as the average adjustment of each series towards the other to restore equality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.60 
0.80 
1.00 
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 
|αdif| 
αer 
45◦ line 
-76- 
 
Chapter 3   
“Explaining the cross-sectional dispersion in reaction of Canadian cross-listed 
stocks to the U.S. and Canadian macroeconomic news during the financial crisis” 
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1. Introduction 
 In real-time, there is an almost daily flow of macroeconomic releases to financial 
markets, which provide most of the relevant information on their fundamentals, i.e. the state of 
the economy and inflation. Given the forward looking nature of interest rates and the efficiency 
of asset prices, the expectation is that only unanticipated news that causes revisions to 
expectations of macroeconomic fundamentals may move stock prices. 
 Numerous papers have studied the impact of macroeconomic news releases on financial 
markets and exchange rates. These studies differ in terms of the panel of economic 
announcements considered, the financial instruments, the frequency of observation and the time 
period examined. Hence, the findings regarding which news systematically moves markets, as 
well as their relative importance, are sometimes conflicting. 
 This paper extends the analysis of the response of asset prices to macroeconomic news 
releases, including monetary policy actions, in several ways. First, we look at the behavior of the 
equity prices
76
 of the Canadian companies cross-listed on the Toronto and New York stock 
exchanges and their response to a large panel of both American and Canadian news, including all 
the important surveys, in the context of the law of one price. This approach allows controlling for 
the foreign exchange effect, which is the main reason for the shares of the same company to have 
a different price across international markets. Second, due to the non-stationarity nature of the 
stock price differentials (SPD), an EGARCH model – which is a predominant estimation 
technique in current literature – is not appropriate because it assumes stationarity.  Therefore we 
employ a vector error-correction model for estimation, which addresses this problem. Thus, we 
examine the dynamic effect the macroeconomic releases have on stock price differentials and 
                                                          
76
 In contrast to the majority of literature that examines that effect of news on asset return, we look at prices because 
we analyze the effects in the context of the law of one price. 
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whether they may contribute to faster convergence to the law of one price. For this, we compare 
the announcement effects with surprises. Third, by using disaggregated data we are able to 
explain the cross-sectional dispersion in reaction of the stock price differential to the news 
releases based on stock characteristics. To our knowledge, this is the first such attempt in 
literature. Last, we concentrate on the period of the recent financial crisis to examine the effect of 
macroeconomic releases on the asset prices during tumultuous times – an issue that has not yet 
been addressed by the extensive news literature. The motivation of this study is indeed not only 
to assess whether news releases affect stock price differentials across international markets, but 
also to gain insight into why stocks react to certain news. 
 We find that not only surprises to macroeconomic fundamentals affect the dynamics of 
the SPD, but just the fact that the announcements are made matters as well. For example, both 
the U.S. and the Canadian monetary policy announcements affect the SPD. Furthermore, the 
effect of the monetary announcements is more significant than the effect of the monetary policy 
surprises. We also find that the inclusion of the macroeconomic announcements and surprises to 
macroeconomic indicators significantly increases the speed of convergence to the equilibrium. 
Depending on the specification, the half-lives are 10%-18% lower than the half-lives from the 
basic model, and the differences are statistically significant across all specifications. In addition, 
our measures of prevalent trading location show that responses to the monetary policy 
announcements are geographically biased – the importance of domestic monetary policy 
announcements depends on whether the stock is traded more at the home or foreign market. 
Finally, while we shed a lot of light on individual stock's reaction to macroeconomic 
announcements, we are not as successful in explaining the dispersion in stock reaction to 
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surprises in macroeconomic indicators, which we attribute to the time frame of our analysis that 
includes the crisis period. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the stock data and studies the properties of news and 
expectations of the macroeconomic variables. In section 4, we describe the econometric 
methodology used to assess the SPD response to these announcements and surprises in 
macroeconomic indicators, as well as our cross-sectional approach.  Section 5 reports the results 
and section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1  Macroeconomic announcements effects on the foreign exchange market. 
 This strand of literature started in the early 1980s and first focused on how money supply 
releases affected the foreign exchange rates. This was due to the key role money played in the 
exchange rate models of the time and the policy employed by the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 
1982 to achieve a desired path of M1 by targeting non-borrowed reserves. Cornell (1982) and 
Engel and Frankel (1984) regressed daily exchange rate changes on money supply announcement 
surprises. Both found that positive shocks to M1 increased the value of the U.S. currency and 
argued that this result supports the notion that a rise in the money supply produces expectations 
of future money tightening.  Hardouvelis (1984) observed a similar result, but also found that the 
expected future value of the U.S. dollar depreciated with positive M1 shocks. Later expanding on 
this work, Hardouvelis (1988) examined effect of other macro announcements on the exchange 
-80- 
 
rate. Using daily data from 1979 to 1984, he showed the importance of trade deficit, inflation and 
business cycle news.  
 The effect of the news about reserves on the exchange rate had not been consistent over 
time, however. For example, Doukas (1985) used the daily data from 1974 to 1978 to examine 
the reaction of CAD/USD exchange rate to both Canadian and U.S. money supply 
announcements. He found that U.S. money surprises were more influential, possibly because 
Canadian monetary policy announcements were perceived as less important. On the other hand, 
Sheehan and Wohar (1995) found that the U.S. money supply announcements stopped affecting 
the USD rates in 1986 and 1987. The early works were not limited to the studies of the money 
supply surprises on exchange rates. Hakkio and Pearce (1985) examined the effect of M1, CPI, 
PPI, unemployment and industrial production shocks on seven exchange rates. They found that 
only M1 shocks consistently affected exchange rates and those effects were significant only after 
1979.  In a separate work, Tandon and Ulrich (1987) researched the effect of PPI, CPI, and U.S. 
money supply on the USD exchange rate with seven industrialized countries from 1977 to 1982. 
The authors found that the USD appreciated with respect to GBP and CAD in response to 
positive PPI shocks. CPI announcements, however, had no effect.  
 Some early papers examined the effects of budget deficit announcements and surprises on 
the exchange rates. Deravi et al. (1989) found that neither announcements nor surprises about 
U.S. Treasury deficits have an effect on the exchange rates. Such result could be due to an 
incorrect specification from ARIMA models, or lack of power because of the short length of the 
subsamples. Beck (1993) examined the effects of M1, U.S. federal budget balance, and spending 
projection shocks on the exchange rates, and found that unexpectedly large budget deficits raised 
real U.S. rates, causing capital inflows and USD appreciation. However, exchange rates stopped 
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reacting to budget deficits after 1985, when the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill was passed. 
Kitchen (1996) confirmed these results using a longer sample from 1981 to 1994. 
 In addition to monetary policy and budget deficit announcements, the early research also 
recognized the importance of the employment report. Moorthy (1995) documented that the U.S. 
employment news led to dollar appreciation. Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) conclude that 
employment news affects foreign exchange returns through expectations of future interest rates.  
 The researchers’ interest in monetary policy announcements has renewed in the end of 
the 20
th
 century as the U.K. government gave the Bank of England operational independence to 
conduct monetary policy, and the European Central Bank (ECB) began to conduct a common 
monetary policy for the original members of the European Monetary Union. Furthermore, the 
transparency of monetary policy has become increasingly important, and so researchers began to 
investigate the effects of policy actions, expectations, and communications more carefully. Galati 
and Ho (2003), for example, use rolling regressions to analyze the effect of the U.S. and 
European macroeconomic announcements on the USD/EUR exchange rate. They find that the 
geographic origin of news and whether the news is good or bad determine the response of the 
exchange rate.  
 Cagliesi and Tivegna (2005) found that scheduled news affects U.S. trading more, 
whereas news surprises dominate European trading. They also found lagged effects of news on 
exchange rates, and therefore rejected the semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis. These 
findings have not been confirmed by other literature. For example, Melvin et al. (2009) analyze 
the Bank of England announcements and its effect on currency markets from 1997 to 2007. They 
find no systematic affect on exchange rate returns.  
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 As the focus shifted from level analysis to analysis of exchange rate returns, GARCH 
models have become particularly dominant. Hayo and Neuenkirch (2009) use daily GARCH-in-
mean model and analyze the effect of U.S. and Canadian macro and monetary policy 
announcements on Canadian financial markets, including foreign exchange market returns for 
the period of 1998-2006. They find that while both the U.S. and Canadian announcements 
impact on markets, the monetary policy announcements mattered most in 2002-2004, when U.S. 
and Canadian monetary policies diverged. In a separate work, Hayo et al. (2008) examine FOMC 
effects on USD/EUR market, from 1998 to 2006.  They find formal communications to be of 
greater importance than informal communications.  
 Researchers also often attempted to link the reactions of the exchange rate to 
macroeconomic surprises to larger questions. Simpson et al. (2005) look into the implications of 
macro surprises for theoretical equilibrium conditions. More specifically, they analyze the effect 
of macro surprises on the purchasing power parity, covered interest parity, and the international 
Fisher effect, among others. The authors calculate the effect of 23 types of U.S. macroeconomic 
surprises on daily spot and forward returns for five currencies with respect to USD over a 10-
year period (1990-2000). They find that positive shocks to the U.S. inflation do not reduce USD 
exchange rate, which is inconsistent with continuous adjustment to PPP.  
 Recently, researchers have argued for jointly studying the effects of announcements on 
multiple asset prices. As Faust et al. (2007) describe, a lower-than-expected inflation might result 
from either weak demand or high productivity growth. In either case the effect on the exchange 
rate will be the same. However, a weak demand shock should decrease future interest rates, 
while high productivity might increase them; therefore a joint study of exchange rates and 
interest rates is needed to determine the likely source of the shock. They use a sample from 
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January 1987 through December 2002 of a 5-minute exchange rate and interest rate data and find 
that 10 U.S. news surprises strongly affect exchange rate returns. Stronger real U.S. activity 
appreciates USD and raise U.S. interest rates at all horizons.   
 Andersen et al. (2007) also emphasize the use of multiple assets to investigate impact of 
announcements on the state of the business cycle and co-movements among asset prices. Using a 
two-step WLS procedure, the authors study the effect of 25 U.S. macro announcements on USD 
exchange rate futures, as well as U.S., British, and German stock and bond futures. Their 
findings were similar to Faust et al. (2007).  
 
2.2  Macroeconomic announcements effects on the stock and bond markets. 
 Numerous empirical studies of financial markets provide substantial evidence in support 
of the argument that share returns are affected by announcements about macro-economic 
variables. Accordingly, equity prices are expected to have a strong relationship with macro-
economic variables. The argument implies that the intrinsic value of equity shares that depends 
on the present value of dividends paid out of company earnings; these earnings depend on real 
economic activities and therefore there should be a relationship between economic variables and 
share prices. Shiller (1981) and Leroy and Porter (1981) demonstrate that the macro-economic 
variables may affect the discount rate and the ability of the firm to generate cash flows – two 
fundamental variables which determine the intrinsic value of the equities in the discounted cash 
flow models. Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) believe that macro-economic variables are 
excellent candidates for determining returns, because changes in these measures will affect 
firms’ cash flows and influence risk-adjusted discount rate. Patro et al. (2002) argue that returns 
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on shares reflect underlying real economic activity; therefore, in the long run one would expect 
to observe a relationship between macroeconomic activity and equity returns.  
 Early US studies have found a connection between price level and stock returns. For 
example, Lintner (1973), Oudet (1973), Bodie (1976), Jaffe and Mandelker (1977) and Fama and 
Schwert (1977), which examined whether financial assets were hedges against inflation, have all 
reported a negative relation between stock returns and changes in the general price level, while a 
study by Firth (1979) arrived at the opposite conclusion observing a positive relationship 
between nominal stock returns and inflation. Fama (1981) shows evidence of a strong positive 
relationship between equity returns and real economic activities such as industrial production, 
capital expenditures and GNP. Chen et al. (1986), built on Fama’s investigation and tested 
whether a set of macro-economic variables explained unexpected changes in equity returns. They 
found evidence that the economic variables such as industrial production, changes in the risk 
premium and twists in the yield curve are significant factors in explaining stock returns.  
 Pearce and Roley (1985) find that surprises in monetary policy have a significant 
influence on stock prices while Jain (1988) note that announcements about money supply and 
consumer price index are significantly associated with stock price changes. Castanias (1979) 
relates macro-economic announcements to the variability of daily returns while Huang and 
Kracaw (1984) observe a significant linkage between the volatility of a stock index and the GNP. 
Cheung and Ng (1998), use the data for Canada, Italy, Germany, USA and Japan to investigate 
the relationship between macro-economic variables and national stock market indices. They 
conclude that changes in stock market indices are typically cointegrated with a country’s 
aggregate real economic activity such as oil price, consumption, money stock and output. 
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 The relationship between asset returns and macroeconomics news announcements has 
been explored in the recent literature as well. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show strong and 
consistent response of the stock market to unexpected monetary policy actions, while Birz and 
Lott (2011) indicate that news about GDP and unemployment does affect stock returns. Gilbert 
(2011) finds that revisions to nonfarm, payroll, GDP and industrial production affect daily 
returns on the S&P 500. Savor and Wilson (2013) show that stock market excess returns are 
significantly higher on the days that inflation, employment, and interest rate announcements are 
made.  
 Researchers have also examined the effects of macroeconomic news announcements on 
the bond markets. Mostly, the finance literature has focused on the high frequency impact of 
macroeconomic news announcements on the U.S. Treasury bond market. Fleming and Remolona 
(1997) analyze price changes in the 5-year Treasury note and find that macroeconomic news 
releases lead to largest price changes and increase in trading activity. Fleming and Remolona 
(1999) extend the analysis further and find a hump-shaped effect of impact of news on the yield 
curve. The effect of the news releases is stronger for intermediate maturities of 1 to 5 years. 
Balduzzi et al. (1997) arrive at similar conclusions.  
  Several papers have extended the analysis by looking at the response of different 
financial instruments to macroeconomic news releases. Among others, Andersen et al. (2007) 
and Bartollini et al. (2008) analyze stock, bond and foreign exchange markets. Faust et al. (2007) 
and Gilbert et al. (2010) look at interest rate futures and exchange rates, Hess (2004) and 
Veredas (2006), focus on T-bond futures, Beechey and Wright (2009) analyze the effect of news 
on spot and forward real and nominal interest rates. A common result that these papers arrive at 
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is that interest rates do respond to many macroeconomic news releases, with the employment 
report having the greatest impact.  
 A relatively new strand of literature has explored the connection between macroeconomic 
news announcements and price discovery. The implications of this research are quite important 
as it provides an insight into how financial markets process the arrival of macroeconomic 
information. For instance, Mizrach and Neely (2008) find weak evidence on the impact of 
announcements on price discovery. Only one of four cases when news is released does the 
futures market gains information share. Chen and Gau (2010), show that price discovery 
increases in the time surrounding macroeconomic announcement releases. Taylor (2011) 
assesses the level of price discovery for S&P 500 index constituents over 2002 year period. He 
finds an increase in information asymmetry and price discovery around release of key 
macroeconomic information. Frijns et al. (2014) examine the announcement effects on price 
discovery using 38 Canadian cross-listed stocks. By analyzing the effects of macroeconomic 
news announcements from both sides of the border, they find that price discovery shifts towards 
the U.S. markets. They conclude that this implies the difference in information processing 
capability between the U.S. and Canadian markets, particularly with regard to the processing of 
market-wide information. 
 Several papers have not found a significant effect of macroeconomic news releases on the 
financial markets. For example, Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) examine 17 
macroeconomic announcements but do not find significant effects of real GNP, retail sales, 
industrial production, and unemployment. Ghent (2010) also fails to find significant stock price 
effects of GDP news. 
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2.3  Summary 
 The literature on the effects of the macroeconomic news announcements and surprises is 
plentiful and diverse. The studies however, are mostly limited to several asset classes, such as 
foreign exchange rates, index funds, and Treasury futures. One can also expect a relationship 
between macroeconomic news releases and individual stock prices since businesses are 
concerned about inflation, industrial production, and other economic conditions (McQueen and 
Roley, 1993). Another limitation of the majority of the studies is that the analyses are done in the 
single market context, while in reality news affects prices of stocks listed on multiple markets. 
Furthermore, very few studies have analyzed the effect of the news releases during the recent 
financial crisis. Finally, none of the studies have analyzed the effect of the macroeconomic news 
releases in the context of the law of one price. These points combined provide an opportunity to 
investigate how macroeconomic news announcements and surprises affect the convergence to 
the law of one price by cross-listed stocks, and then examine which stock characteristics explain 
the heterogeneous stock reaction to different local and foreign macroeconomic news releases.  
 
3. Data Description 
 
3.1 Daily Stock Prices and Exchange Rate Data 
 
 3.1.1  Data Sources 
 The daily data used in this study are from the following sources. We obtained the list of 
companies listed on both the New York and Toronto stock exchanges from the TSX website, and 
later cross-referenced with the NYSE website for correct ticker information. At the time of data 
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collection, there were 55 companies listed on both TSX and NYSE. As of August 31, 2013, TSX 
database has 106 cross-listed companies on NYSE. The daily adjusted closing prices are from 
the Yahoo! Finance website. The data were later cross-referenced with COMPUSTAT North 
America database for accuracy. However, since Yahoo! Finance database also provides daily 
closing prices adjusted for splits and dividends, it was used as the primary data source for stock 
prices. In addition to prices, the Yahoo! Finance historical database provides daily trading 
volumes which we later use in the cross-sectional analysis.  
 For the exchange rate corresponding to the closing time of the stock exchange markets, 
i.e. 4 PM Eastern Standard Time, I use a Bloomberg dataset. This dataset provides the midpoint 
of bid-ask quotes at the closing of the foreign exchange market in New York. For accuracy, I 
cross-referenced the exchange rate data from Bloomberg with a tick data from Gain Capital 
historical database. Some of the other data, such as the date of listing in the United States and the 
market capitalization, are from the websites of exchanges and the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). CRSP provides historical daily data for number of outstanding shares, 
which are used to calculate the corresponding market capitalization for the day. Company 
industry classification is based on the classification by the Yahoo! Finance website. 
 
 3.1.2  Sample Details 
 Our study covers the two-year period from January 2, 2008 to December 31, 2009. This 
period is of a particular interest due to the financial crisis period that began in the end of 2007 
when financial markets experienced periods of extreme volatility. As Figure 1 shows, the 
Financial Stress Index was at its highest level in the past twenty years, reaching the peak of six at 
the end of the year 2008, and then declining back to levels around zero towards the end of 2009. 
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We choose to study Canadian stocks listed in the U.S. for several reasons. First, Canadian 
stocks represent the largest share of stocks cross-listed in the U.S. from a single country. Second, 
many of these Canadian stocks trade actively on both the TSX and the NYSE. Third, the trading 
hours of the TSX coincide with that of the NYSE (9:30 AM – 4:00 PM, EST), a distinct 
advantage for studying Canadian stocks relative to those from other world markets with little or 
no overlap in trading times between home and U.S. markets. Finally, Canadian stocks trade in 
the U.S. as ordinary shares, due to compatible accounting standards, whereas shares from other 
countries are American Depositary Receipts issued by the U.S. custodian banks. This makes it 
easier to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities, since it is not necessary to create or destroy 
depositary receipts. Similarly to Choi et al. (2012, 2013), I analyze Canadian stocks that are 
listed on the TSX in Canada and on the NYSE in United States. My sample has 491 days for 
which trading occurred simultaneously on both markets.  
 Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the sample firms. The data shows that 
majority of the Canadian firms trading on NYSE are well capitalized and are actively traded. 
Seventy five percent of the firms in the sample had more than 250 million shares traded on both 
the TSX and the NYSE over the two-year period and had an average market capitalization above 
1.8 billion. 
There is a great variation in market trading shares across the stocks. The share of trading 
volume in a stock on the NYSE for a median firm is 57 percent
77
, with a high of 95 percent and a 
low of 6 percent. Most of the stocks have a history of cross-listing, as only 5 percent of the firms 
have been listed for less than a year on the NYSE as of the beginning of the sample period. The 
median duration of a listing is 6.7 years.  
                                                          
77
 Interestingly,  the median share is above 50 percent (compared to 43 percent in Eun et al. (2003)), perhaps 
indicating a preference  shift towards trading in the United States, or perhaps an increased interest from U.S. 
investors for Canadian stocks during the crisis. 
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3.2  Macroeconomic News Announcements and Surprises 
 
 3.2.1  Macroeconomic News Announcements  
 Table 2 lists the names, sources, and frequency of the macroeconomic news releases used 
in this study. We obtain the date and the actual figures for the macroeconomic news 
announcements from Informa Global Markets and their respective websites as listed in the 
Appendix.  As we concentrate on the asset response to macroeconomic news announcements 
during the financial crisis, we include the announcements made during the two year period from 
Jan 2, 2008 to Dec 31, 2009. We choose macroeconomic announcements on both sides of the 
border that cover a wide range of economic activity. For the U.S., we choose announcements and 
surprise components that are of particular interest to financial markets participants, based on the 
list in Ielpo and Guegan (2009), and Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012). We choose announcements 
about nonfarm payrolls, unemployment, housing starts and consumer confidence as a proxy for 
real economic activity in the labor, real estate, and consumption markets. Nonfarm payrolls and 
unemployment figures are released by The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) monthly. Housing 
starts and consumer confidence are released monthly by the Census Bureau and the Conference 
Board, respectively. Each month the Conference Board surveys 5,000 households about labor 
market conditions receiving 3,500 responses (Neely 2010).  The summary of the survey is 
released on the last Tuesday of each month.  
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the most comprehensive measure of real economic 
activity and, as such, is important to the financial markets. The Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) releases quarterly advanced GDP reports in the final week of January, April, July and 
October, with two revision rounds – preliminary and final – following one and two months later, 
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respectively. Similarly to Andersen et al. (2003), we include all announcements about GDP in 
our analysis. In addition, we include announcements about new building permits, which are 
released by Census Bureau, to capture the business cycle phase.  
 To cover inflation information we use the Producer Price Index (PPI), and the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). Both are released by the BLS, with a one month lag, in the middle of the 
month. The PPI measures the price inflation of initial, intermediate, and final goods, and 
presages the CPI release.  
 Also included in our data set are three announcement types related to the monetary 
policy. First, we include the days on which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
released the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. The FOMC 
organizes eight meetings a year and reviews economic and financial conditions, determines the 
appropriate stance of monetary policy, and assesses the risks to its long-run goals. In addition, 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve releases the Fed Funds rate decision. There are 17 
such announcements during our sample period. In addition, given the nature of our sample 
period, we include the days on which Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve at the 
time, testified before the Congress or some of its Committees to explain the economic situation 
and the policies applied to improve it. These testimonies are included in the miscellaneous 
category, totaling 59 such testimonies.  
 The choice of Canadian macroeconomic announcements is made based on the lists of 
Gravelle and Moessner (2001), Doukas and Switzer (2004), and Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012). 
We use real GDP and building permits to control for business cycle, housing starts for real estate 
markets, unemployment rate to proxy labor market conditions, and CPI for inflation. All these 
announcements are made by Statistics Canada. In addition, two types of monetary policy related 
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announcements by the Bank of Canada (BoC) are used in our study. First, we include the BoC 
monetary policy report. In this periodically released report, the BoC provides a study of 
economic movements in Canada. It also indicates a sign of a new fiscal policy. There were 7 
such reports released during our sample period. Finally, we include the BoC interest rate decision 
announcements. 
 
 3.2.2  Macroeconomic News Surprises 
 According to the efficient market hypothesis, only new information should affect market 
prices. This new information is represented by the surprise component of the macroeconomic 
announcement. To compare coefficients on announcement surprises with different magnitudes, 
we follow the methodology introduced by Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001). We standardize 
surprises by subtracting the expected value from an actual release and divide by the standard 
deviation of the series of differences. For example, the standardized surprise for announcement j 
is as follows: 
  
   
  
 
   
 
  
                                                                                                                          (1) 
where   
 
 and   
 
 are the realization of the announcement j at time t and its expected realization, 
respectively, and     is the estimated standard deviation of those differences. We obtain the data 
on realization expectations from Informa Global Markets and Bloomberg services. The actual 
realizations are obtained from websites of the agencies that make the announcements. 
 
4. Methodology 
 Our goal is to examine the dynamic effects of macroeconomic announcements and 
surprises on the stock price differential of Canadian cross-listed companies in the context of the 
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Law of One Price. Further, we want to examine how these dynamic effects differ based on 
various stock characteristics. Due to the stochastic trend in the exchange rate and stock price 
differential time-series, we cannot use LS or GARCH methods for our estimation.  Therefore, 
our modeling approach consists of two stages. First, we add the exogenous time series of 
macroeconomic announcements and surprises to the vector error-correction model used in 
chapter 2 and estimate several specifications of the following equation 
             
   
                
 
           
 
      ;   n=16, m=15         (2)     
for each stock. In equation 2,     
    
  
 ,    αβ’ where α is the loading matrix showing  
the speed at which the system reverts back to the equilibrium, and β  is the cointergrating vector 
showing the long run relationship between the levels of the exchange rate (E) and stock price 
differential (Dif). The variables       and      are exogenous.      either takes value of 1 if the j
th
 
announcement is made on day t or 0 otherwise; while      is defined by eq.1.   
 In the second stage of our estimation we focus on the estimated values of α,   and  . 
First, we investigate whether macroeconomic announcements and/or surprises have an effect on 
how quickly the system reverts back to the equilibrium relationship. Hence, we perform the 
difference in means analysis on the α estimates obtained in chapter 2 and the α estimates 
obtained from different specifications of equation 2. Then we turn our attention to the estimates 
of δ and λ. These estimates show the response of the system to the macroeconomic 
announcements and surprises, respectively. Since we estimate equation 2 for each stock 
individually, we obtain fifty estimates for each type of announcement or surprise. Thus, we are 
able to comprise a sample of 50 observations and then perform cross-sectional analysis to 
explain the dispersion in response based on individual stock characteristics.  We follow 
Amemiya (1978), and perform a weighted least squares estimation. More specifically, we 
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estimate the following models to examine how stock characteristics affect the response of the 
stock to announcements and surprises: 
               
                          (3) 
               
                          (4) 
In equations 3 and 4, Z is a vector of the stock characteristics, i is an index for stocks  
(i=1,…,50), and j is an index for announcements/surprises. Similarly to Eun and Sabherwal 
(2003) we include market capitalization, number of years the stock has been cross-listed, 
industry, and the share of the trading volume on the US market in the Z vector. In addition, we 
use a ratio of average daily volume as an alternative measure of prevalent trading location and a 
relative liquidity measure introduced in chapter 2. 
 
5. Results 
In this section, we present the results of the models proposed in the previous section. We divide 
this into two subsections. First, we present the results from the time series analysis, and the 
analysis of the speed of convergence with and without controlling for announcements and 
surprises. Then, we follow with the discussion of the cross-sectional models 3 and 4. 
 
5.1 Time series analysis 
 
 5.1.1  The role of the announcements and surprises in the time series dynamics.  
 Our time series analysis involves two steps. First, we assess the role of the 
announcements and surprises in the time-series dynamics by estimating the VECM of equation 2. 
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For robustness, we estimate several different specifications of equation 2, which are presented in 
Table 3.  
 The VECM is estimated by OLS with the optimal lag length chosen by SBIC – a test 
statistics that is most commonly used in the literature. We perform this procedure for every stock 
individually, hence we obtain fifty estimates for each type of announcement and surprise for 
each specification.
78
 It is reasonable to expect that the effects differ across individual stocks. 
Therefore, once we obtain the fifty estimates from the estimation of VECM models for each 
stock, we perform a weighted least squares regression of those estimates on a constant to obtain a 
weighted average estimator. We proceed with this approach for each type of an announcement 
and surprise.
79
   
 Tables 4 and 5 report on the first element of each   and   vector (see eq.2), together with 
the percentage of the stocks for which the estimators were significant
80
 on an individual level.  
The conclusion in recent literature is that due to the efficiency of stock markets only the surprises 
in macroeconomic indicators may have an effect on the stock market. We find, however, that on 
the individual stock level, the most significant are the announcements from the U.S. and 
Canadian central banks, with the estimators being significant for 70% and 48% of the stocks, 
respectively.  The surprises in monetary policy, however, have an effect on a much smaller 
percentage of stocks, with the U.S. monetary policy surprises significant for 20% of the stocks 
and only 4% for the Canadian monetary policy. We believe this result may be due to the time 
frame of our analysis. During the global financial crisis both the Fed and the Bank of Canada 
were expected to keep the interest rate at low levels, and since they did there weren’t many 
                                                          
78
 For this step, we discuss only results from specifications 1, 2, 4, and 5 for space conservation. The results are 
consistent across all specifications and are available upon request.  
79
 This approach follows Amemiya (1978) approach, with the w= 1/var(

 )  and w=1/var(

 ) for announcements 
and surprises, respectively. 
80
 At either 1%, 5%, or 10% significance level. 
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surprises in the policy announcements. However, when these announcements did happen, the 
investors responded to the policy confirmation by the central banks, and therefore these 
announcements played a significant role in the time series dynamics.  
 Additionally, we find that the announcement about the U.S. GDP is relatively significant 
on an individual stock level, with the estimates showing significance in 34% of the stocks. We 
attribute this result to the time frame of our analysis as well. During the financial crisis, 
investors’ primary focus would be on the performance of the U.S. economy.  Since GDP is one 
of the main indicators of the well-being of the economy, it is reasonable that during the panic 
environment created by the financial crisis investors reacted more to the announcements of the 
U.S. GDP numbers, rather than the surprises in them. For the rest of the announcements, the 
percentage of stocks showing significance is below 10%. When we look at the significance of 
surprises in macroeconomic indicators on an individual stock level, we find that other than the 
aforementioned surprises in the Fed monetary policy, surprises in Canadian inflation and 
surprises in the U.S. consumer confidence show significance in more than 10% of the stocks.  
 As the discussion above indicates, the effects vary across individual stocks, and, 
therefore, only for a few stocks does a particular announcement or surprise have significance
81
. 
Therefore, we average the effects across all the stocks for each announcement and surprise, using 
the weighted least squares estimation. We report the results of this procedure in the 2
nd
 column 
of the tables 4 and 5. We find that with the exception for the announcements about the U.S.  
GDP, surprises in U.S. unemployment, and Canadian GDP numbers, all other announcements 
and surprises are significant. Hence, we conclude that while a particular announcement or 
surprise in a macroeconomic indicator may or may not affect a particular stock, both 
                                                          
81
 Other than the 70% of the stocks that show significance of the Fed monetary policy announcements. 
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announcements and surprises play a role in the time series dynamics of the Canadian cross-listed 
stocks. 
 
 5.1.2  Effects on the speed of convergence and half life. 
 To further illustrate the importance of the macroeconomic announcements and surprises 
in macroeconomic indicators, the second step of our time series analysis investigates whether the 
inclusion of announcements and surprises in the VECM model affects the speed of the system’s 
convergence back to the law of one price – the long run equilibrium. For this purpose, we 
perform a paired difference test between the speed of convergence estimate without inclusion of 
announcements and surprises in the VECM model and the speed of convergence estimates 
obtained from estimation of VECM specifications in Table 3. In addition, we use the speed of 
convergence estimates to calculate the half-lives of the conversion and then perform the paired 
difference test again. 
 The results, which are presented in Table 7, clearly illustrate that both, announcements 
and surprises in macroeconomics indicators, contribute to faster convergence to the law of one 
price. Looking at Panel A, we find that the speed of convergence is faster by about 3%, 
depending on the specification. The faster convergence can be seen more profoundly from the 
paired difference test on the half-lives
82
, reported in Panel B. The average half-lives are shorter 
between 10.75% and 18.57%.  
 Why do announcements and surprises contribute to faster convergence to the law of one 
price? We believe that perhaps investors are more “in tune” with the market during the times of 
the announcements, especially in times of crisis.  As a macroeconomic announcement is made, 
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 Half-lives are calculated by          
        
        
, where α is the speed of convergence estimator from VECM. 
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regardless of whether it carries a surprise, the investors, already following the market due to the 
fact that the announcement is made, react faster and therefore the SPD adjusts faster.  
 
5.2  Cross-sectional analysis  
 We have seen that the effect of the announcements and surprises in the macroeconomic 
indicators on the SPD varies across stocks. In this section we analyze the determinants of this 
variation.  The dependent variables of interest are 

 and 

 , the effect estimates from the VECM 
estimation. To achieve better normality properties, we do perform logarithmic transformation of 
the estimates. However, since some of the estimates are negative, a straight forward logarithmic 
transformation cannot be done.  Therefore, we first shift the data in the following way: 
                                       (5) 
                                       (6) 
This shift assures non-negativity without changing the statistical properties of the data, and thus 
we can now perform the following weighted
83
 regressions to analyze the dispersion in cross-
listed stocks' reaction to announcements and surprises in macroeconomic indicators. 
                                                               
 
   
 
                                             (7)     
                                                               
 
   
 
                                            (8) 
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 The weights, following Amemiya (1977), are       
   and       
  , respectively. 
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where     is either the stock i's US volume share, relative average volume, or relative volume 
volatility, and              . 
 Table 8 presents the summary statistics of the explanatory variables used in the 
aforementioned regressions. The sample stocks are actively traded on both NYSE and TSX 
markets. The median number of shares traded over two year period is 1.28 billion shares and the 
median value of the U.S. share of the trading is 57 percent. Based on the daily average volume, 
TSX is more actively traded relative to the NYSE, as the median relative average volume is 1.33. 
Consequently, the trading on TSX is also less volatile, on average, as median relvolvolatility is 
0.64. Most of the Canadian cross-listed companies have been well capitalized during the two 
year period. Only five percent of companies had an average market capitalization of less than 
300 million, and the median company has an average market capitalization of 7.4 billion.  For 
our sample, the median duration of listing on the NYSE at the beginning of the study period is 
6.7 years. 
 Since our sample covers a wide range of announcements and surprises in macroeconomic 
indicators, we do not expect to find a common factor that would explain the variation in cross-
listed stocks' reaction to announcements or surprises. Instead, the main goal of our analysis is to 
provide an insight into which stock characteristics contribute to a stronger influence by an 
announcement or a surprise on the time series dynamics of the cross-listed SPD. The results of 
the VECM estimations are similar across the specifications. Therefore, for our cross-sectional 
analysis, we choose    estimates from specifications 1 and 2, to analyze the dispersion in cross-
listed stocks' reaction to the U.S. and Canadian announcements, and we choose    estimates from 
specifications 4 and 5, to analyze the dispersion in cross-listed stocks' reaction to the U.S. and 
Canadian surprises in macroeconomic indicators. 
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 We present the cross-section results on a country-specific basis. First, tables 9 and 10 
present the results for the U.S. announcements and surprises in macroeconomic indicators. Then, 
tables 11 and 12 present the results for Canada.  Our results confirm our expectation of no 
particular variable or pattern consistently contributing to the understanding of the dispersion in 
the reaction of the cross-listed stocks to announcements or surprises. However, the results do 
provide several interesting insights. 
 
 5.2.1  Dispersion in the stocks' reaction to the U.S. announcements and surprises  
 We are particularly interested in examining how liquidity measure proposed in chapter 2, 
as well as the U.S. trading volume share and relative average volume, contribute to stocks' 
reaction to the announcements and surprises in macroeconomic variables. We find that for two 
types of announcements, the release of FOMC minutes and announcements about nonfarm 
payrolls, the coefficients on these variables are significant. We focus mainly on the sign of the 
estimates, since those indicate whether a particular announcement or surprise plays a stronger 
role in the time series dynamics of the cross-listed stock based on a characteristic. Hence, for the 
FOMC minutes, the results in table 9 show that stocks that have a higher U.S. volume share, 
have a stronger reaction to FOMC announcement, while for those that have a higher share of 
trading occurring on the TSE, the reaction to FOMC announcements is weaker.  
 The sign of the relative average volume coefficient is negative, which is consistent with 
the previous discussion. Interestingly, the coefficient of the relative volume volatility is negative 
as well, which means that stocks respond stronger to the Fed announcements if the relative 
liquidity is higher in Toronto. Our interpretation of this result is that the investors, who invest in 
Canadian cross-listed stocks on the NYSE, are more responsive to the announcements made on 
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the U.S. side of the border. Hence, the stocks that have a higher trading volume share or higher 
daily average volume in the U.S. relative to the TSX, respond stronger to announcements of the 
U.S. central bank. Additionally, in order for Canadian investors to respond to the Fed 
announcements, the relative liquidity has to be higher on the home market. We find a similar 
result for the nonfarm payroll announcements.  Higher U.S. trading volume share in the U.S. and 
higher liquidity in Toronto lead to a stronger role of the nonfarm payroll announcements in the 
time series dynamics.  
 We also find that the industry of the stock contributes to understanding the stocks' 
reaction to the U.S. announcements. The nonfarm payrolls announcements have a weaker effect 
on stocks in the materials industry, while U.S. inflation announcements have a stronger effect on 
stocks in the financial and technology sectors. We attribute this weaker response of the stocks in 
the materials sector to the U.S. nonfarm payrolls announcements to the fact that these stocks 
comprise a large part of the stocks trading in the TSX.
84
 Therefore, investors in these stocks 
might be less sensitive to the announcements on the U.S. side of the border. On the other hand, 
the financial and technology sectors have been most volatile during the financial crisis, and it is 
reasonable for some U.S. announcements to have had a stronger effect on stocks in these sectors.   
 From table 10, we can see that our chosen explanatory variables, however, are not as 
successful in explaining the cross-listed stocks' reaction to the surprises in the U.S. 
macroeconomic variables.  We only find significance of the financial industry for surprises in the 
interest rate, technology industry for surprises in the GDP, and services industry and the length 
of cross-listing for surprises in inflation. Surprisingly, the U.S. share of trading volume, relative 
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 The stocks in the materials and energy sectors comprise more than 40% of the TSX. In our sample of 50 cross-
listed stocks, 26 are in the materials industry. 
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daily average volume and relative volume volatility are insignificant across all surprises, except 
for new building contracts. 
 
 5.2.2  Dispersion in the stocks' reaction to the Canadian announcements and surprises  
 Tables 11 and 12 present the results for the Canadian side of the border.  In contrast to 
the U.S. results, where we found that investors are more responsive to the Federal Reserve 
minutes rather than the actual interest rate announcements, the picture is reversed for Canadian 
monetary policy announcements.  While our regression model fails to explain variation in stocks’ 
reaction to the Bank of Canada monetary policy announcements, we find that our liquidity and 
geographic trading prevalence measures increase the effect of the interest rate announcements. 
Both measures of geographic trading prevalence show that higher trading volume on the TSX 
relative to the NYSE leads to stronger role of the Canadian interest rate announcements in the 
time series dynamics. On the other hand, stocks with higher relative volatility on the NYSE are 
more responsive to these announcements. These findings, together with our findings about the 
cross-listed stocks' reaction to the U.S. monetary policy announcements, are particularly 
interesting. As expected, domestic monetary policy has a stronger role in the time series 
dynamics for those stocks traded more prevalently on the domestic market. At the same time, the 
response to foreign monetary policy occurs only if the home market is relatively more liquid than 
the foreign market. The implication is that investors respond to monetary policy announcements 
through their home market, even though the stock trades on both the home and the foreign 
markets. While this could signal some market imperfections and a violation of the efficient 
market hypothesis, we believe that a more plausible reason is that during the financial crisis 
investors couldn't access the markets as easily. For example, as the Bank of Canada made 
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interest announcements, the U.S. investors not only couldn't respond to this by trading on the 
U.S. market due to relatively low stock liquidity or volume share, but also couldn't access the 
Canadian market. Conversely, Canadian investors with easier access to these stocks on the 
Canadian market were able to respond more adequately to the Bank of Canada interest 
announcements.  
 We also find that the length of cross-listing strengthens the effect of the Canadian interest 
rate announcements, while the response of the stocks in the financial industry is weaker. The 
longer the stock is cross-listed, the more time it allows investors to familiarize themselves with 
it, perhaps providing a larger pool of investors involved with the stock relative to stocks with 
shorter length of cross-listing. Thus, it is plausible that such stocks are more affected by the 
interest rate announcement. The negative sign of the coefficient of the financial industry is 
puzzling, as one would expect financial sector stocks to be more responsive to interest rate 
announcements.
85
 This result may be attributable to a low number of the financial sector stocks 
in our sample.
86
 However, we do find that stocks in the financial sector respond stronger to 
surprises in the interest rate. Perhaps, Canadian investors who follow the Bank of Canada closely 
form more precise expectations; hence, if there is a surprise in the announcement they react more 
strongly.   
 Our model also sheds light on the dispersion in cross-listed stocks' reaction to both 
announcements and surprises in the new building permits. Smaller cap stocks that are cross-listed 
for a longer period of time react stronger to these announcements. Conversely, surprises in the 
new building permits have a stronger effect on stocks in financial, technology, and services 
industries that have not been cross-listed for long. A final result of note is that, to our surprise, 
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 Similar to the response of the stocks in financial sector to surprises in the U.S. interest rate. 
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 There are only 7 stocks in the financial sector in our sample. 
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American investors react stronger to the Canadian GDP announcements than Canadian investors. 
Based on the signs of the geographic trading prevalence measures, stocks that have a higher 
trading volume share or higher relative average daily volume in the U.S. are affected more 
strongly by the Canadian GDP announcements.  Perhaps this owes to a difference in Canadian 
and American investors' announcement preferences. American investors may be putting greater 
weight on GDP announcements, while Canadian investors concentrate on interest rate and new 
building permits announcements. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we analyze the importance of the U.S. and Canadian announcements and 
surprises in macroeconomic indicators in the time series dynamics of the cross-listed stocks' 
price differential during the recent financial crisis. Using a version of the law of one price model 
introduced in chapters 1 and 2, we estimate several specifications of the vector error-correction 
model that include announcement dummies (zero-one) and/or standardized values of the 
surprises in these announcements. Additionally, by employing a weighted cross-sectional 
analysis, we use these VECM estimates to investigate the differences in stocks' reaction to these 
announcements and surprises, based on different stock characteristics. 
 In contrast to the current literature, we find that announcements, as well surprises in 
macroeconomic indicators, affect the stock market. In fact, on an individual stock level, the 
announcements by the Federal Reserve and Bank of Canada are the most impactful in the time 
series dynamics, affecting 70% of the stocks in our sample. Other important announcements are 
pertaining to the U.S. GDP and the Canadian interest rate.  Furthermore, when we consider the 
weighted average of the VECM estimates, we find that all but the announcement of the U.S. 
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nonfarm payrolls, surprises in the U.S. unemployment and the Canadian GDP, are significant in 
the time series dynamics of the SPD.  
 Additionally, we find that the inclusion of the announcements and surprises in the VECM 
model significantly increases the speed with which stock prices revert to the law of one price. 
We employ a paired difference test between the half-life estimates obtained in chapter 2 and the 
half-lives estimated from different specifications of our model. Our half-lives, depending on the 
specification, are lower by 10%-18%. We therefore conclude that during the times of the 
announcements, especially during the financial crisis, investors follow the market more closely 
and hence respond more quickly. 
 We also explore the reasons for the dispersion in cross-listed stocks reaction to 
announcements and surprises. We find that geographic trading prevalence and liquidity measures 
are helpful in explaining the dispersion in reaction to the FOMC minutes, nonfarm payroll, and 
the Canadian interest rate announcements. Moreover, the signs of the estimated coefficients 
indicate that these reactions are geographically biased. In particular, U.S. announcements have a 
stronger effect on stocks prevalently trading in the U.S., while the effect of the Canadian 
announcements is more profound for stocks trading more heavily in Toronto.    
 Surprisingly, the effect is reversed for the Canadian GDP announcements. We find that 
investors on the American market react stronger to these announcements. We interpret this result 
as an insight into the difference in announcement preferences between American and Canadian 
investors. Perhaps, American investors investing in foreign stocks are more concerned with 
foreign GDP announcements, while Canadian investors, as our results show, are more responsive 
to interest rate and new building permits announcements. 
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Table 1.  Summary statistics of sample firms 
Trading Volume 
Information 
Number of shares traded 
on the NYSE (million) 
Number of shares traded 
on the TSX (million) 
Total number of shares 
traded on both markets 
5th percentile 32.1 27.1 121.2 
25th percentile 254.2 278.4 636.9 
Median 489.0 635.7 1,282.5 
75th percentile 1,595 1,311.0 3,002.2 
95th percentile 5,290 2,669.8 7,009.7 
Company Information Average Market 
Capitalization (US$ 
million) 
Duration of listing on the 
NYSE (years) 
Percentage of shares 
traded on the NYSE 
5th percentile 304 1.0 13% 
25th percentile 1,813 2.1 28% 
Median 7,400 6.7 57% 
75th percentile 18,970 10.9 68% 
95th percentile 38,831 16.4 85% 
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Table 2. U.S. and Canadian Macroeconomic Announcements 
No Macroeconomic Announcement Obs Source Frequency 
 
CAN Announcements 
   1 Building Permits 24 CANSIM monthly 
2 Consumer Price Index 24 CANSIM monthly 
3 Gross Domestic Product 24 CANSIM monthly 
4 Housing Starts 24 CANSIM monthly 
5 Interest Rate 17 BoC 6 weeks 
6 Monetary Policy 7 BoC   3 months 
7 Unemployment 23 CANSIM monthly 
     
 
US Announcements 
   8 Building Permits 24 CB monthly 
9 Consumer Confidence 24 Conf. Board monthly 
10 Consumer Price Index 24 BLS monthly 
11 Fed Funds Rate 18 FRB 6 weeks 
12 FOMC Minutes 16 FRB 6 weeks 
13 Gross Domestic Product 24 BEA monthly 
14 Nonfarm Payroll 24 BLS monthly 
15 Producer Price Index 24 BLS monthly 
16 Unemployment 24 BLS monthly 
17 Housing Starts 24 CB monthly 
18 Miscellaneous  59 FRB unscheduled 
 
Total US and Canadian 
Announcements 428 
    Total Sample Days 493     
     
 
CANSIM = Statistics Canada 
   
 
BoC = Bank of Canada 
   
 
BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis 
   
 
CB = Census Bureau 
   
 
Conf.Board = Conference Board 
FRB = Federal Reserve Bank 
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Table 3.  VECM model specification description 
Model 
# Description 
1 U.S. Announcements only 
2 Canada Announcements only 
3 All Announcements 
4 U.S. Surprises only 
5 Canada Surprises only 
6 All Surprises 
7 U.S. Announcements and Surprises only 
8 Canada Announcements and Surprises only 
 
Table 4.  VECM results for the announcement effects based on specifications #'s 1 and 2.* 
Announcement  
weighted 
average of 
the 
estimator (  ) t-stat Total 
Specification 1 
   United States 
 
  
 Building starts 0.000937*** (4.69) 2% 
Consumer conf. -0.000845*** (-3.66) 4% 
CPI -0.001417*** (-7.34) 4% 
Fed Funds -0.005673*** (-17.94) 70% 
FOMC minutes -0.001597*** (-6.37) 2% 
GDP -0.002986*** (-14.49) 34% 
Non-farm  0.000238 (1.13) 2% 
PPI -0.001481*** (-8.97) 0% 
Miscellaneous 0.001395*** (9.95) 8% 
Specification 2  
 
  
 Canada 
 
  
 Building starts 0.001861*** (8.58) 4% 
CPI 0.001045*** (4.95) 2% 
GDP 0.000695*** (3.45) 2% 
Housing starts 0.000447** (2.23) 2% 
Interest rate 0.004128*** (15.54) 48% 
BOC announcements -0.003111*** (-10.44) 4% 
Unemployment -0.001131*** (-4.95) 2% 
*The weighted average is based on the regression of    , taken from estimation of the VECM specifications #1 and 
#2, on a constant with weights=1/var(  ). The "Total" column represent the percent of stocks for which    was 
significant on 1%, 5% or 10% significance level. 
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Table 5.  VECM results for surprises in macroeconomic indicators effects based on 
specification #'s 4 and 5.* 
Surprises 
weighted 
average of 
the 
estimator (  ) t stat Total 
Specification 4 
   United States     
 Building starts -0.001447*** (-4.66) 6% 
Consumer conf. 0.002447*** (9.97) 16% 
CPI -0.001027*** (-5.60) 4% 
Fed Funds -0.003032*** (-9.61) 20% 
GDP -0.000434** (-2.43) 2% 
Non-farm  0.001698*** (7.87) 8% 
PPI -0.002301*** (-16.79) 0% 
Unemployment 0.00004 (0.26) 2% 
Housing starts 0.002066*** (9.41) 2% 
Specification 5     
 Canada     
 Building starts -0.001172*** (-5.07) 4% 
CPI 0.003317*** (9.59) 44% 
GDP 0.000297 (1.24) 2% 
Housing starts 0.001748*** (10.87) 0% 
Interest rate -0.001387*** (-3.12) 8% 
Unemployment 0.002891*** (15.97) 14% 
*The weighted average is based on the regression of(  ), taken from estimation of the VECM specification #1, on a 
constant with weights=1/var(  ).The "Total" column represent the percent of stocks for which (  ) was significant 
on 1%, 5% or 10% significance level. 
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Table 6.  Estimated speed of adjustment ( ) and half-lives from VECM with and without 
announcements and surprises.* 
Model Specification 
average 
speed of 
convergence 
( ) 
average 
half life 
No ann/surprises -0.89 0.31 
U.S. announcements only -0.92 0.27 
Canada announcements only -0.92 0.27 
All announcements -0.92 0.25 
U.S. surprises only -0.91 0.27 
Canada surprises only -0.92 0.26 
All surprises -0.92 0.26 
U.S. only -0.92 0.27 
Canada only -0.92 0.25 
*The estimates of α are taken from the estimation of different specifications of eqn.2, except for the first row which 
are taken from Sorkin (2014). Half-lives are calculated as follows:          
       
       
 
 
Table 7. Paired Difference test results* 
 
Panel A: Speed of 
adjustment comparison   
Panel B:                 
Half-life comparison   
Model specification Difference t-stat Difference t-stat 
U.S. Announcements only -2.99%*** (-6.85) 13.7%*** 6.63 
Can. Announcements only -2.76%*** (-5.96) 13.64%*** 5.86 
U.S. and Can. Announcements only -3.55%*** (-7.44) 18.57%*** 6.57 
U.S. Surprises Only -2.27%*** (-5.42) 10.75%*** 5.08 
Can. Surprises only -3.04%*** (-5.6) 16.4%*** 5.43 
U.S. and Can. Surprises only -2.84%*** (-5.8) 14.5%*** 5.16 
U.S. Announcements and Surprises only -2.92%*** (-6.91) 13.44%*** 6.44 
Can. Announcements and Surprises only -3.31%*** (-5.95) 17.44%*** 5.72 
Average improvement 3.0 % 
 
14.8% 
  
*Panel A shows the percentage increase in speed of convergence for each VECM model specification. Panel B 
shows the percentage improvement in half-lives for each VECM model specification. *** indicates the significance 
of improvement at p<0.01 
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Table 8.  Cross-Sectional Regression Related Variables* 
Liquidity Measure 
 
relvolvolatility   
5th percentile 
 
0.03 
 
25th percentile 
 
0.30 
 
Median 
 
0.64 
 
75th percentile 
 
7.34 
 
95th percentile 
 
75.16 
 
Measures of trading prevalence relavol USvolshare   
5th percentile 0.15 13%  
25th percentile 0.38 28%  
Median 1.33 57%  
75th percentile 2.14 68%  
95th percentile 5.94 85%  
Company Characteristics  avcap years   
5th percentile 304 1.0 
 25th percentile 1,813 2.1 
 Median 7,400 6.7 
 75th percentile 18,970 10.9 
 95th percentile 38,831 16.4   
* Relavol is a ratio of daily average volume on TSX and daily average volume on the NYSE;  Relvolvolatility is a 
ratio of daily volume variances; USvolshare, is the number of shares traded on the NYSE as a percentage of the total 
number of shares traded in that stock on the TSX and the NYSE during the two year period;  years is the number of 
years the firm has been listed on the NYSE through January 1, 2008; Avcap is the average market capitalization of 
the firm during the two year period. See table A.2 for details on variable construction and description. The data 
sources are the CRSP database, websites of the exchanges, and yahoo financial database.  
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Table 9.  Cross-section results for dispersion in stocks' response to the U.S. announcements based on stock characteristics and 
liquidity measures. 
The variables lnavcap, lnyears, lnusvolshare, lnrelavol, and lnrelvolvol, are logs of the variables described in table 8. The results are obtained from a WLS 
regression of   , estimated from VECM specification #1, on the aforementioned explanatory variables. The weights are equal to      
  . Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES usbuildan usbuildan usbuildan consconfan consconfan consconfan uscpian uscpian uscpian 
lnavcap -0.000317 -0.000328 -0.000325 0.000157 0.000148 0.000158 -0.000091 -0.000087 -0.000075 
 
(-1.63) (-1.66) (-1.65) (0.60) (0.57) (0.59) (-0.34) (-0.32) (-0.27) 
lnyears 0.000360 0.000393* 0.000387* -0.000041 -0.000024 -0.000035 -0.000190 -0.000217 -0.000230 
 
(1.52) (1.71) (1.73) (-0.17) (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.94) (-1.09) (-1.17) 
financial 0.000750 0.000810 0.000811 0.000874 0.000853 0.000861 0.000111 -0.000027 -0.000016 
 
(0.94) (1.08) (1.07) (0.83) (0.84) (0.84) (0.11) (-0.02) (-0.01) 
technology 0.000509 0.000559 0.000559 -0.000417 -0.000434 -0.000429 -0.001009 -0.001123 -0.001115 
 
(0.59) (0.69) (0.69) (-0.31) (-0.33) (-0.32) (-0.99) (-1.14) (-1.10) 
services -0.000439 -0.000116 -0.000152 0.001132 0.001226 0.001208 0.000646 0.000245 0.000238 
 
(-0.36) (-0.10) (-0.13) (0.97) (1.14) (1.11) (1.05) (0.36) (0.34) 
materials -0.000107 0.000364 0.000303 0.000258 0.000440 0.000413 0.000284 -0.000227 -0.000234 
 
(-0.08) (0.29) (0.24) (0.19) (0.34) (0.32) (0.36) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
lnusvolshare 0.000321 
  
-0.000092 
  
-0.000724* 
  
 
(0.53) 
  
(-0.14) 
  
(-2.01) 
  lnrelavol 
 
0.000037 
  
0.000157 
  
0.000208 
 
  
(0.11) 
  
(0.41) 
  
(0.93) 
 lnrelvolvol 
  
0.000002 
  
0.000073 
  
0.000104 
   
(0.01) 
  
(0.35) 
  
(0.79) 
Constant 0.005860*** 0.005229*** 0.005273*** 0.006325*** 0.006275*** 0.006288*** 0.002968*** 0.003989*** 0.003986*** 
 
(3.24) (4.20) (4.10) (3.48) (4.94) (4.79) (3.09) (5.16) (4.93) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.113 0.103 0.102 0.093 0.099 0.097 0.168 0.125 0.122 
 
 
 
 - 
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Table 9. continued 
          (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
VARIABLES usgdpan usgdpan usgdpan usmisan usmisan usmisan usintan usintan usintan 
lnavcap -0.000214 -0.000209 -0.000214 0.000213 0.000218 0.000210 0.000524 0.000512 0.000545 
 
(-0.94) (-0.91) (-0.93) (1.37) (1.40) (1.34) (1.58) (1.53) (1.63) 
lnyears 0.000276 0.000262 0.000275 -0.000177 -0.000182 -0.000175 0.000049 0.000048 0.000030 
 
(1.27) (1.17) (1.27) (-1.39) (-1.42) (-1.37) (0.13) (0.13) (0.08) 
financial 0.001052 0.001051 0.001049 -0.000429 -0.000391 -0.000398 -0.001867 -0.002075* -0.002043* 
 
(1.29) (1.29) (1.31) (-0.95) (-0.87) (-0.88) (-1.57) (-1.82) (-1.75) 
technology 0.000901 0.000900 0.000898 -0.000291 -0.000260 -0.000265 -0.000847 -0.001018 -0.000996 
 
(1.00) (0.99) (1.01) (-0.47) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.50) 
services 0.001099 0.001000 0.001089 -0.000455 -0.000437 -0.000450 0.001491 0.001179 0.001332 
 
(0.92) (0.92) (0.99) (-0.94) (-1.00) (-1.00) (1.03) (0.93) (1.01) 
materials 0.001364 0.001200 0.001353 -0.000668 -0.000682 -0.000709 0.000823 0.000544 0.000822 
 
(1.12) (1.07) (1.20) (-1.31) (-1.47) (-1.40) (0.53) (0.40) (0.57) 
lnusvolshare -0.000023 
  
0.000188 
  
-0.001061 
  
 
(-0.04) 
  
(0.66) 
  
(-1.42) 
  lnrelavol 
 
-0.000072 
  
-0.000132 
  
0.000554 
 
  
(-0.22) 
  
(-0.95) 
  
(1.43) 
 lnrelvolvol 
  
0.000005 
  
-0.000074 
  
0.000357 
   
(0.03) 
  
(-0.89) 
  
(1.58) 
Constant 0.006136*** 0.006275*** 0.006164*** 0.004719*** 0.004560*** 0.004585*** 0.013916*** 0.015072*** 0.014841*** 
 
(3.65) (5.18) (5.06) (7.63) (11.20) (10.67) (6.99) (11.49) (10.81) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.081 0.082 0.081 0.065 0.070 0.070 0.185 0.181 0.195 
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Table 9. continued 
           (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
VARIABLES fedan fedan fedan nonfarman nonfarman nonfarman usppian usppian usppian 
lnavcap 0.000241 0.000258 0.000229 0.000080 0.000094 0.000062 0.000182 0.000182 0.000172 
 
(0.66) (0.72) (0.63) (0.25) (0.30) (0.19) (1.24) (1.22) (1.16) 
lnyears 0.000023 0.000001 0.000032 -0.000200 -0.000210 -0.000183 -0.000026 -0.000017 -0.000006 
 
(0.09) (0.00) (0.13) (-0.86) (-0.92) (-0.79) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.03) 
financial 0.000094 0.000222 0.000199 -0.000560 -0.000388 -0.000415 0.000756* 0.000840* 0.000831* 
 
(0.08) (0.19) (0.17) (-0.61) (-0.43) (-0.45) (1.75) (1.92) (1.89) 
technology 0.001354 0.001459 0.001443 0.000381 0.000522 0.000503 0.001305* 0.001374* 0.001368* 
 
(1.29) (1.44) (1.37) (0.54) (0.72) (0.65) (1.91) (1.89) (1.89) 
services 0.000590 0.000617 0.000662 -0.001005 -0.000818 -0.000848 0.000253 0.000443 0.000454 
 
(0.77) (0.90) (0.95) (-1.30) (-1.20) (-1.18) (0.37) (0.77) (0.77) 
materials 0.000325 0.000222 0.000285 -0.001228 -0.001116* -0.001181* 0.000305 0.000527 0.000542 
 
(0.38) (0.29) (0.36) (-1.65) (-1.70) (-1.77) (0.56) (1.10) (1.01) 
lnusvolshare 0.000629* 
  
0.000870*** 
  
0.000429 
  
 
(1.96) 
  
(2.87) 
  
(1.24) 
  lnrelavol 
 
-0.000471** 
  
-0.00052*** 
  
-0.000166 
 
  
(-2.68) 
  
(-3.33) 
  
(-0.94) 
 lnrelvolvol 
  
-0.000223* 
  
-0.00028*** 
  
-0.000081 
   
(-1.98) 
  
(-2.72) 
  
(-0.75) 
Constant 0.007390*** 0.006900*** 0.006872*** 0.009050*** 0.008188*** 0.008258*** 0.002127*** 0.001580*** 0.001576*** 
 
(8.35) (12.49) (11.28) (12.38) (18.38) (16.01) (3.03) (3.57) (3.42) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.128 0.152 0.137 0.102 0.115 0.109 0.174 0.160 0.157 
Note: For dependent variable description see Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 - 
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Table 10.  Cross-section results for dispersion in stocks' response to the surprises in the U.S. macroeconomic indicators based 
on stock characteristics and liquidity measures. 
The variables lnavcap, lnyears, lnusvolshare, lnrelavol, and lnrelvolvol, are logs of the variables described in table 8. The results are obtained from a WLS 
regression of   , estimated from VECM specification #3, on the aforementioned explanatory variables. The weights are equal to       
  . Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES usbuildsur usbuildsur usbuildsur consconfsur consconfsur consconfsur uscpisur uscpisur Uscpisur 
lnavcap 0.000185 0.000174 0.000216 -0.000152 -0.000161 -0.000146 0.000110 0.000112 0.000106 
 
(0.48) (0.45) (0.55) (-0.69) (-0.73) (-0.66) (0.57) (0.59) (0.54) 
lnyears 0.000031 0.000017 -0.000026 0.000291 0.000304 0.000284 0.000250* 0.000251* 0.000253* 
 
(0.10) (0.05) (-0.08) (1.18) (1.25) (1.18) (1.70) (1.70) (1.72) 
financial -0.001375 -0.001663 -0.001629 -0.000465 -0.000521 -0.000512 -0.001063* -0.001017 -0.001024 
 
(-1.15) (-1.33) (-1.31) (-0.52) (-0.65) (-0.61) (-1.72) (-1.64) (-1.66) 
technology -0.001343 -0.001580 -0.001557 -0.000296 -0.000342 -0.000335 0.000297 0.000335 0.000330 
 
(-1.02) (-1.11) (-1.10) (-0.31) (-0.38) (-0.36) (0.73) (0.80) (0.79) 
services 0.000489 -0.000036 -0.000070 -0.000009 0.000001 -0.000072 -0.001205* -0.001126* -0.001174* 
 
(0.38) (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.01) (0.00) (-0.06) (-1.85) (-1.86) (-1.86) 
materials 0.000569 0.000029 -0.000012 0.000843 0.000924 0.000804 -0.000830 -0.000752 -0.000837 
 
(0.42) (0.02) (-0.01) (0.63) (0.78) (0.63) (-1.39) (-1.35) (-1.49) 
lnusvolshare -0.0015** 
  
-0.000276 
  
0.000233 
  
 
(-2.02) 
  
(-0.46) 
  
(0.75) 
  lnrelavol 
 
0.000687* 
  
0.000226 
  
-0.000113 
 
  
(1.99) 
  
(0.67) 
  
(-0.59) 
 lnrelvolvol 
  
0.000339 
  
0.000083 
  
-0.000080 
   
(1.53) 
  
(0.42) 
  
(-0.86) 
Constant 0.0056*** 0.00733*** 0.00733*** 0.005971*** 0.006160*** 0.006240*** 0.00754*** 0.00728*** 0.00734*** 
 
(3.18) (5.80) (5.36) (3.34) (5.28) (4.99) (10.80) (15.36) (15.56) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.136 0.110 0.094 0.077 0.084 0.077 0.173 0.171 0.174 
 
 
 
 
 - 
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Table 10. continued 
          (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
VARIABLES usgdpsur usgdpsur usgdpsur usunsur usunsur usunsur usintsur usintsur usintsur 
lnavcap 0.000293 0.000292 0.000296 -0.000026 -0.000041 -0.000025 0.000217 0.000203 0.000223 
 
(1.45) (1.45) (1.48) (-0.15) (-0.24) (-0.14) (0.62) (0.58) (0.64) 
lnyears 0.000139 0.000138 0.000129 0.000164 0.000195 0.000175 -0.000189 -0.000165 -0.000198 
 
(1.08) (1.06) (1.02) (0.81) (1.00) (0.87) (-0.53) (-0.47) (-0.56) 
financial 0.000462 0.000438 0.000439 0.000039 0.000013 0.000024 0.002859** 0.002794** 0.002805** 
 
(0.64) (0.61) (0.62) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (2.06) (2.09) (2.04) 
technology 0.000919* 0.000899* 0.000900* 0.000203 0.000181 0.000189 0.000533 0.000479 0.000487 
 
(1.90) (1.83) (1.89) (0.46) (0.36) (0.40) (0.34) (0.32) (0.31) 
services 0.000849 0.000807 0.000746 -0.000078 0.000106 0.000047 0.001318 0.001392 0.001231 
 
(1.33) (1.39) (1.23) (-0.14) (0.20) (0.08) (1.03) (1.18) (0.99) 
materials 0.000734 0.000692 0.000589 -0.000222 0.000118 0.000021 0.000758 0.000959 0.000691 
 
(1.19) (1.20) (1.02) (-0.39) (0.22) (0.04) (0.52) (0.70) (0.46) 
lnusvolshare -0.000125 
  
-0.000104 
  
-0.000317 
  
 
(-0.39) 
  
(-0.33) 
  
(-0.44) 
  lnrelavol 
 
0.000061 
  
0.000249 
  
0.000315 
 
  
(0.33) 
  
(1.19) 
  
(0.81) 
 lnrelvolvol 
  
0.000003 
  
0.000101 
  
0.000089 
   
(0.03) 
  
(0.95) 
  
(0.40) 
Constant 0.003738*** 0.003880*** 0.003955*** 0.00696*** 0.00681*** 0.00687*** 0.00588*** 0.00602*** 0.00621*** 
 
(6.09) (9.58) (9.70) (8.30) (10.35) (10.22) (3.16) (4.42) (4.19) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.179 0.179 0.177 0.063 0.098 0.080 0.203 0.213 0.202 
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Table 10. continued 
  (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
VARIABLES ushoussur ushoussur ushoussur nonfarmsur nonfarmsur nonfarmsur usppisur usppisur usppisur 
lnavcap 0.000154 0.000161 0.000136 -0.000291 -0.000282 -0.000294 -0.000210 -0.000204 -0.000212 
 
(0.57) (0.59) (0.49) (-1.05) (-1.02) (-1.05) (-1.30) (-1.28) (-1.33) 
lnyears 0.000011 0.000020 0.000035 0.000102 0.000087 0.000098 0.000138 0.000128 0.000133 
 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.17) (0.46) (0.39) (0.44) (1.13) (0.98) (1.06) 
financial 0.000335 0.000509 0.000485 -0.000376 -0.000339 -0.000348 -0.000629 -0.000592 -0.000601 
 
(0.36) (0.54) (0.52) (-0.37) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-1.06) (-1.00) (-1.02) 
technology 0.000195 0.000338 0.000321 -0.001194 -0.001163 -0.001170 -0.000303 -0.000273 -0.000279 
 
(0.18) (0.29) (0.28) (-1.40) (-1.44) (-1.45) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.49) 
services -0.000264 0.000051 -0.000041 -0.000898 -0.000948 -0.000949 -0.000563 -0.000575 -0.000621 
 
(-0.26) (0.05) (-0.04) (-0.74) (-0.91) (-0.89) (-1.08) (-1.15) (-1.25) 
materials -0.000905 -0.000580 -0.000749 -0.000102 -0.000230 -0.000236 -0.000144 -0.000207 -0.000290 
 
(-0.86) (-0.61) (-0.72) (-0.08) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.25) (-0.34) (-0.48) 
lnusvolshare 0.000885 
  
0.000178 
  
0.000180 
  
 
(1.66) 
  
(0.34) 
  
(0.67) 
  lnrelavol 
 
-0.000414 
  
-0.000186 
  
-0.000153 
 
  
(-1.64) 
  
(-0.81) 
  
(-0.84) 
 lnrelvolvol 
  
-0.000256 
  
-0.000096 
  
-0.000100 
   
(-1.63) 
  
(-0.69) 
  
(-1.05) 
Constant 0.011748*** 0.010716*** 0.010860*** 0.007646*** 0.00758*** 0.00759*** 0.00608*** 0.00596*** 0.0061*** 
 
(8.49) (11.92) (11.17) (4.81) (7.46) (7.10) (8.27) (10.52) (10.59) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.109 0.090 0.101 0.138 0.146 0.144 0.169 0.180 0.186 
Note: For dependent variable description see Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
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Table 11.  Cross-section results for dispersion in stocks' response to the Canadian announcements based on stock 
characteristics and liquidity measures. 
The variables lnavcap, lnyears, lnusvolshare, lnrelavol, and lnrelvolvol, are logs of the variables described in table 8. The results are obtained from a WLS 
regression of   , estimated from VECM specification #1, on the aforementioned explanatory variables. The weights are equal to       
  . Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES canbuildan canbuildan canbuildan cancpian cancpian cancpian cangdpan cangdpan cangdpan 
lnavcap -0.000603** -0.00060*** -0.00061*** 0.000181 0.000185 0.000177 0.000203 0.000218 0.000186 
 
(-2.67) (-2.72) (-2.70) (0.84) (0.86) (0.82) (1.00) (1.08) (0.92) 
lnyears 0.000434** 0.000430** 0.000429** -0.000209 -0.000214 -0.000215 -0.000318 -0.000330 -0.000302 
 
(2.18) (2.02) (2.11) (-1.16) (-1.18) (-1.23) (-1.55) (-1.66) (-1.49) 
financial 0.000494 0.000532 0.000525 -0.001141 -0.001093 -0.001102 0.001056 0.001218 0.001190 
 
(0.56) (0.60) (0.58) (-1.33) (-1.26) (-1.24) (1.15) (1.27) (1.23) 
technology 0.001505 0.001536 0.001534 -0.000811 -0.000772 -0.000774 0.000097 0.000231 0.000212 
 
(1.55) (1.59) (1.60) (-0.68) (-0.65) (-0.66) (0.12) (0.27) (0.25) 
services 0.000852 0.000881 0.000790 -0.000451 -0.000416 -0.000528 -0.000161 -0.000018 -0.000028 
 
(0.93) (0.97) (0.86) (-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.62) (-0.21) (-0.03) (-0.04) 
materials 0.000919 0.000923 0.000761 0.000182 0.000185 -0.000013 -0.000655 -0.000605 -0.000634 
 
(0.93) (0.92) (0.73) (0.21) (0.24) (-0.02) (-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.80) 
lnusvolshare 0.000187 
  
0.000234 
  
0.000809* 
  
 
(0.46) 
  
(0.50) 
  
(1.73) 
  
lnrelavol 
 
-0.000122 
  
-0.000153 
  
-0.000510** 
 
  
(-0.39) 
  
(-0.69) 
  
(-2.33) 
 
lnrelvolvol 
  
-0.000106 
  
-0.000132 
  
-0.000267** 
   
(-0.68) 
  
(-0.98) 
  
(-2.16) 
Constant 0.004053*** 0.003881*** 0.004007*** 0.017566*** 0.017353*** 0.017508*** 0.006101*** 0.005337*** 0.005382*** 
 
(3.25) (3.86) (3.89) (15.92) (22.42) (20.73) (5.92) (6.79) (6.56) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.253 0.254 0.261 0.193 0.195 0.205 0.180 0.204 0.191 
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Table 11. continued 
        
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
VARIABLES canhousan canhousan canhousan canintan canintan canintan bocan bocan bocan canunan canunan canunan 
lnavcap -0.000317 -0.000314 -0.000310 0.000495* 0.000476* 0.000518** 0.000127 0.000133 0.000126 -0.000060 -0.000047 -0.000060 
 
(-1.33) (-1.29) (-1.30) (1.94) (1.82) (2.04) (0.41) (0.43) (0.41) (-0.31) (-0.25) (-0.30) 
lnyears -0.000091 -0.000106 -0.000110 0.000004 0.000017 -0.000013 0.000313 0.000302 0.000300 -0.000321 -0.000350 -0.000339 
 
(-0.38) (-0.44) (-0.47) (0.01) (0.07) (-0.05) (1.34) (1.25) (1.27) (-1.43) (-1.62) (-1.57) 
financial -0.000691 -0.000746 -0.000742 -0.002075* -0.002305** -0.002268** -0.000237 -0.000210 -0.000218 -0.000471 -0.000453 -0.000464 
 
(-0.72) (-0.79) (-0.79) (-1.85) (-2.15) (-2.10) (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.57) (-0.51) (-0.53) 
technology -0.000486 -0.000529 -0.000527 -0.001054 -0.001243 -0.001221 0.000234 0.000258 0.000256 0.001034 0.001053 0.001046 
 
(-0.63) (-0.68) (-0.69) (-1.07) (-1.35) (-1.39) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76) 
services 0.000310 0.000113 0.000115 0.000939 0.000704 0.000815 0.000082 0.000040 -0.000078 -0.000313 -0.000511 -0.000525 
 
(0.40) (0.15) (0.15) (0.85) (0.79) (0.86) (0.06) (0.03) (-0.06) (-0.31) (-0.54) (-0.54) 
materials 0.000281 0.000020 0.000026 0.001325 0.001198 0.001408 0.000208 0.000109 -0.000098 -0.000762 -0.001109 -0.001139 
 
(0.30) (0.02) (0.03) (1.01) (1.07) (1.19) (0.14) (0.07) (-0.07) (-0.67) (-1.05) (-1.03) 
lnusvolshare -0.000306 
  
-0.001138** 
  
0.000118 
  
0.000030   
 
(-0.63) 
  
(-2.13) 
  
(0.19) 
  
(0.06)   
lnrelavol 
 
0.000063 
  
0.000688*** 
  
-0.000132 
 
 -0.000208  
  
(0.23) 
  
(2.70) 
  
(-0.37) 
 
 (-0.72)  
lnrelvolvol 
  
0.000033 
  
0.000408*** 
  
-0.000123   -0.000114 
   
(0.24) 
  
(2.87) 
  
(-0.62)   (-0.71) 
Constant 0.004634*** 0.005098*** 0.005091*** 0.008618*** 0.009734*** 0.009546*** 0.004463*** 0.004428*** 0.004589*** 0.00923*** 0.0945*** 0.00948*** 
 
(4.16) (5.73) (5.69) (5.80) (10.90) (9.86) (3.08) (3.60) (3.64) (704.77) (966.86) (936.89) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.203 0.195 0.195 0.290 0.309 0.319 0.043 0.045 0.050 0.142 0.154 0.153 
Note: For dependent variable description see Table A.4 in the Appendix. 
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Table 12.  Cross-section results for dispersion in stocks' response to the surprises in the Canadian macroeconomic indicators based on 
stock characteristics and liquidity measures. 
The variables lnavcap, lnyears, lnusvolshare, lnrelavol, and lnrelvolvol, are logs of the variables described in table 8. The results are obtained from a WLS 
regression of   , estimated from VECM specification #3, on the aforementioned explanatory variables. The weights are equal to       
  . Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES canbuildsur canbuildsur canbuildsur cancpisur cancpisur cancpisur cangdpsur cangdpsur cangdpsur 
lnavcap -0.000161 -0.000168 -0.000151 0.000355 0.000348 0.000365 0.000365 0.000372 0.000354 
 
(-0.74) (-0.76) (-0.70) (0.73) (0.71) (0.77) (1.34) (1.36) (1.29) 
lnyears -0.000288* -0.000287* -0.000291* -0.000540* -0.000540 -0.000534* 0.000169 0.000167 0.000181 
 
(-1.89) (-1.79) (-1.87) (-1.69) (-1.66) (-1.73) (0.77) (0.74) (0.82) 
financial 0.002556*** 0.002454*** 0.002470*** 0.001085 0.000976 0.000993 -0.000737 -0.000634 -0.000649 
 
(4.59) (4.56) (4.52) (0.64) (0.58) (0.60) (-0.86) (-0.72) (-0.74) 
technology 0.001219** 0.001136** 0.001143** 0.000325 0.000236 0.000241 -0.000705 -0.000621 -0.000630 
 
(2.27) (2.11) (2.32) (0.23) (0.17) (0.18) (-0.71) (-0.62) (-0.63) 
services 0.001114* 0.000974* 0.001107* 0.001020 0.000867 0.001127 0.000909 0.001051* 0.001021* 
 
(1.79) (1.71) (1.82) (1.10) (0.93) (1.25) (1.55) (1.85) (1.72) 
materials 0.001029 0.000913 0.001150 0.001803 0.001673 0.002132 -0.000439 -0.000323 -0.000384 
 
(1.18) (1.03) (1.23) (1.42) (1.28) (1.65) (-0.58) (-0.42) (-0.49) 
lnusvolshare -0.000512 
  
-0.000550 
  
0.000523 
  
 
(-1.49) 
  
(-1.04) 
  
(1.32) 
  lnrelavol 
 
0.000278 
  
0.000296 
  
-0.000285 
 
  
(1.27) 
  
(0.94) 
  
(-1.20) 
 lnrelvolvol 
  
0.000206 
  
0.000276 
  
-0.000161 
   
(1.66) 
  
(1.66) 
  
(-1.08) 
Constant 0.005546*** 0.006091*** 0.005901*** 0.007263*** 0.007852*** 0.007496*** 0.011372*** 0.010817*** 0.010875*** 
 
(1,017.89) (1,437.16) (1,344.08) (937.05) (1,095.26) (1,179.43) (1,080.84) (1,506.54) (1,446.93) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.252 0.252 0.267 0.127 0.126 0.144 0.208 0.208 0.208 
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Table 12. continued 
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
VARIABLES canhoussur canhoussur canhoussur canintsur canintsur canintsur canunsur canunsur canunsur 
lnavcap -0.000115 -0.000111 -0.000115 -0.000108 -0.000134 -0.000108 0.000227 0.000229 0.000229 
 
(-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.60) (-0.27) (-0.33) (-0.28) (1.06) (1.06) (1.06) 
lnyears 0.000237 0.000228 0.000224 0.000318 0.000376 0.000327 -0.000197 -0.000204 -0.000199 
 
(1.60) (1.50) (1.51) (0.45) (0.54) (0.47) (-1.15) (-1.14) (-1.13) 
financial 0.000795 0.000804 0.000799 0.004189* 0.004165* 0.004184* -0.000687 -0.000704 -0.000703 
 
(1.48) (1.50) (1.47) (1.74) (1.96) (1.87) (-1.01) (-1.14) (-1.12) 
technology 0.000282 0.000289 0.000288 0.001183 0.001157 0.001176 -0.000800 -0.000813 -0.000814 
 
(0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (-0.88) (-0.91) (-0.92) 
services 0.000326 0.000272 0.000178 0.001499 0.001906 0.001606 0.000173 0.000095 0.000150 
 
(0.55) (0.47) (0.29) (0.50) (0.69) (0.57) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) 
materials 0.000113 0.000015 -0.000148 0.002115 0.002817 0.002310 -0.000169 -0.000280 -0.000184 
 
(0.17) (0.02) (-0.21) (0.58) (0.80) (0.63) (-0.15) (-0.31) (-0.19) 
lnusvolshare 0.000030 
  
-0.000038 
  
-0.000095 
  
 
(0.11) 
  
(-0.03) 
  
(-0.18) 
  lnrelavol 
 
-0.000073 
  
0.000402 
  
0.000004 
 
  
(-0.42) 
  
(0.41) 
  
(0.02) 
 lnrelvolvol 
  
-0.000081 
  
0.000066 
  
0.000028 
   
(-0.80) 
  
(0.13) 
  
(0.20) 
Constant 0.004057*** 0.004101*** 0.004226*** 0.019757*** 0.019283*** 0.019644*** 0.012263*** 0.012428*** 0.012356*** 
 
(1,349.15) (1,737.49) (1,598.26) (213.79) (294.66) (278.77) (716.39) (1,168.04) (1,070.80) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.081 0.084 0.092 0.127 0.139 0.128 0.065 0.064 0.065 
Note: For dependent variable description see Table A.4 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1. Financial Stress Index 1994-2014  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 
Table A1.1. Individual OLS estimates of the LOOP parameter for 2008-2009
‡ 
‡
The following model was estimated for each stock:                 where             
            
     
       
             
     , and                      
OLS standard errors are in (..), while Newey-West are in [..]. 
Company's NYSE ticker    R²(%) 95% interval 
ABX 
0.7755***  
(0.0675) 
[0.1124] 
36% [0.55 - 0.99] 
AEM 
0.7455*** 
(0.0712) 
[0.1075] 
32% [0.53 - 0.95] 
AGU 
0.9310*  
(0.0475) 
[0.0535] 
62% [0.84 - 1.02] 
AUY 
0.6939 
(0.0848) 
[0.0932] 
22% [0.53 - 0.86] 
BCE 
0.9249* 
(0.0374) 
[0.0551] 
72% [0.85 - 1.03] 
BMO 
0.8838*  
(0.0576)  
[0.0645] 
50% [0.77 - 1.01] 
BNS 
0.8197  
(0.0561) 
[0.0570] 
47% [0.71 - 0.93] 
BTE 
0.7908*** 
(0.0682)  
[0.0864] 
36% [0.62 - 0.96] 
BVF 
0.8348* 
(0.0844) 
[0.1111] 
29% [0.61 - 1.05] 
CAE 
0.8038* 
(0.0807) 
[0.1062] 
29% [0.59 - 1.01] 
CCJ 
0.8115*** 
(0.0650)  
[0.0911] 
40% [0.63 - 0.99] 
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Table A1.1. continued 
Company's NYSE ticker    R²(%) 95% interval 
CLS 
0.9850*  
(0.1451) 
[0.1806] 
16% [0.62 - 1.34] 
CM 
0.8988* 
(0.0649)  
[0.0656] 
45% [0.77 - 1.03] 
CMZ 
0.7049*  
(0.1715) 
[0.2927] 
6% [0.12 - 1.28] 
CNI 
0.9690* 
(0.0428)  
[0.0548] 
68% [0.86 - 1.07] 
CNQ 
0.9081*  
(0.0487)  
[0.0675] 
59% [0.77 – 1.04] 
COT 
0.3793 
(0.2292) 
[0.2865] 
1% [-0.18 - 0.94] 
CP 
0.8389***  
(0.0607)  
[0.0782] 
45% [0.68 - 0.99] 
ECA 
0.7292  
(0.0511)  
[0.0550] 
46% [0.56 - 0.88] 
ENB 
0.9195*  
(0.0406)  
[0.0512] 
68% [0.81 - 1.02] 
ENT 
1.3402*  
(0.2396) 
[0.3035] 
11% [0.74 - 1.93] 
ERF 
0.6534  
(0.0620) 
[0.0814] 
32% [0.49 - 0.81] 
GG 
0.5932  
(0.0967)  
[0.1403] 
13% [0.31 - 0.86] 
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Table A1.1. continued 
Company's NYSE ticker    R²(%) 95% interval 
GIB 
0.9434*  
(0.0769) 
[0.1432] 
39% [0.65 - 1.22] 
GRS 
0.7976* 
(0.1332)  
[0.1306] 
13% [0.53 - 1.06] 
IAG 
0.8326* 
(0.1093)  
[0.1477] 
20% [0.54 - 1.12] 
ITPOF.PK 
0.9478* 
(0.1221) 
[0.1205] 
20% [0.71 - 1.18] 
IVN 
0.5806*  
(0.1763)  
[0.2235] 
4% [0.14 – 1.02] 
KFS 
0.9822* 
(0.1234)  
[0.1858] 
21% [0.64 - 1.31] 
KGC 
0.8122***  
(0.0647)  
[0.0860] 
40% [0.64 - 0.98] 
MDZ 
0.6789 
(0.0635) 
[0.0843] 
32% [0.55 - 0.80] 
MFC 
0.9051*  
(0.0932) 
[0.0858] 
28% [0.72 - .1.09] 
NOA 
0.8096*  
(0.1871)  
[0.2027] 
7% [0.41 - 1.20] 
NXY 
0.7980*** 
(0.0660) 
[0.0920] 
38% [0.61 - 0.97] 
POT 
0.8461409***  
(0.0583) 
[0.0740] 
47% [0.71 - 0.99] 
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Table A1.1. continued 
Company's NYSE ticker    R²(%) 95% interval 
PVX 
0.7063  
(0.0897)  
[0.1072] 
21% [0.50 - 0.90] 
PWE 
0.7689 
(0.0673) 
[0.0862] 
35% [0.60 - 0.94] 
RBA 
0.7534* 
(0.6825)  
[0.1658] 
1% [0.42 - 1.05] 
RCI 
0.7794  
(0.0566)  
[0.0612] 
44% [0.67 - 0.89] 
RY 
0.8095 
(0.0591) 
[0.0695] 
44% [0.69 - 0.93] 
SLF 
0.9063* 
(0.0747) 
[0.0817] 
38% [0.76 - 1.05] 
SLW 
0.9158* 
(0.0908) 
[0.1643] 
30% [0.59 - 1.24] 
STN 
0.9004* 
(0.0710) 
[0.0804] 
40% [0.76 - 1.04] 
SU** 
0.8158* 
(0.3047)  3% [0.21 - 1.41] 
TAC 
0.7905  
(0.0539)  
[0.0567] 
48% [0.68 - 0.90] 
TC 
0.7807 
(0.0897) 
[0.0549] 
24% [0.60 - 0.96] 
TCK 
0.9458*  
(0.0953)  
[0.1129] 
29% [0.76 - 1.13] 
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Table A1.1. continued 
Company's NYSE ticker    R²(%) 95% interval 
TD 
0.8582* 
(0.0557) 
[0.0744] 
50% [0.71 – 1.00] 
THI 
0.8539 
(0.0555) 
[0.0448] 
50% [0.74 - 0.96] 
TLM 
0.7736 
(0.0662) 
[0.0816] 
37% [0.64 - 0.90] 
TRP 
0.8739 
(0.0349) 
[0.0456] 
72% [0.78 - 0.96] 
TU 
0.9531* 
(0.0638) 
[0.0857] 
49% [0.73 - 1.18] 
UFS 
1.4007 
(0.1406) 
[0.1811] 
29% [1.04 - 1.75] 
* represents the estimates for which the hypothesis of β=1 could not be rejected at 95% level of significance. 
** no serial correlation in residuals 
*** represents the estimates for which the hypothesis of β=1 could not be rejected at 99% level of significance. 
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Table A1.2. Individual OLS estimates of the LOOP parameter for 2009-2010
‡ 
‡
The following model was estimated for each stock:                 where             
            
     
       
             
     , and                      
OLS standard errors are in (..), while Newey-West are in [..]. 
Company's NYSE ticker                          R²(%) 95% interval 
ABX 
0.9360*  
(0.0339)    
[0.0349] 
76% [0.87 - 1.00] 
AEM 
0.9131  
  (0.0367)        
[0.0365] 
72% [0.84 - 0.99] 
AGU 
0.8952  
 (0.0351)  
[0.0376] 
73% [0.83 - 0.96] 
AUY 
0.8971* 
(0.0535)  
[0.0589] 
54% [0.79 - 1.00] 
BCE 
0.9081 
 (0.0273)  
[0.0264] 
82% [0.85 - 0.96] 
BMO 
0.9321*  
(0.0368)  
[0.0347] 
73% [0.86 - 1.00] 
BNS 
0.9721* 
(0.0402)  
[0.0365] 
71% [0.89 - 1.05] 
BTE 
0.8495 
  (0.0558)  
  [0.0647] 
49% [0.74 - 0.96] 
BVF 
0.8353  
(0.0391)  
[0.0329] 
65% [0.76 - 0.91] 
CAE 
0.9767* 
(0.0691)  
[0.0708] 
45% [0.84 - 1.11] 
CCJ 
0.9237*  
(0.0444)  
[0.0457] 
64% [0.83 - 1.01] 
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Table A1.2.  continued 
Company's NYSE ticker                          R²(%) 95% interval 
CLS 
0.9963*     
(0.0821)   
[0.1013] 
39% [0.84 - 1.15] 
CM 
 0.9632* 
0.0331) 
[0.0305] 
77% [0.90 - 1.02] 
CMZ 
 0.9111* 
(0.2291) 
[0.2590] 
6% [0.46 - 1.36] 
CNI 
0.8541  
(0.0372) 
[0.0359] 
68% [0.78 - 0.93] 
CNQ 
0.8841 
 (0.0361)       
[0.0308] 
71% [0.81 - 0.96] 
COT 
0.8771* 
(0.1281) 
[0.1992] 
16% [0.62 - 1.13] 
CP 
0.9523   
(0.0354)     
[0.0319] 
73% [0.83 - 0.97] 
ECA** 
0.4721*     
(0.4026)  1%  [-0.31 - 1.26] 
ENB 
0.9113    
(0.0271) 
[0.0241] 
81% [0.85 - 0.96] 
ENT 
1.4352*    
(0.2420) 
[0.2851] 
12% [0.93 - 1.88] 
ERF 
0.8443 
  (0.0432)  
  [0.0414] 
61% [0.75 - 0.93] 
GG 
0.9391*  
(0.0382) 
[0.0385] 
72% [0.86 - 1.01] 
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Table A1.2.  continued 
Company's NYSE ticker                         R²(%) 95% interval 
GIB 
0.9882* 
(0.0471) 
[0.0503] 
64% [0.90 - 1.08] 
GRS 
0.8012   
 (0.0791)  
[0.0934] 
30% [0.65 - 0.97] 
IAG 
0.8511   
(0.0561) 
[0.0543] 
49% [0.74 - 0.96] 
ITPOF.PK 
0.9582*  
(0.2375) 
[0.2527] 
6% [0.49 - 1.43] 
IVN 
0.9222*   
(0.0851) 
[0.0908] 
32% [0.75 - 1.08] 
KFS 
0.7643 
(0.1430)  
[0.1279] 
9% [0.43 - 0.99] 
KGC 
0.8671 
 (0.0412) 
[0.0497] 
65% [0.79 - 0.95] 
MDZ 
0.8966* 
(0.0552) 
[0.0567] 
52% [0.79 -1.01] 
MFC 
0.9427* 
(0.0396) 
[0.0423] 
70% [0.86 - 1.02] 
NOA 
1.0930*    
(0.1530) 
[0.1602] 
17% [0.80 - 1.40] 
NXY 
0.8892  
(0.0422) 
[0.0446] 
65% [0.81- 0.97] 
POT 
0.9069  
(0.0366) 
[0.0401] 
73% [0.84 - 0.98] 
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Table A1.2. continued 
Company's NYSE ticker                         R²(%) 95% interval 
PVX 
0.7221    
(0.0892)     
[0.1047] 
20% [0.53 - 0.88] 
PWE 
0.8621    
(0.0412) 
[0.0420] 
64% [0.78 - 0.94] 
RBA 
0.6947  
(0.0794) 
[0.0803] 
24% [0.54 - 0.85] 
RCI 
0.9192  
(0.0373) 
[0.0383] 
72% [0.85 - 0.99] 
RY 
0.9891* 
(0.0337) 
[0.0356] 
79% [0.92 - 1.05] 
SLF 
0.9057  
(0.0456) 
[0.0415] 
63% [0.82 - 0.99] 
SLW 
0.8517    
(0.0573) 
[0.0538] 
47% [0.74 - 0.96] 
STN 
0.8592  
(0.0596) 
[0.0758] 
47% [0.74 - 0.98] 
SU 
0.8691 
(0.0448)  
[0.0481] 
61% [0.78 - 0.96] 
TAC 
0.9298*  
(0.0384) 
[0.0422] 
70% [0.85 - 1.02] 
TC 
0.8414  
(0.0697) 
[0.0737] 
38% [0.70 - 0.98] 
TCK 
0.9295* 
(0.0455) 
[0.0534] 
64% [0.84 - 1.02] 
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Table A1.2.  continued 
Company's NYSE ticker                          R²(%) 95% interval 
TD 
0.8910    
(0.0344) 
[0.0386] 
73% [0.82 - 0.96] 
THI 
0.8963  
(0.0344) 
[0.0403] 
74% [0.83 - 0.96] 
TLM 
0.9187  
(0.0348) 
[0.0370] 
74% [0.85 - 0.99] 
TRI 
0.9566*  
(0.0225) 
[0.0283] 
82% [0.90 - 1.01] 
TRP 
0.9395  
(0.0257) 
[0.0269] 
85% [0.89 - 0.99] 
TU 
0.873  
(0.0486) 
[0.0543] 
57% [0.78 - 0.97] 
UFS 
1.13*   
(0.1612) 
[0.1800] 
17% [0.81 - 1.45] 
* represents the estimates for which the hypothesis of β=1 could not be rejected at 95% level of significance. 
** no serial correlation in residuals 
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Table A1.3.  Individual OLS estimates of the LOOP parameter for 2008-2010
‡ 
‡
The following model was estimated for each stock:                 where             
            
     
       
             
     , and                      
OLS standard errors are in (..), while Newey-West are in [..]. 
Company's NYSE ticker 
      
                    R²(%) 95% interval 
ABX 
 0.8517***  
(0.0383)  
[0.0632] 
51% [0.72 - 0.97] 
AEM 
0.8251 
(0.0406)  
[0.0645] 
46% [0.71 - 0.95] 
AGU 
0.9138***  
(0.0299)  
[0.0339] 
66% [0.84 - 0.98] 
AUY 
0.7901 
(0.0506)  
[0.0568] 
34% [0.69 - 0.89] 
BCE 
0.9174***  
(0.0232)  
[0.0316] 
76% [0.85 - 0.98] 
BMO 
0.9060***  
(0.0344)  
[0.0374] 
59% [0.84 - 0.97] 
BNS 
0.8900 
(0.0348)  
[0.0361] 
58% [0.82 - 0.96] 
BTE 
0.8194 
(0.0441) 
[0.0555] 
42% [0.73 - 0.91] 
BVF 
0.8353 
(0.0470)  
[0.0499] 
40% [0.74 - 0.93] 
CAE 
0.8845***  
(0.0533) 
[0.0571] 
36% [0.78 - 0.99] 
CCJ 
0.8641***  
(0.0397) 
[0.0512] 
50% [0.76 - 0.96] 
 
 -134- 
 
Table A1.3. continued 
Company's NYSE ticker                    R²(%) 95% interval 
CLS 
0.9889* 
(0.0837)  
[0.1276] 
22% [0.73 - 1.23] 
CM 
0.9283* 
(0.0369) 
[0.0350] 
57% [0.43 - 1.18] 
CMZ 
0.8034* 
(0.1416)  
[0.1954] 
6% [0.53 - 1.08] 
CNI 
0.9144***  
(0.0285)  
[0.0312] 
66% [0.86 - 0.97] 
CNQ 
0.8972***  
(0.0304) 
[0.0384] 
64% [0.84 - 0.96] 
COT 
0.6179***  
(0.1330) 
[0.1760] 
4% [0.27- .096] 
CP 
0.8694 
(0.0354)  
[0.0382] 
56% [0.80 - 0.94] 
ECA** 
0.6117* 
(0.1967)  2% [0.23 - 1.00] 
ENB 
0.9108  
(0.0246) 
[0.0289] 
74% [0.86 - 0.96] 
ENT 
1.3731* 
(0.1696)  
[0.2117] 
12% [0.95 - 1.78] 
ERF 
0.7430  
(0.0382) 
[0.0496] 
44% [0.67 - 0.82] 
GG 
0.7568 
(0.0532)  
[0.0794] 
30% [0.65 - 0.86] 
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Table A1.3. continued 
Company's NYSE ticker                       R²(%) 95% interval 
GIB 
0.9630* 
(0.0454) 
[0.0752] 
48% [0.81 - 1.11] 
GRS 
0.8018 
(0.0781) 
[0.0817] 
18% [0.64 - 0.96] 
IAG 
0.8442* 
(0.0620) 
[0.0844] 
28% [0.67 - 1.01] 
ITPOF.PK 
0.9532* 
(0.1311)  
[0.1299] 
10% [0.70 - 1.21] 
IVN 
0.7386*** 
(0.0993) 
[0.1165] 
10% [0.50 - 0.96] 
KFS 
0.8537*  
(0.0940)  
[0.1109] 
14% [0.63 - 1.07] 
KGC 
0.8372  
(0.0386) 
[0.0508] 
49% [0.76 - 0.91] 
MDZ 
0.7813 
(0.0424)  
[0.0531] 
41% [0.70 - 0.86] 
MFC 
0.9217* 
(0.0513) 
[0.0506] 
40% [0.82 - 1.02] 
NOA 
0.9501* 
(0.1213) 
[0.1300] 
11% [0.71 - 1.18] 
NXY 
0.8412 
(0.0394) 
[0.0530] 
49% [0.76 - 0.92] 
POT 
0.8746  
(0.0345) 
[0.0438] 
57% [0.81 - 0.94] 
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Table A1.3.  continued 
Company's NYSE ticker                       R²(%) 95% interval 
PVX 
0.7057 
(0.0631) 
[0.0692] 
20% [0.58 - 0.83] 
PWE 
0.8124 
(0.0399) 
[0.0491] 
46% [0.73 - 0.89] 
RBA 
0.7238 
(0.3500) 
[0.0999] 
1% [0.52 - 0.92] 
RCI 
0.8447 
(0.0341) 
[0.0387] 
56% [0.78 - 0.91] 
RY 
0.8930*** 
(0.0344) 
[0.0432] 
58% [0.80 - 0.97] 
SLF 
0.9041*** 
(0.0439)  
[0.0447] 
47% [0.81 - 0.99] 
SLW 
0.8838* 
(0.0541) 
[0.0857] 
36% [0.71 - 1.05] 
STN 
0.8815*** 
(0.0463) 
[0.0557] 
43% [0.77 - 0.99] 
SU** 
0.8308*  
(0.1569)  5% [0.52 - 1.13] 
TAC 
0.8563  
(0.0334) 
[0.0374] 
58% [0.79 - 0.92] 
TC 
0.8095  
(0.0569) 
[0.0627] 
30% [0.68 - 0.92] 
TCK 
0.9385* 
(0.0533)  
[0.0647] 
39% [0.83 - 1.04] 
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Table A1.3.  continued 
Company's NYSE ticker                      R²(%) 95% interval 
TD 
0.8737  
(0.0330)  
[0.0435] 
59% [0.81 - 0.94] 
THI 
0.8750  
(0.0329)  
[0.0305] 
60% [0.81 - 0.94] 
TLM 
0.8409  
(0.0378)  
[0.0519] 
51% [0.77 - 0.92] 
TRP 
0.9047  
(0.0217)  
[0.0282] 
78% [0.86 - 0.95] 
TU 
0.9164*  
(0.0402)  
[0.0521] 
52% [0.84 – 1.00] 
UFS 
1.2728***  
(0.1063)  
[0.1282] 
23% [1.02 - 1.52] 
* represents the estimates for which the hypothesis of β=1 could not be rejected at 95% level of significance. 
** no serial correlation in residuals 
*** represents the estimates for which the hypothesis of β=1 could not be rejected at 99% level of significance 
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Table A1.4.  List of Companies (in alphabetical order) 
Agnico-Eagle Mines Cott Corporation Provident Energy 
Agrium Inc. Domtar Corporation Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers 
AuRico Gold Enbridge Inc Rogers Communications 
Bank Nova Scotia Encana Royal Bank of Canada 
Bank of Montreal Enerplus Corp. Silver Wheaton Corp 
Barrick Gold Corp. Enterra Trust Stantec Inc 
Baytex Energy Goldcorp Inc. Sun Life Financial Inc. 
BCE Inc. Iamgold Corp Suncor Energy 
Biovail Corp Intertape Polymer GP Talisman Energy Inc. 
CAE Inc. Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. Teck Resources 
Cameco Corporation Kingsway Financial Services Telus Corporation 
Canadian Imperial Bank Kinross Gold Corp. Thompson Creek Metals 
Canadian National Railway Manulife Financial Corp. Thompson Reuters Corp. 
Canadian Natural Resources MDC Partners Tim Hortons Inc 
Canadian Pacific Railway Nexen Inc Toronto Dominion Bank 
Celestica Inc. North American Energy TransAlta Corporation 
CGI Group Penn West Petrolium TransCanada Corp. 
Compton Petroleum Potash Corporation  Yamana Gold 
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Appendix 2 
A2.1. Variable Construction and Description 
Variable 
name 
Construction Description 
USvolshare 
                              
                                                        
 
The share of trading occuring on 
the NYSE 
relavol 
                                       
                                       
  
The ratio of the average daily 
volume on the TSX relative to the 
average daily volume on the NYSE 
relvolvolatility 
    
 
   
   
The ratio of the variance of the 
daily trading volume on the TSX 
relative to the variance of the daily 
trading volume on the NYSE 
lyears N/ A 
Natural logarithm of the number of 
years the stock was listed on the 
NYSE prior to 2008 
lavcap Ln( 
                           
                       
) 
Natural logarithm of the stock's 
average market capitalization over 
the sample period 
exmove 
1 if      is significant in the VECM estimation; 0 
otherwise 
Dummy variable capturing the 
financial crisis feedback to the 
exchange rage 
financial 
1 if the stock is classified in the financial industry on the 
finance.yahoo.com website; 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable for stocks in the 
financial industry 
materials 
1 if the stock is classified in the materials industry on the 
finance.yahoo.com website; 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable for stocks in the 
materials industry 
technology 
1 if the stock is classified in the technology industry on the 
finance.yahoo.com website; 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable for stocks in the 
technology industry 
services 
1 if the stock is classified in the services industry on the 
finance.yahoo.com website; 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable for stocks in the 
services industry 
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A2.2.  List of Companies and (ticker symbol on NYSE) (in alphabetical order) 
Agnico-Eagle Mines (AEM) Cott Corporation (COT) Provident Energy (PVX) 
Agrium Inc. (AGU) Domtar Corporation (UFS) Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (RBA) 
AuRico Gold (AUQ) Enbridge Inc (ENB) Rogers Communications (RCI) 
Bank Nova Scotia (BNS) Encana (ECA) Royal Bank of Canada (RY) 
Bank of Montreal (BMO) Enerplus Corp. (ERF) Silver Wheaton Corp (SLW) 
Barrick Gold Corp. (ABX) Enterra Trust (ENT) Stantec Inc (STN) 
Baytex Energy (BTE) Goldcorp Inc. (GG) Sun Life Financial Inc. (SLF) 
BCE Inc. (BCE) Iamgold Corp (IAG) Suncor Energy (SU) 
Biovail Corp (BVF) Intertape Polymer GP (ITPOF) Talisman Energy Inc. (TLM) 
CAE Inc. (CAE) Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. (IVN) Teck Resources (TCK) 
Cameco Corporation (CCJ) Kingsway Financial Services (KFS) Telus Corporation (TU) 
Canadian Imperial Bank (CM) Kinross Gold Corp. (KGC) Thompson Creek Metals (TC) 
Canadian National Railway (CNI) Manulife Financial Corp. (MFC) Thompson Reuters Corp. (TRI) 
Canadian Natural Resources (CNQ) MDC Partners (MDC) Tim Hortons Inc (THI) 
Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) Nexen Inc (NXY) Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) 
Celestica Inc. (CLS) North American Energy (NOA) TransAlta Corporation (TAC) 
CGI Group (GIB) Penn West Petrolium (PWE) TransCanada Corp. (TRP) 
Compton Petroleum (CMZPF) Potash Corporation (POT) Yamana Gold (AUY) 
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Table A2.3.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Results for Unit Roots 
    
Level 
    
First 
Differences   
Ticker on 
NYSE/Exchange 
Rate 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
trend 
none Intercept 
Intercept 
and trend 
none 
ABX -1.580(1) -1.233(1) -0.831(1) -26.123(0)* -26.156(0)* -26.147(0)* 
AEM -1.589(1) -1.236(1) -0.818(1) -26.417(0)* -26.454(0)* -26.441(0)* 
AGU -1.627(1) -1.289(1) -0.802(1) -24.687(0)* -24.720(0)* -24.707(0)* 
AUY -1.599(2) -1.289(2) -0.847(2) -15.984(1)* -16.021(1)* -15.998(1)* 
BCE -1.571(1) -1.202(1) -0.816(1) -23.292(0)* -23.312(0)* -23.334(0)* 
BMO -1.621(1) -1.274(1) -0.847(1) -26.482(0)* -26.516(0)* -26.506(0)* 
BNS -1.615(1) -1.254(1) -0.831(1) -26.446(0)* -26.469(0)* -26.483(0)* 
BTE -1.625(1) -1.288(1) -0.869(1) -25.755(0)* -25.787(0)* -25.779(0)* 
BVF -1.626(1) -1.271(1) -0.842(1) -28.912(0)* -28.949(0)* -28.938(0)* 
CAE -1.497(4) -1.156(4) -0.835(4) -12.170(3)* -12.210(3)* -12.175(3)* 
CCJ -1.624(1) -1.287(1) -0.847(1) -26.088(0)* -26.120(0)* -26.111(0)* 
CLS -2.009(1) -1.808(1) -1.145(1) -35.086(0)* -35.088(0)* -35.119(0)* 
CM -1.643(1) -1.310(1) -0.855(1) -26.640(0)* -26.671(0)* -26.664(0)* 
CMZ -2.497(1) -2.397(1) -1.583(1) -36.932(0)* -36.921(0)* -36.969(0)* 
CNI -1.641(1) -1.301(1) -0.851(1) -23.757(0)* -23.792(0)* -23.778(0)* 
CNQ -1.611(1) -1.266(1) -0.824(1) -23.854(0)* -23.890(0)* -23.875(0)* 
COT -2.299(1) -2.177(1) -1.359(1) -39.077(0)* -39.066(0)* -39.115(0)* 
CP -1.538(1) -1.149(1) -0.783(1) -26.426(0)* -26.470(0)* -26.449(0)* 
ECA -1.958(1) -1.888(1) -1.888(1) -24.153(0)* -24.138(0)* -24.175(0)* 
ENB -1.544(1) -1.158(1) -0.784(1) -24.473(0)* -24.518(0)* -24.494(0)* 
ENT -3.398(1) -3.495(1) -2.144(1) -34.945(0)* -34.919(0)* -34.980(0)* 
ERF -1.534(1) -1.141(1) -0.764(1) -27.113(0)* -27.157(0)* -27.136(0)* 
GG -1.593(1) -1.253(1) -0.842(1) -29.612(0)* -29.643(0)* -29.639(0)* 
GIB -1.592(1) -1.255(1) -0.847(1) -29.630(0)* -29.660(0)* -29.658(0)* 
GRS -2.102(1) -1.892(1) -1.183(1) -29.444(0)* -29.453(0)* -29.471(0)* 
IAG -1.577(1) -1.246(1) -0.829(1) -34.119(0)* -34.146(0)* -34.151(0)* 
ITP -2.793(1) -2.759(1) -1.734(1) -32.545(0)* -32.531(0)* -32.578(0)* 
IVN -2.367(1) -2.274(1) -1.387(1) -32.391(0)* -32.381(0)* -32.423(0)* 
KFS -2.190(1) -2.046(1) -1.282(1) -32.427(0)* -32.424(0)* -32.459(0)* 
KGC -1.616(1) -1.286(1) -0.858(1) -25.116(0)* -25.148(0)* -25.139(0)* 
MDZ -1.595(1) -1.283(1) -0.776(1) -27.139(0)* -27.164(0)* -27.161(0)* 
MFC -1.732(1) -1.430(1) -0.928(1) -29.949(0)* -29.972(0)* -29.976(0)* 
NOA -2.431(1) -2.238(1) -1.376(1) -38.030(0)* -38.037(0)* -38.065(0)* 
NXY -1.505(1) -1.110(1) -0.755(1) -29.311(0)* -29.354(0)* -29.337(0)* 
POT -1.577(1) -1.214(1) -0.806(1) -26.428(0)* -26.466(0)* -24.451(0)* 
PVX -1.613(1) -1.283(1) -0.847(1) -31.832(0)* -31.859(0)* -31.862(0)* 
PWE -1.548(1) -1.134(1) -0.749(1) -27.864(0)* -27.913(0)* -27.889(0)* 
RBA -1.848(1) -1.617(1) -1.022(1) -33.042(0)* -33.049(0)* -33.073(0)* 
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Table A2.3.con't 
 
 
    
    
Level 
    
First 
Differences   
Ticker on 
NYSE/Exchange 
Rate 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
trend 
none Intercept 
Intercept 
and trend 
none 
 
RCI -1.611(1) -1.252(1) -0.821(1) -26.034(0)* -26.071(0)* -26.056(0)* 
RY -1.607(1) -1.242(1) -0.825(1) -26.557(0)* -26.595(0)* -26.580(0)* 
SLF -1.718(1) -1.421(1) -0.933(1) -27.302(0)* -27.325(0)* -27.327(0)* 
SLW -1.612(1) -1.280(1) -0.842(1) -30.772(0)* -30.800(0)* -30.800(0)* 
STN -1.684(1) -1.345(1) -0.876(1) -27.203(0)* -27.236(0)* -27.227(0)* 
SU -1.566(1) -1.202(1) -0.801(1) -26.781(0)* -26.819(0)* -26.804(0)* 
TAC -1.635(1) -1.292(1) -0.847(1) -23.897(0)* -23.933(0)* -23.918(0)* 
TC -1.608(1) -1.309(1) -0.882(1) -29.928(0)* -29.948(0)* -29.956(0)* 
TCK -6.101(1)* -6.329(1)* -4.179(1)* -37.580(0)* -37.544(0)* -37.618(0)* 
TD -1.551(4) -1.279(4) -0.852(4) -10.639(3)* -10.688(3)* -10.649(3)* 
THI -1.603(1) -1.246(1) -0.826(1) -24.779(0)* -24.800(0)* -24.816(0)* 
TLM -1.603(1) -1.243(1) -0.810(1) -27.213(0)* -27.250(0)* -27.236(0)* 
TRI NA NA NA NA NA NA 
TRP -1.555(3) -1.256(3) -0.847(3) -12.466(2)* -12.508(2)* -12.477(2)* 
TU -1.512(2) -1.151(2) -0.598(2) -16.556(1)* -16.606(1)* -16.571(1)* 
UFS -2.591(1) -2.542(1) -1.570(1) -31.900(0)* -31.886(0)* -31.931(0)* 
Exchange rate -1.616(1) -1.258(1) -0.871(1) -21.355(0)* -21.396(0)* -21.396(0)* 
Notes: 
1. * implies significance at the 1% level 
2. ADF statistic is obtained by estimating the following:                    
 
            ,  where   is the 
difference operator,         are parameters to be estimated,    is the time series whose time series properties are examined, and 
   is the white-noise.  
3. The lags of dependent variable used to obtain white-noise residuals (in parenthesis) are determined using the Schwartz-
Bayesian Criterion (SBIC) 
4. The null and the alternative hypothesis are respectively     (series is non-stationary) and     (series is stationary) 
5. The 1% significance critical values are based on Enders (1995). They are -3.441, -3.980, and -2.580 for a model with constant, 
constant and trend, and neither, respectively.  
6. TRI doesn’t have the trading data for the full sample period, and therefore is excluded from the analysis. 
7. Each ticker represents the difference between the corresponding stock price on the TSX and NYSE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -143- 
 
Appendix 3 
Table A3.1.  List of Companies and (ticker symbol on NYSE) (in alphabetical order) 
Agnico-Eagle Mines (AEM) Cott Corporation (COT) Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (RBA) 
Agrium Inc. (AGU) Domtar Corporation (UFS) Rogers Communications (RCI) 
AuRico Gold (AUQ) Enbridge Inc (ENB) Royal Bank of Canada (RY) 
Bank Nova Scotia (BNS) Enerplus Corp. (ERF) Silver Wheaton Corp (SLW) 
Bank of Montreal (BMO) Enterra Trust (ENT) Stantec Inc (STN) 
Barrick Gold Corp. (ABX) Goldcorp Inc. (GG) Sun Life Financial Inc. (SLF) 
Baytex Energy (BTE) Iamgold Corp (IAG) Suncor Energy (SU) 
BCE Inc. (BCE) Intertape Polymer GP (ITPOF) Talisman Energy Inc. (TLM) 
Biovail Corp (BVF) Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. (IVN) Teck Resources (TCK) 
CAE Inc. (CAE) Kingsway Financial Services (KFS) Thompson Creek Metals (TC) 
Cameco Corporation (CCJ) Kinross Gold Corp. (KGC) Tim Hortons Inc (THI) 
Canadian Imperial Bank (CM) Manulife Financial Corp. (MFC) TransAlta Corporation (TAC) 
Canadian National Railway (CNI) MDC Partners (MDC) TransCanada Corp. (TRP) 
Canadian Natural Resources (CNQ) Nexen Inc (NXY) Yamana Gold (AUY) 
Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) North American Energy (NOA) 
 Celestica Inc. (CLS) Penn West Petrolium (PWE) 
 CGI Group (GIB) Potash Corporation (POT) 
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Table A3.2.  Variable Construction and Description 
Variable 
name 
Construction Description 
USvolshare 
                              
                                                        
 
The share of trading occuring on 
the NYSE 
relavol 
                                       
                                       
  
The ratio of the average daily 
volume on the TSX relative to the 
average daily volume on the NYSE 
relvolvolatility 
    
 
   
   
The ratio of the variance of the 
daily trading volume on the TSX 
relative to the variance of the daily 
trading volume on the NYSE 
lyears N/ A 
Natural logarithm of the number of 
years the stock was listed on the 
NYSE prior to 2008 
lavcap ln( 
                           
                       
) 
Natural logarithm of the stock's 
average market capitalization over 
the sample period 
exmove 
1 if      is significant in the VECM estimation; 0 
otherwise 
Dummy variable capturing the 
financial crisis feedback to the 
exchange rage 
financial 
1 if the stock is classified in the financial industry on the 
finance.yahoo.com website; 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable for stocks in the 
financial industry 
materials 
1 if the stock is classified in the materials industry on the 
finance.yahoo.com website; 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable for stocks in the 
materials industry 
technology 
1 if the stock is classified in the technology industry on the 
finance.yahoo.com website; 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable for stocks in the 
technology industry 
services 
1 if the stock is classified in the services industry on the 
finance.yahoo.com website; 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable for stocks in the 
services industry 
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Table A3.3.  Description of the dependent variables in cross-sectional regression (U.S.) 
Variable Announcements Description 
usbuildan Building permits Announcement about number of new building permits issued 
consconfan Consumer confidence Report about level of consumer confidence 
Uscpian U.S. CPI U.S. Inflation report 
Usgdpan U.S. GDP Announcements about growth in the U.S. GDP 
Usmisan Miscellaneous Days when Fed. Chairman testified in front of Congress 
Usintan Fed Funds rate Interest rate announcements by the Federal Reserve  
Fedan FOMC minutes Minutes from the Open Market Committee meetings 
nonfarman Non-farm payrolls U.S. Unemployment report 
Usppian U.S. PPI U.S. Inflation report 
  Surprises  Description 
usbuildsur Building permits Surprise in the number of new building permits issued 
consconfsur Consumer confidence Surprise in the consumer confidence level 
Uscpisur U.S. CPI Surprise in the U.S. inflation 
usgdpsur U.S. GDP Surprise in growth of the U.S. GDP 
Usunsur U.S. Unemployment Surprise in the U.S. unemployment 
Usintsur Fed Funds rate Surprise in the Fed Funds rate 
ushoussur U.S. new housing starts Surprise in the new housing starts 
nonfarmsur Non-farm payrolls Surprise in the U.S. unemployment 
Usppisur U.S. PPI Surprise in the U.S. inflation 
 
Table A3.4.  Description of the dependent variables in cross-sectional regression (Canada) 
Variable Announcements Description 
canbuildan Building permits Announcement about number of new building permits issued. 
cancpian Canadian CPI Canadian Inflation report. 
cangdpan Canadian GDP Announcements about growth in the Canadian GDP. 
canhousan New Housing starts Announcements about new housing starts. 
canintan Canadian interest rate Announcements about the level of Canadian interest rate. 
bocan Bank of Canada minutes Report by the Bank of Canada about state of the economy. 
canunan Canadian unemployment Canadian unemployment report. 
  Surprises  Description 
canbuildsur Building permits Surprise in the number of new building permits issued. 
cancpisur Canadian CPI Surprise in the Canadian inflation. 
cangdpsur Canadian GDP Surprise in growth of the Canadian GDP 
canhoussur New Housing starts Surprise in the Canadian new housing starts. 
canintsur Canadian interest rate Surprise in the Canadian interest rate. 
canunsur Canadian interest rate Surprsise in the Canadian unemployment.  
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